John I. Laskin

The appellants appealed a judgment finding negligent criminal defence representation and awarding general and special damages to the former client.

Negligence was conceded on appeal, and the dispute concerned causation and quantification of damages.

The court held that the special damage awards relating to the respondent's mother's legal fees and Legal Aid payments were unsupported.

The majority upheld recoverability of mental distress damages in principle but reduced the award to $15,000 after finding no evidentiary basis to attribute family estrangement to counsel's negligence.

The appellant challenged a criminal conviction on the grounds that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in refusing a mistrial.

The court held that, although the case was circumstantial, the cumulative effect of the evidence, particularly the pathologist’s opinion and an unsigned letter, supported a verdict that a properly instructed trier of fact could reasonably render.

The court further held that the trial judge did not err in declining to grant a mistrial and that two letters tendered on appeal did not satisfy the Palmer criteria for admissibility as fresh evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed only the assessment of damages following a negligence finding against criminal defence counsel arising from the handling of an abduction prosecution and plea discussions.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent could not recover amounts paid toward his mother's legal fees or amounts paid by Legal Aid, as those losses were not legally attributable to the appellants.

The majority further held that while the trial judge erred in linking the respondent's family estrangement to counsel's negligence, the expert psychiatric evidence supported a reduced award for depression caused by the negligent conduct of the defence.

The damages award was reduced to $15,000, with prejudgment interest and trial costs preserved on the basis fixed below.

The appellant, a young offender, appealed conviction and sentence, arguing that a videotaped police statement was inadmissible because it was a continuation of earlier inadmissible statements.

The Court of Appeal held that the governing authority did not establish hard and fast rules on admissibility where the statutory criteria had been met, and upheld the trial judge’s findings that the statement was not tainted and that the appellant wanted to acknowledge responsibility.

The court found no error in admitting the videotaped statement.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence of four months open custody and community service was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellants challenged the valuation of dissenting shareholders' shares in a closed-end investment holding company, arguing that fair value should have been determined by net asset value rather than stock market trading price.

The court held that the appropriate valuation methodology depends on the facts of each case and accepted expert evidence that market price was the better indicator in light of the issuer's nature, the illiquidity of some portfolio assets, and the trading history of the shares.

The court found it was open to the applications judge to prefer that expert evidence and concluded there was no error in adopting the market value approach.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for attempted murder arising from a shooting in which the complainant survived a gunshot wound to the head.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge’s instructions on accidental discharge and intent were confusing, legally flawed, and improperly focused on capacity when capacity was not in issue.

The court further found that the absence of a sharp limiting instruction on highly prejudicial bad character evidence, including drug use, trafficking, gang affiliation, and illegal handgun possession, undermined trial fairness.

The court also noted improper Crown submissions inviting speculation on motive and planning.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 810.1 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the child-protection recognizance regime created a status offence, was overbroad, and was impermissibly vague, and further challenged the availability of arrest and detention procedures in such proceedings.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 810.1 is preventive, not punitive, and is directed at assessing present risk of future harm to children rather than punishing status.

The court found the regime sufficiently tailored and procedurally safeguarded, upheld the reading down of 'shall' to 'may' in s. 810.1(2), and confirmed that ss. 507(4) and 515 apply to s. 810.1 proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to recover deposit monies on the basis that they were impressed with a trust if the underlying transaction failed to close.

The court held that the appellant met neither branch of the Quistclose requirements because the monies were advanced and used as a deposit for their intended purpose.

The respondents also had no notice at the time the monies were provided that any trust obligation attached to them.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Police entered private commercial property at night after observing circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of a break-in or theft.

Upon contact with the property owner, the officer observed signs of impairment, arrested the owner for care and control, and force was used during the ensuing resistance.

The court held the officer's entry was authorized by an implied invitation extending to protective investigation of suspected crime against the property, so no s. 8 search occurred.

The court further held the arrest was lawful, rejected ss. 7 and 9 arguments, upheld findings that the force used was not excessive, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant challenged a partial summary judgment arising from a dispute over whether an oral agreement had been made in the spring of 1997 and whether its terms were breached.

The majority held that the existence and terms of the alleged oral agreement raised a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court concluded that only after those factual issues were resolved could the legal enforceability of the agreement be determined.

The appeal was allowed, the partial summary judgment was set aside, and the respondent's summary judgment motion was dismissed with costs to the appellant.

The appellants sought to set aside a sentence order directing forfeiture of cash bail toward restitution arising from a break and enter and theft involving the release of mink from a fur farm.

The Crown conceded that the Criminal Code did not authorize forfeiture of bail money to satisfy a restitution order, and the court quashed that portion of the sentence.

The majority held, however, that it should not direct payment of the bail funds to third-party family members and a friend who had supplied the money, particularly given possible competing creditor claims and the unsuitability of criminal proceedings to adjudicate such disputes.

Requests for costs and interest against the Crown were also denied.

A dissent would have ordered the bail money returned directly to the third-party funders ex debito justitiae.

On an appeal from a Rule 21 determination in a fatal motor vehicle case, the court held that family members' independent nervous shock claims were barred by s. 266 of the Insurance Act because the claimants themselves did not meet the statutory threshold.

However, the majority held that s. 61(1) of the Family Law Act permits recovery for a family member's pecuniary loss in the form of lost income resulting from the death, and is not confined to loss of expected financial benefits from the deceased.

Because the trial judge later took the opposite view and made no necessary factual findings on causation and loss, the trial judgment was set aside and a new trial ordered on the loss of income claim.

No costs were awarded because success was divided.

Parents appealed from a trial judgment arising out of their son's death in a motor vehicle accident.

The court held that awards under s. 61(2)(e) of the Family Law Act for loss of care, guidance and companionship were low but within range and should not be disturbed.

Applying the deduction analysis under s. 267 of the Insurance Act, the court held that only statutory death benefits, and not no-fault wage-loss or disability benefits, were deductible from those awards because the death benefits were akin to the compensable loss.

The court also held, by reference to the companion appeal, that a loss of income claim under s. 61(1) could proceed and ordered a new trial on that issue.