John I. Laskin

The appellants challenged a Divisional Court decision that held development lands zoned for industrial and commercial use could not receive farm land assessment treatment because agricultural use was illegal under the zoning by-laws.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 19(3) of the Assessment Act focuses on actual use of the land as a factual matter, not on zoning legality, and that the ordinary meaning of the provision should govern absent compelling contrary indicators.

The court found no basis to read the word “lawfully” into the statute, noted the legislative scheme and policy favoured continued agricultural production, and concluded the Ontario Municipal Board reasonably found the lands were farm lands used only for farm purposes.

The appeal was allowed, the Divisional Court order was set aside, and the Board's order was restored.

The appellant borrower agreed under a commercial loan arrangement to pay the lender's actual legal fees and authorized the lender to debit its account for those fees.

After the lender paid its solicitors from the appellant's account over the appellant's objection and without providing meaningful billing detail, the appellant sought an assessment under the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 11 applied because the bills had been paid, but that the contractual wording did not preclude assessment and did not amount to a waiver.

Special circumstances existed because the payment was made over objection, the third party payer had virtually no information about the work done, and only an assessment could determine whether the fees actually fell within the contractual obligation.

The appeal was allowed, an assessment was directed, privilege issues were left to the assessment officer, and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant appealed a fraud conviction and an 18-month custodial sentence arising from an undisclosed conflict of interest.

The court held that the jury instruction on deprivation was correct and consistent with governing fraud authorities, so the conviction appeal failed.

On sentence, the court declined to substitute a conditional sentence, emphasizing the amount involved, the prolonged conduct, and the breach of trust.

However, the court found inadequate recognition of sentencing disparity with the co-accused and reduced the custodial term to 9 months.

The appellant appealed a 12-month sentence for aggravated assault and sought a conditional sentence followed by probation.

The court emphasized the appellant's youth, first-offender status, remorse, positive pre-sentence report, strong family supervision, and the trial judge's finding that he was not a danger to the community.

In light of recent Supreme Court of Canada conditional sentencing decisions, the court held that denunciation and general deterrence could still be achieved by a conditional sentence in this case.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence was converted to an 18-month conditional sentence followed by 9 months probation.

The appellant, a young person, appealed an order transferring him to adult court for numerous offences including robbery, unlawful confinement, and related property offences.

The Court of Appeal held that the youth court judge erred in concluding that the maximum youth sentence was inadequate to protect the public and failed to give sufficient weight to the appellant's excellent progress in secure custody.

The court found that the objectives of public protection and rehabilitation could be reconciled within the youth justice system.

The appeal was allowed and the Crown's transfer application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for first degree murder and related offences arising from the kidnapping, confinement, sexual assault, and deaths of two teenage victims.

He admitted the predicate offences and argued that another participant alone committed the killings, leaving him guilty only of manslaughter.

The court rejected challenges to the admission of similar fact evidence and expert evidence on battered woman syndrome, found no reversible error in the jury charge on burden of proof, party liability, or credibility, and upheld the jury selection procedure under s. 635(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was dismissed in full.

Sentence appeal by an aboriginal offender who pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault and aggravated assault committed several hours apart against different victims while in a continuous state of extreme intoxication.

The court held the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and to the systemic and background factors bearing on the offender's circumstances.

The court also found error in failing to consider the nexus between the offences and the resulting totality of consecutive sentences.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the assault sentence was made concurrent.

The appellant employer appealed liability only from a wrongful dismissal judgment, arguing the trial judge applied the wrong legal test for constructive dismissal.

The court held that constructive dismissal is not confined to unilateral changes to a specific fundamental contractual term and may also arise where the employer's conduct objectively repudiates the entire employment relationship.

On the factual findings, a series of unjustified criticisms, warning letters, and probation made continued employment intolerable.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Crown appealed from the dismissal of a summary conviction appeal after the accused was acquitted of impaired care or control and care or control over 80.

The Court of Appeal held that, to establish care or control of a motor vehicle, the accused's act or conduct in relation to the vehicle must create a risk of danger, whether by putting the vehicle in motion or in some other way.

Reconciling the Supreme Court authorities, the court concluded that an inoperable vehicle may still ground liability if it presents some danger in the hands of an impaired person, but no such danger was established on the facts presented.

It was therefore open to the trial judge to conclude that an impaired person sitting in an immovable vehicle in a ditch while waiting for a tow truck was not in care or control.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed and no costs were awarded.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge failed to leave simple possession with the jury as an included offence.

The court held that a jury must be instructed on both the principal offence and any included offences supported by the evidence.

Given the live issue over whether any possession proven was for the purpose of trafficking, the omission was an error.

Applying the governing included-offence authorities, the court found the error could not be cured and ordered a new trial.

The sentence appeal was not addressed.

The appellant province appealed a judgment concerning the designation of First Nations bands as delivery agents under the Ontario Works Act.

The Court of Appeal resolved the dispute narrowly by declaring that, in light of the 1965 Welfare Agreement, the minister's powers under s. 38 had to be exercised with the consent of the band.

The court set aside the judgment below, established a process by which bands could indicate non-consent and obtain immediate revocation of designation, and left existing designations temporarily in place pending that choice.

The court expressly declined to determine the broader constitutional issues addressed below.

The appellants challenged a judgment upholding a municipality's distraint of chattels for unpaid taxes.

The Court of Appeal held the motion judge was entitled to find that the taxpayer had at least constructive possession of the chattels at the time of distraint, notwithstanding that the taxpayer had vacated the premises where they were kept.

The court further held that the sale of the chattels occurred before the taxpayer's bankruptcy, rendering the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the cited appellate authority inapplicable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed both conviction for attempted murder and an eight-year penitentiary sentence arising from a stabbing of his wife.

The Court of Appeal rejected arguments that the trial judge ignored a reasonable doubt, reversed the burden of proof, improperly treated psychiatric evidence concerning specific intent, or wrongly relied on post-offence statements.

On sentence, the court held that protection of the spouse was the dominant consideration and that the appellant’s mental illness did not necessarily reduce the otherwise fit sentence where the illness created future risk.

Fresh evidence concerning day parole and psychiatric conditions of release did not justify appellate intervention.

The appellant challenged a Commercial List order refusing an adjournment and dismissing its appeal from the disallowance of a proof of claim in a winding-up proceeding for want of prosecution.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge was aware of the full context, including the appellant's prolonged inaction, failure to file responding materials, and failure to explain either the asserted conflict with counsel or the delay.

The court rejected the appellant's procedural fairness argument and found no error in the exercise of discretion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed from a directed issue trial arising out of a dispute over the right to provide cable television services to apartment buildings after the landlord terminated its long-standing arrangement and entered into an exclusive agreement with a competitor.

The Court of Appeal held that the landlord's relationship with the appellant was governed by a contract that permitted termination, and the landlord's lawful exercise of that contractual right could not ground the appellant's tort claim.

Because the contractual component was dispositive, it was unnecessary for the trial judge or the appellate court to determine the broader intentional interference with economic relations issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The requesting state appealed an order discharging fugitives at an extradition hearing on heroin conspiracy charges.

The Court of Appeal held that the extradition judge misapplied s. 18(1)(b) of the Extradition Act by focusing on proof of the foreign offences and territorial situs rather than asking whether the conduct underlying the foreign charges, wherever it occurred, would if committed in Canada establish a prima facie case of any Canadian extradition offence.

Applying the proper conduct-based double criminality analysis, the court found sufficient evidence of conspiracy to traffic in heroin and trafficking in heroin to justify committal.

The fugitives' separate application alleging a 25-month appellate delay under s. 7 of the Charter was dismissed because they took no steps to expedite the appeal and showed no real prejudice affecting fairness.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its solicitor's negligence action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was barred from relitigating the previously determined issue that recission was unavailable in the underlying commercial action, and therefore could not maintain negligence allegations premised on the solicitor's failure to plead recission.

However, the court accepted that the statement of claim also contained distinct negligence allegations unrelated to recission.

The appeal was allowed in part, the recission-based claims remained barred, and the remaining negligence claims were permitted to proceed.

No costs were awarded because success was divided.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for second degree murder arising from a spousal shooting in a case where intent was the sole issue and the Crown’s case was entirely circumstantial.

The majority held that the trial judge erred by providing the deliberating jury with only the Crown’s closing address after the jury requested it, without also providing the defence closing address.

The court found that closing addresses are persuasive advocacy, and fairness required balanced access where the case turned on competing inferences rather than direct evidence.

The majority concluded the imbalance created serious prejudice and that the curative proviso could not be applied.

A dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice.

The Crown appealed from the dismissal of its appeal from an acquittal on a provincial offences charge under s. 84.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The respondent's truck lost the dual wheels, hub and axle on one side as a single unit, but the wheels themselves did not separate from their fasteners.

Applying the modern approach to statutory interpretation, the court held that s. 84.1 addresses the specific public safety concern of "flying wheels" and applies only when the wheel itself separates from the vehicle.

Because the wheel fastening mechanism did not fail and only a larger assembly detached, the acquittal was properly upheld.

The appellants sought to restore a motion order extending the time for service of a statement of claim issued within the limitation period but not served before the service deadline expired.

The court held that the controlling question was whether the respondent would suffer prejudice caused by the delay, and confirmed that while the onus remained on the plaintiffs, a defendant asserting prejudice had at least an evidentiary obligation to provide some particulars.

The court further held that a defendant could not manufacture prejudice by failing to take reasonable steps earlier to preserve evidence, and that prejudice unrelated to the delayed service was irrelevant.

The appeal was allowed, the Divisional Court order was set aside, and the original extension order was restored.