Lee A. Pinelli

The applicant sought judicial review of a Superior Court judge's decision made under the Building Code Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, holding that certiorari is not available to challenge a decision of a Superior Court judge absent exceptional circumstances, which were not present.

The Court also declined to transfer the proceeding to the Court of Appeal under s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act, noting that an application for judicial review is distinct from an appeal and the time to appeal had expired.

The appellant municipality appealed a declaration that the respondents had established legal non-conforming uses for outdoor storage and business operations on their agriculturally zoned lands.

The appellant argued the application judge unreasonably preferred the respondents' witness testimony over historical aerial photographs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the application judge's factual findings and no palpable or overriding error.

The Minister of Transportation appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Ontario Municipal Board compensation award for expropriated land.

The dispute centered on the 'before and after' valuation method, specifically whether development and delay costs were double-counted when calculating the 'after' value of the remaining parcel.

The Court of Appeal found that deducting the full development costs while also factoring in the betterment of the remaining lands amounted to double-counting.

The appeal was allowed, and the compensation payable to the respondent was reduced from $1,110,344 to $623,121.

The Minister of Transportation appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision awarding the respondent $1,110,348 for the expropriation of a portion of her land.

The Minister argued the Board erred by deducting development and delay costs from the 'after value' of the remaining land, contending the compensation should be lower.

The Divisional Court applied a correctness standard of review and upheld the Board's decision, finding that the Board correctly applied the 'before and after' valuation method and properly interpreted the Expropriations Act regarding market value and injurious affection.

The complainant, a part-time firefighter with a visual impairment, applied for a full-time position.

He was denied employment because his visual impairment prevented him from obtaining a class F licence, which was required to operate the town's ambulance.

The Board of Inquiry found that the requirement to hold a class F licence was prima facie discriminatory.

The respondents failed to establish that the requirement was a bona fide occupational requirement, as they did not properly consider whether the complainant could be accommodated by performing firefighting duties only, without undue hardship.

The Board concluded that the respondents discriminated against the complainant on the basis of disability.

In a human rights complaint alleging discrimination in employment because of handicap, the complainant sought a remedy that included the development of an accommodation policy for the respondent.

The adjudicator granted the firefighters' association leave to intervene to make submissions confined to the issue of the accommodation policy, recognizing its significant interest in the terms of such an order.

The Ancaster Professional Firefighters' Association sought leave to intervene in a human rights complaint alleging discrimination in employment because of handicap.

The Commission requested a remedy that included the development of an accommodation policy for the respondent.

The adjudicator granted the Association leave to intervene to make oral and written submissions confined to the issue of the accommodation policy, recognizing its significant interest in the terms of such an order.

The appellants challenged a judgment upholding a municipality's distraint of chattels for unpaid taxes.

The Court of Appeal held the motion judge was entitled to find that the taxpayer had at least constructive possession of the chattels at the time of distraint, notwithstanding that the taxpayer had vacated the premises where they were kept.

The court further held that the sale of the chattels occurred before the taxpayer's bankruptcy, rendering the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the cited appellate authority inapplicable.

The appeal was dismissed.