John I. Laskin

The appellant estate representative challenged a trial judgment finding that a deceased had made a $195,000 inter vivos gift to the respondent rather than creating a resulting trust.

The Court of Appeal held that the corroboration requirement in s. 13 of the Evidence Act, and the rebuttal of the presumption of resulting trust, are both governed by the civil standard of proof on a balance of probabilities, albeit with careful scrutiny of the evidence.

The court upheld the rejection of hearsay evidence from the deceased's accountant as unreliable and found that the deceased's detailed holograph will, which omitted any reference to the transfer while expressly dealing with other loans and assets, independently corroborated the respondent's evidence that the transfer was a gift.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple historical sexual offences arising from alleged abuse over a six-year period beginning when the complainant was a child.

The appeal focused on expert psychiatric evidence describing trauma symptoms and a 24-factor assessment tool said to be consistent with sexual abuse, as well as the adequacy of the jury charge on that evidence.

The majority held that substantial parts of the psychiatrist’s evidence amounted to impermissible oath-helping because it conveyed a belief in the complainant’s truthfulness, and that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury against that use.

Given that credibility was central and there was no independent evidence of abuse, the convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

A dissenting judge would have dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant challenged a family law decision upholding a trial judgment that granted the respondent unsupervised access, found the appellant in contempt, and awarded costs against her.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge carefully reviewed the evidence, made findings of fact amply supported by the record, applied the relevant legal principles, and properly exercised discretion on costs.

The appeal was characterized as an improper attempt to re-try the case and was dismissed in all respects.

The cross-appeal was also rejected, except that any remaining issues were left to be addressed in the Ontario Court on proper application.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction and advanced, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel and improper use of evidence connected to a bail hearing.

Applying the governing two-part framework, the court held the proposed fresh evidence established neither incompetence nor a miscarriage of justice, and found the suggested alternative trial strategy would have exposed the appellant to highly prejudicial bad character evidence.

The court also held that the impugned questioning did not engage s. 13 of the Charter and did not violate s. 7 because the appellant was not confronted with his prior bail testimony and the reply evidence regarding the bail document was inconsequential.

The application to admit fresh evidence was dismissed and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction arising from a motel room encounter where the central issue was consent and credibility.

The court held that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that a deliberately false explanation could be used as circumstantial evidence of guilt without first requiring extrinsic or independent evidence that the explanation was concocted.

Given the nature of the case, the jury's difficulties, and the risk that the burden of proof was distorted, the curative proviso could not be applied.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed following a guilty plea to aggravated assault arising from a stabbing that caused near-fatal injuries.

The majority held that the trial judge crafted a sentence that appropriately responded to the circumstances, including significant restrictions on liberty over four and a half years, and found no error warranting appellate intervention.

Fresh psychiatric evidence indicating the respondent's mental state was stable and that he presented no risk to the community reinforced that conclusion.

A dissenting judge would have set aside the conditional sentence and imposed a 12-month custodial sentence plus probation.

The appellant appealed a sentence of fifteen months' imprisonment imposed after a guilty plea to production of 102 marijuana plants.

The court held that the sentence was outside the appropriate range, noting the absence of a prior record, the absence of evidence of trafficking, and recent Supreme Court of Canada guidance on conditional sentences.

Applying the principle that a conditional sentence is likely a better sanction where both punitive and restorative objectives can be achieved, the court substituted a conditional sentence of fifteen months commencing on the date of judgment.

The appeal concerned whether an assault on a taxi driver by passengers following a fare dispute constituted an "accident" under s. 1 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

Applying the Amos purpose and causation test, as confirmed for the SABS context by prior appellate authority, the court held that the assault was the end product of the commercial relationship created by the taxi ride and that an unbroken chain of causation linked the use and operation of the taxi to the injuries.

The motions judge's factual findings were upheld.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appeal concerned whether an assault on a taxi driver following a fare dispute qualified as an accident under s. 1 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

Applying the purpose test and causation test from Amos, as confirmed in Ontario appellate authority, the court held that the assault was the end product of the commercial relationship created by the taxi ride and that an unbroken line of causation connected the ride to the injuries.

The court agreed that the injuries were caused, at least indirectly, by the use and operation of the taxicab.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged an order enforcing a settlement allegedly formed through correspondence between solicitors in a property dispute.

The Court of Appeal majority held that the motions judge made no reversible error in finding a binding settlement and in refusing to set it aside for unilateral mistake.

A dissenting judge would have found that the surrounding circumstances should have alerted the respondents to the mistake in the offer and would have set aside the settlement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged a summary conviction appeal court decision that had interfered with a trial acquittal on the first count in an animal welfare prosecution.

The Court of Appeal held that there was evidence on which the trial judge could reasonably make the necessary findings and that the summary conviction appeal court judge erred in law by treating the verdict as perverse.

On the cross-appeal, the prosecuting society argued that the respondent should have been convicted on a second count for failing to authorize veterinary treatment, but the court held the evidence could not support a finding of wilful neglect or failure to provide suitable and adequate care.

Leave was granted on both matters, the appeal was allowed, the cross-appeal was dismissed, and no costs were ordered.

The appellant physician appealed the refusal to replace the future care and gross-up components of a personal injury judgment with periodic payments under s. 116 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal held that where a plaintiff seeks gross-up, periodic payments are presumptively required unless the plaintiff shows they are not in the plaintiff's best interests, having regard to all the circumstances.

The trial judge properly treated the inquiry globally, accepted that the plaintiff's financial plan need not be confined to future care spending, and was entitled to consider the lack of a guarantee period, the structure's inflexibility, and concerns about prosthetic innovation and medical-cost inflation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appeal concerned whether a statutory accident benefits settlement notice complied with the commuted value disclosure requirement under s. 9.1(2), para. 5 of the Automobile Insurance Regulation.

The court held that a description of the maximum statutory accident benefits available to the insured was not a commuted value of those benefits, and that the notice provided did not satisfy the regulation.

The insured was therefore entitled to rescind the settlement under s. 9.1(4).

The court dismissed the appeal, while clarifying that an insurer may determine commuted value based on the information available if done in good faith and with clear factual assumptions.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to a former chief financial officer and consultant arising from a stock option plan.

The central issue was whether a termination provision ending options when the optionee ceased to be an employee applied to a participant who was found at trial to be a consultant rather than a true employee.

The court held that, on a fair reading of the plan as a whole, the terms 'employee' and 'eligible participant' were used interchangeably, so the termination provision applied to all persons granted options under the plan.

Because the respondent did not exercise his options before ending his relationship with the company, his rights under the option agreement had terminated.

The appeal was allowed, the trial judgment was set aside, and the action was dismissed with costs.

Appeal from a trial judgment concerning interpretation of a share purchase agreement for the sale of a life insurance company.

The dispute was whether post-closing industry-wide compensation assessments, calculated using pre-closing premium income, were payable by the vendors or the purchasers.

The court held that the assessments were liabilities arising in the years they were levied, not in the years used to calculate them, and that the agreement required the purchasers to pay them.

The court further held that the negotiation evidence supported that reading and that the general indemnity clause did not displace the specific allocation in the contract.

Appeal allowed, trial judgment set aside, and the action dismissed.

The appellant inventory financier appealed a conversion judgment arising from the seizure and sale of a boat delivered to a dealer for resale.

Assuming without deciding that the dealer held the boat on consignment and lacked title, the court held that the financier could rely on s. 2(1) of the Factors Act because it took its chattel mortgage in good faith and without notice of any lack of authority.

The court rejected the trial judge's conclusion that good faith under s. 2(1) includes a due diligence requirement, holding instead that good faith means honesty, even if conduct is negligent.

The action was dismissed and the appellant received trial and appeal costs.

In this occupier’s liability appeal arising from a slip and fall, the appellant challenged the jury’s findings on liability and damages as unreasonable, while the plaintiff cross-appealed the reduction of damages, the failure to award pre-judgment interest, and related matters.

The court upheld the jury’s liability finding, holding there was evidence of negligence including water on the floor, absence of mats, and absence of signs.

The court declined to interfere with the jury’s general damages award, but set aside the special damages award for lack of evidentiary foundation and reduced the Family Law Act award to the husband.

The cross-appeal succeeded to the extent that the 20 percent reduction in the plaintiff’s damages was deleted and pre-judgment interest was ordered.

No costs were awarded on the appeal or cross-appeal.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing the wrongful dismissal portion of her action at the opening of trial on the basis that the claim was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion record and pleadings did not properly set up reliance on the prior human rights proceeding, and in any event the prior decision did not determine the same question for issue estoppel purposes.

The prior tribunal may have addressed disability-related dismissal, but it did not adjudicate the pleaded allegation that the employer acted precipitously and in bad faith in terminating employment.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal order was set aside, and no costs were ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for unlawful cultivation of marijuana based on evidence seized under a warrant-authorized search of his home.

He argued that the warrant lacked reasonable grounds and that inaccuracies in the supporting information required the warrant to be quashed, with the resulting evidence excluded under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court held that the anonymous tip, police observations, and hydro consumption evidence, assessed on the corrected and amplified record, met the reasonable grounds threshold under the governing authorities.

The court further held that the misstatements were not deliberate, did not seriously mislead the issuing justice, and did not invalidate the warrant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought review of a single judge’s order refusing an extension of time to appeal the dismissal of two civil actions tried together, one arising from a motor vehicle accident and the other from an alleged solicitor negligence claim connected to earlier accident litigation.

The court gave the applicant the benefit of the doubt on delay but held there was no basis to disturb the single judge’s conclusion that the proposed appeal lacked sufficient merit.

The proposed appeal turned primarily on credibility findings and factual determinations, including the treatment of medical evidence based on incomplete or inaccurate histories.

The application was dismissed with costs.