[Indexed as: Saharkhiz v. Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd's London]
Mehdi Saharkhiz, (Respondent) v. M. J. Oppenheim in his quality as Attorney in Fact in Canada for Underwriters, Members of Lloyds, London, England, (Appellant)
Ontario Court of Appeal Labrosse, Laskin, Moldaver D.A. Heard: May 24, 2000 Judgment: May 25, 2000 Docket: CA C331 16 Donald H. Rogers, Q.C. and Michael K. Walter, for Appellant. David B. Hinzelfarb, for Respondent.
APPEAL from judgment reported at (1999), (sub nom. Saharkhiz v. Underwriters, Meinhers of Lloyd's, London, England 15C.C.L.I.(3d) 104, 50 M.V.R. (3d) 223, 46 O.R. (3d) 154 (Ont. S.C.J.), that assault upon taxi driver constituted "accident" within meaning of
Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.
Per curiam:
This appeal involves the meaning of an "accident" within s. 1 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule for accidents after December 31, 1993 and before November 1, 1996 (0. Reg. 776/93) ("SABS").
The respondent, a taxi driver, was assaulted outside his taxicab on June 8, 1996, as a result of an argument stemming from the refusal by two customers to pay their fare. The respondent was seriously injured.
The issue is whether the assault is an "accident" within the meaning of s. 1 of the SABS, that is, "an incident in which directly or indirectly, the use or operation of an automobile causes an impairment", entitling the respondent to statutory accident benefits.
Lederman J. (the "motions judge") found in favour of the respondent. The appellant appeals this decision.
The motions judge, relying on the liberal approach pronounced by Major J. in Amos v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [1995]3S.C.R.405(S.C.C.), applied the "purpose test" and the "causation test" to the facts before him. In Vijeyekumar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1999), 44O.R.(3d)545(Ont. C.A.), this court confirmed that the provision considered in Amos was sufficiently similar to the definition of "accident" in s. 1 of the SABS that the Amos test may be applied to this definition.
The motions judge was therefore correct in applying the Amos test to the facts of this case. He found that the assault was the end product of the commercial relationship that had been created when the ride in the taxicab had started. He also found that an unbroken line of causation existed, beginning with the ride in the taxicab and ending with the assault.
He thus concluded that the injuries sustained by the respondent were caused, at least indirectly, by the use and operation of the taxicab.
The motions judge did not misapprehend or fail to appreciate the evidence. His findings and the inferences he drew are well founded on the evidence. We agree with his analysis and conclusion.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.