Harry S. LaForme

The appellant sued her father for damages arising from childhood sexual abuse.

The father had previously been convicted of criminal offences based on the same conduct.

At the civil trial, the father adduced evidence from his two sons, who claimed they had committed the abuse, not him.

The trial judge accepted this evidence and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in permitting the father to relitigate the underlying facts of his criminal conviction.

The evidence of the sons was not 'fresh evidence' as it was known prior to the criminal trial, and allowing the relitigation constituted an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment determining the ownership of a property in favour of the Estate of Samuel Lallman.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence or the admission of discovery evidence.

The court also upheld the relief granted against a non-party to one of the proceedings and rejected the defence of laches.

The appellant appealed an order dissolving a constructive trust imposed on the shares of a joint venture vehicle.

The constructive trust had been imposed to secure the repayment of a loan and the payment of the appellant's share of the joint venture profits.

After the respondents paid the amounts owing, they moved to discharge the trust to utilize accumulated tax losses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the constructive trust had served its purpose and the trial judge properly exercised his equitable discretion to dissolve it once the appellant had elected to pursue an accounting and received payment.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident with the defendant, who was driving a cube van.

The defendant's auto insurance policy excluded coverage for vehicles over 4,500 kg.

The plaintiff's insurer, CAA, appealed a motion judge's finding that the defendant's insurer, Royal & Sun Alliance, was not obliged to compensate the plaintiff under s. 258(1) of the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 258(1) is only triggered if the insured could have been entitled to indemnity under the policy.

The tenant (TDL) leased property from a landlord and later signed a postponement and non-disturbance agreement (PNDA) with the landlord's mortgagee.

TDL obtained a judgment against the landlord for damages and costs, with a right to set off the amount against rent.

When the landlord defaulted on the mortgage, the mortgagee went into possession and demanded rent without the set-off.

The Court of Appeal held that under the PNDA, the mortgagee stepped into the landlord's shoes and assumed the existing state of accounts, including TDL's right of set-off.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant, a non-party witness, appealed an order directing him to attend for examination pursuant to a summons issued by the applicant.

The applicant had commenced an application against the Conservative Party of Canada.

A previous motion by the Conservative Party to quash the summons had been dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the order requiring the appellant's attendance, as the appellant's evidence was potentially relevant and he had not brought his own motion to quash the summons.

The court also refused to stay the examination pending a motion to stay the underlying application.

The appellant conceded that the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

Because the respondent never raised the question of jurisdiction, the court ordered the matter transferred to the Divisional Court.

Costs thrown away were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $750.

The appellants were convicted of various weapons offences and crimes of violence related to the collection of drug debts.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the segregation of evidence, the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning for unsavoury witnesses, and the position of the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge.

However, the sentence appeals for three of the appellants were allowed, as the trial judge failed to adequately consider the principle of rehabilitation and mitigating factors, resulting in reduced sentences.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict granting judgment to the respondent for $35,126 for prepaid telephone cards and implicitly dismissing the appellants' counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the main action but allowed the appeal in part regarding the counterclaim for slander.

The Court found that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the concepts of general, special, and nominal damages for slander, and that proof of special damages is not essential when the slander concerns the appellant's business.

A new trial was ordered for the counterclaim for defamation.

The appellant appealed an order made in a divorce proceeding that set aside property agreements and divided property on an asset-by-asset basis.

At trial, the respondent, who had just retained counsel, sought an equalization of net family properties and to set aside the agreements without amending the pleadings.

The trial judge discouraged the unrepresented appellant from seeking time to prepare financial statements.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that proceeding without proper notice and explicit statements of claims amounted to a denial of natural justice.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision regarding a motor vehicle accident in Manitoba involving two visitors to the province.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that neither party tendered admissible expert evidence on the interpretation of the applicable Manitoba statute.

The court concluded that the proper interpretation of the statute presented a genuine issue for trial, and the motion judge erred in determining it on a summary judgment motion.

The appellants were charged with second degree murder after a fire they allegedly set for insurance proceeds resulted in a death.

The preliminary inquiry judge discharged them on the murder charges, finding no subjective foresight of death.

The reviewing judge quashed the discharge on certiorari, finding the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the preliminary inquiry judge erred by failing to consider the available inference that the appellants, as reasonable persons, would have foreseen the likelihood of death.

The appellant appealed a judgment ordering him to pay $25,000 on a personal guarantee and $42,000 in costs.

He argued he was discharged from the guarantee because the lender failed to obtain confirmed future contracts as required by the loan commitment letter, constituting a material alteration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the requirement was satisfied by the receipt of contracts before the commitment letter was signed.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the trial costs award from $42,000 to $25,000 as a more reasonable amount for a one-day trial.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on consent without costs.

The successful appellant insurer sought partial indemnity costs of $171,943.31 for an appeal.

The Court of Appeal reduced the fees claimed by two-thirds, noting that the preparation time spent by junior lawyers and law clerks was excessive given the lack of complexity of the issues.

The court also reduced the costs because the insurer's trial counsel had failed to raise the issues on which the insurer ultimately succeeded on the liability appeal.

Costs were fixed at $50,000 for fees and $10,000 for disbursements, plus GST.

The appellants' parked motor vehicle was destroyed by a fire allegedly caused by a transmission fluid leak.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action as statute-barred by the two-year limitation period in s. 206(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, relying on the binding precedent of Karakas v. General Motors of Canada Ltd. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while there was arguable merit to the appellants' claim that Karakas was at odds with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, the court was not asked to overrule Karakas and the present case could not be distinguished from it.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson International Airport with liquor bottles containing the drug.

He claimed a man he met in Antigua asked him to deliver the bottles to an unknown person in Canada.

On appeal, he argued that evidence of his nervous demeanour at customs should not have been admitted and that the trial judge erred in leaving wilful blindness with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the demeanour evidence was contemporaneous with the offence and did not render the trial unfair, and that the inherently suspicious circumstances provided an air of reality to the wilful blindness instruction.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict awarding the elderly respondents damages, including $250,000 each in general non-pecuniary damages, after an oil spill destroyed their home.

The appellant argued that a mistrial should have been declared due to prejudicial evidence regarding insurance and settlement negotiations, and that the damages were excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no unfair prejudice to warrant a mistrial and concluding that while the general damages award was high, it was reasonably open to the jury given the devastating impact of the loss of the respondents' home.

The appellant was convicted of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of a boating accident after his boat collided with another vessel at night.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the standard for criminal negligence, the knowledge requirement for failing to remain, the presumption of intent to escape liability, and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and upholding the sentence as fit.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action and allowing the respondent's counterclaim on a promissory note arising from a share purchase agreement.

The appellants had alleged unconscionability, economic duress, and oppression.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by deciding which competing inferences should be preferred from primary facts in evidence on a motion for summary judgment.

The court concluded there were genuine issues of material fact requiring a trial.