Grant Huscroft

The appellant was successful in an oppression action against the respondents.

The respondents had served an offer to settle nine calendar days before trial, which technically amounted to fewer than seven days under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial judge treated the offer as a valid Rule 49 offer and awarded costs accordingly.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the 'no near miss' policy applies to the timing requirement under rule 49.03, meaning the offer was not a valid Rule 49 offer.

However, the Court upheld the costs award, finding that the trial judge was entitled to take the offer into account under his residual discretion pursuant to rule 49.13.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring them vexatious litigants.

They failed to appear at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the application judge's reasons and the appellants' written arguments, finding no merit to the appeal and agreeing that the appellants' conduct met the definition of vexatious litigants.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order quashing notices of examination served on the responding defendants in relation to a Mareva injunction motion.

The responding defendants moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the order was interlocutory because it did not terminate the underlying action or resolve a substantive claim or defence.

The appeal lies to the Divisional Court.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for index offences in 2007, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that concluded he constituted a significant threat to the safety of the public and ordered his continued detention without community living privileges.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable because it failed to address conflicts and ambiguities in the expert evidence regarding whether the appellant posed a significant threat, particularly given his lack of violent offences since 2003.

The matter was returned to the Board for a fresh determination.

The appellant appealed from orders striking his statement of claim against seven respondents without leave to amend and setting aside a noting in default against one respondent.

The motions judge found the claims, which included allegations of torture and invasion of privacy, to be frivolous, vexatious, an abuse of process, and lacking any reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the decision to set aside the noting in default and agreeing that the pleadings were properly struck under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The moving party brought a motion to rehear an appeal that had previously been dismissed in part.

The moving party argued that the appeal panel erred in law and fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion under Rule 2.1.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding it to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as the moving party was merely attempting to re-argue the same points.

The court also prohibited the moving party from bringing further motions without leave.

The appellants appealed an order striking their defence for failing to file material as directed by a previous court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellants provided no evidence to explain their failure to satisfy undertakings, did not appear on the return date for a contempt motion, and had a history of dilatory and obstructionist conduct.

The motion judge's discretionary order was entitled to deference and no clear error was found.

The respondents sued the appellant for $580,000 paid pursuant to an oral contract for temporary foreign worker employment positions, alleging the contracts were fraudulent.

The appellant counterclaimed for $170,000 and pleaded equitable set-off.

The motion judge struck the defence of set-off.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge failed to apply the Telford factors for equitable set-off and that the appellant's claim was proper given the close connection between the parties' claims.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his negligence action against a surveying company regarding a boundary dispute.

The motion judge found the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the appellant knew of the encroachment and had sufficient information to sue more than two years before commencing the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the action was out of time and rejecting the appellant's procedural arguments regarding the timing of the summary judgment motion.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his restaurant.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in her treatment of missing original police notes, and engaged in forbidden oath-helping when assessing police credibility regarding alleged fabricated evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, no error in placing little weight on the missing rough notes given the officers' independent recollections, and no improper oath-helping in the trial judge's consideration of the professional risks officers would face if they fabricated evidence.

The self-represented appellant appeared for the hearing of her appeal, but the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) revealed that its materials had never been served on her.

The Court of Appeal found it would be unfair to proceed and adjourned the appeal.

Due to the late adjournment caused by the OCL's failure to serve its materials, the court ordered the OCL to pay costs thrown away of $1,000 to both the appellant and the respondent.

The appellant claimed she suffered pregnancy complications after a police officer wrongfully confiscated her car in August 2009.

She pursued a police complaint and was informed of the outcome in November 2012.

She commenced a negligence action in October 2013.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the limitation period began to run on the date of the incident, as the appellant knew the material facts giving rise to her claim at that time.

The appellant teachers were wrongfully dismissed by the respondent private school.

The motion judge reduced their reasonable notice period from twelve months to six months due to the school's financial difficulties and a presumption about the availability of alternative teaching positions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an employer's financial circumstances are not relevant to determining the reasonable notice period under the Bardal factors.

The twelve-month notice period was restored.

The appellants purchased a vehicle with a malfunctioning air conditioner and sued the selling dealer, the supplying dealer, and various individuals for over $400,000.

After settling with the selling dealer for a full refund plus additional compensation, the appellants continued their action against the supplying dealer and its manager.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims, finding no contractual relationship, no evidence of negligence, and that any damages were already fully compensated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellant commenced a negligence action against the respondent dentists for substandard dental implant procedures.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in applying the discoverability test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the claim was discoverable when the appellant's new dentist explained the nature of the problem and advised he would have conducted the procedure differently, which occurred more than two years before the action was commenced.

The appellants sued the respondent for damages after allegedly finding a mouldy piece of chicken in a box of cereal.

The parties reached a settlement to dismiss the action without costs, but the appellants later attempted to resile from the agreement, claiming it was accepted in haste and under stress.

The motion judge enforced the settlement against the adult appellants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants failed to establish grounds, such as mistake or significant compromise, to justify setting aside the settlement.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had excluded evidence obtained from a cell phone search incident to arrest and a subsequent search of the respondent's residence, finding Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in his approach to the cell phone search in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, the error did not have a material bearing on the acquittal.

Even if the cell phone evidence was included in the Information to Obtain, there was insufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds to issue the warrant for the residence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought to amend their statement of claim in a securities class action to add further particulars of wrongful conduct underlying their misrepresentation claims against the corporate respondent.

The motion judge denied leave for most of the amendments, finding they constituted discrete misrepresentation claims requiring fresh leave under s. 138.8(1) of the Securities Act, and were statute-barred under s. 138.14(1).

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, with one limited exception permitting the appellants to plead a narrower omission allegation relating to previously pleaded facts.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of powder cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, seeking a reduction to six months less one day to avoid immigration consequences, arguing the trial judge failed to properly consider his post-traumatic stress disorder and misapprehended the sentencing range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully considered all relevant factors and imposed a fit sentence within the applicable range.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court order quashing their discharge at a preliminary inquiry regarding a tractor trailer robbery.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and testimony from former co-accused implicating the appellants in other robberies.

The appellants argued the motion judge improperly treated evidence from other counts as similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly identified a jurisdictional error by the preliminary inquiry judge in failing to consider the evidence as a whole, and that the similarities between the robberies supported an inference that the same group committed them.