Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed his convictions on seven counts for various offences against his former domestic partner, including sexual assault with a weapon, and his three-year custodial sentence.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, arguing uneven scrutiny of evidence, improper application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and sentence, finding the trial judge fairly assessed the evidence, that any error regarding Browne v. Dunn did not materially affect the outcome, and that the appellant failed to meet the threshold for ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant appealed her three-year sentence (less six months pre-sentence custody credit) imposed following a guilty plea to trafficking in firearms.

The appellant challenged the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 99(2)(a) of the Criminal Code as contrary to s. 12 of the Charter on the basis that it was overly broad and could be grossly disproportionate in certain circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to address the constitutional argument as the three-year sentence was fit and appropriate even without the mandatory minimum, given the serious aggravating factors present.

The appellants sought to add Toronto Dominion Bank and Bank of Montreal as defendants to an existing class action alleging a secret conspiracy to manipulate the foreign exchange market.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on the basis that the claim against the respondents was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by establishing too high an evidentiary threshold and by finding that the respondents' identities could have been discovered with reasonable diligence without proper evidentiary foundation.

The court held that the appellants provided a reasonable explanation for why they could not have identified the respondents before the limitation period expired, and that the issue of due diligence should be determined on a summary judgment motion or at trial.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition that detained an NCR accused who had been under the Board's jurisdiction for over a decade following a finding of not criminally responsible for criminal harassment and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The Board determined the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety despite fresh evidence from a clinical forensic psychologist indicating low risk on stalking-specific assessment tools.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's decision unreasonable, holding that the evidence fell short of establishing a significant threat to public safety and that the Board had effectively reversed the burden of proof by relying solely on a moderate-risk HCR-20 V3 assessment without proper expert contextualization.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking her statement of claim without leave to amend on two grounds: that the action was commenced beyond the applicable limitation period and that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action for civil fraud.

The appellant sought damages for fraudulent billing submissions to OHIP and alleged inability to obtain travel insurance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's own pleadings admitted discovery of the alleged fraud in 2009, which triggered the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court also addressed procedural issues regarding the improper use of rule 21.01(1)(a) to advance a limitations defence and the inappropriate reliance on rule 21.01(1)(b) after the respondents had filed a statement of defence joining issue on the material facts.

The appellants (tenant and its successor) repudiated a commercial lease for an industrial property owned by the respondent.

The respondent was forced to sell the property and sued for damages.

The trial judge awarded $1,277,000 in damages, including lost rental profits and lost capital appreciation.

The appellants appealed, arguing the sale at fair market value fully mitigated damages and that lost capital appreciation was too remote.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that damages for lost capital appreciation were too remote under the Hadley v. Baxendale test, that the property was sold at fair market value, and that damages should be calculated using a discounted cash flow analysis based on the 2013 sale price with appropriate deductions for mitigation.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to change child and spousal support orders.

The motion judge dismissed the motion under Rule 1(8)(b) of the Family Law Rules due to the appellant's failure to comply with prior support and costs orders, combined with an absence of good faith effort to pay.

The motion judge also rejected the appellant's fraud claim as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the assignee (City of Toronto) maintained party status to the extent of its financial interests, that the motion judge properly exercised her discretion to dismiss based on non-compliance, and that the fraud allegation was both irrelevant and statute-barred.

The appellant sought to appeal an order from the Superior Court of Justice dated November 29, 2017.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order under appeal was interlocutory in nature and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the proposed appeal.

The appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellant's right to seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

Costs of $3,500 inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking cocaine contrary to s. 5(3)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown's case relied on evidence that the appellant sold nine ounces of cocaine to an intermediary, who subsequently sold it to an undercover officer.

The trial judge accepted the intermediary's testimony and found the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge also found that guilt could be independently established through police surveillance evidence.

The appellant appealed, challenging the trial judge's treatment of the intermediary's evidence, particularly regarding credibility assessment and reliance on demeanour.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant dismissed the respondent, a 55-year-old professional engineer with approximately two decades of management experience, without cause on December 16, 2016.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of the respondent, awarding 12 months' salary, benefits and pension contributions in lieu of notice, and a $12,000 discretionary bonus for the year of termination.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the notice period should be reduced to 8 to 10 months and challenging the bonus award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the motion judge's determinations were entitled to deference.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his counterclaim against his former counsel, Lang Michener LLP.

The counterclaim alleged negligent advice regarding a potential claim against his professional liability insurer (LawPro) for coverage of an Italian judgment based on fraud.

The motion judge found no coverage existed under the policy because the Italian judgment was based on fraud rather than professional negligence or error.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the Italian court had explicitly declined jurisdiction over professional liability claims and the judgment was based on extra-contractual fraud, not professional services.

The court also upheld the costs award of $45,000 against the appellant.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and unlawful entry into a dwelling house following a seven-day trial.

He received a sentence of two years less a day imprisonment and two years of probation.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding serious deficiencies in the appellant's bail compliance history, material omissions in his affidavits regarding outstanding breach charges, and insufficient grounds of appeal to overcome public interest considerations.

The trial judge's findings regarding the victim's incapacity to consent due to extreme intoxication were well-grounded in evidence and revealed no obvious error.

The appellants, a developer, appealed from a summary judgment that dismissed claims for conspiracy and negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation against appraisers, and ordered a mini-trial on claims of negligence, inducing breach of contract, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the conspiracy and misrepresentation claims, finding no reasonable reliance and no evidence of conspiracy.

The court also set aside the mini-trial order and dismissed the remaining claims, finding they had no possibility of success due to lack of reliance, absence of unlawful conduct, and expiration of the limitation period.

The applicants sought leave to appeal their convictions under the Environmental Protection Act following a 14-day trial and a subsequent appeal to the Superior Court of Justice.

The applicants were convicted of nine provincial offences related to discharging contaminants into the environment and failing to comply with lawful orders issued following catastrophic propane explosions at their facility that killed one employee and displaced approximately 12,000 residents.

The Court of Appeal considered whether leave to appeal should be granted under section 131 of the Provincial Offences Act, which requires identification of a pure question of law that is essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice.

The court found that the two grounds of appeal raised by the applicants were fact-laden and did not identify pure questions of law transcending the unique factual circumstances of the case.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on dangerous driving causing bodily harm under section 249(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in his analysis of the mens rea component by relying on the respondent's lack of deliberate intention to create danger and failed to consider all relevant circumstances.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the established test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, properly considered whether the respondent had deliberate intention to cause danger, and appropriately applied the modified objective test in concluding there was no marked departure from the standard of care of a prudent person.

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to import heroin and possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, as well as his sentence of 11 years and 3.5 months.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal regarding conviction: (1) inadequate jury instruction on the limited use of a co-accused's out-of-court statement, and (2) failure to hold a jury inquiry due to alleged juror bias.

The appellant also appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give effect to rehabilitation and failed to consider the lower purity of the heroin as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no manifest unfitness in the sentence imposed.

A Toronto police officer was convicted of attempted murder for firing a second volley of six shots at a knife-wielding man lying on a streetcar floor, 5.5 seconds after an initial volley that had fatally wounded the victim.

The officer was acquitted of second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and the six-year sentence, finding the verdicts were not inconsistent and that the mandatory minimum sentences for attempted murder with a firearm do not violate the Charter.

The court rejected the officer's constitutional challenges under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter and dismissed his application to adduce fresh evidence on appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and assault, arising from an altercation with his partner's uncle.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made material misapprehensions of evidence, including regarding blood on a swivel chair and the complainant's actions in preparing for the fight.

These misapprehensions were key to the self-defence analysis and undermined the trial judge's credibility findings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, challenging the trial judge's credibility analysis of the complainant's evidence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge impermissibly relied on the concept of memory fragmentation caused by alcohol consumption without expert evidence and that counsel was not given an opportunity to address this finding.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in failing to address the complainant's refusal to provide her cellphone to police to recover deleted text messages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings were open to him based on the evidence and that there was no unfairness in the proceedings.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the shooting death of Troy Hutchinson.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant was the actual shooter, but the jury was also instructed on liability as an aider or abettor.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea required for aiding or abetting murder.

Specifically, the jury was not properly instructed that an aider or abettor must know that the principal actor has subjective foresight of death.

The error was repeated multiple times throughout the charge and was compounded by an incorrect definition of recklessness and an inadequate answer to the jury's final question.

The curative proviso was not applied because the jury's final question demonstrated that at least one juror had a reasonable doubt about the appellant being the principal actor, making it impossible to conclude that conviction was inevitable.

A new trial was ordered.