Diana M. Lumba

The appellant appealed a sentence of eight years and two months imposed for trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking in heroin, fentanyl, and methamphetamine.

The principal ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in selecting the appropriate sentencing range for mid-level trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, noting the case contained numerous aggravating factors including the appellant's calculated return to commercial trafficking within months of release from custody, the nature and variety of highly addictive substances trafficked, and significant community problems with opioid use.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking (cocaine, cannabis resin, and oxycodone) and sentenced to ten months custody less three days' presentence custody.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal found that the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds for arrest based on reliable confidential informant information corroborated by police surveillance, that the trial judge did not apply uneven scrutiny to Crown and defence evidence, and that the trial judge's findings on the trafficking purpose were supported by the totality of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was allowed based on fresh evidence of a serious medical issue, and the custodial portion was reduced to time served (44 days with credit for pre-sentence custody), with the victim surcharge set aside.

The accused, Andrew Knight, was charged with possessing cocaine and heroin for the purpose of trafficking, found hidden in a car registered to him but also used by his paramour.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove knowledge of the drugs.

The court found Mr. Knight's testimony regarding car ownership and his relationship suspicious but accepted that his paramour also used the car.

Applying principles of circumstantial evidence, the court determined that while an inference of guilt was strong, it was not the *only* reasonable inference, as there remained a reasonable possibility that the paramour placed the drugs without Mr. Knight's knowledge.

Consequently, Mr. Knight was found not guilty.

The appellant appealed his convictions on one count of possession for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal involved two main issues: (1) whether the police violated the appellant's Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) when they arrested and searched him based on information from a confidential informant, and (2) whether certain telephone calls received on seized cellular phones were admissible as evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The trial judge rejected the Charter challenge and admitted the telephone evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Debot test for assessing confidential informant information and finding the telephone calls admissible under the principled exception to hearsay as established in Baldree.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

On appeal, the court found that the Crown engaged in improper conduct during cross-examination and closing address, including eroding the appellant's right to silence by suggesting he should have provided information to police earlier, and mischaracterizing forensic evidence.

The trial judge failed to provide correcting jury instructions to address these issues.

The court found that the cumulative effect of these problems resulted in an unfair trial and a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a question of law alone, arguing that the trial judge applied a categorical rather than contextual approach to assessing whether a Charter section 8 breach had been established.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did apply a contextual approach and therefore no question of law arose on the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded, restricted firearm following a search of his apartment pursuant to a telewarrant.

The trial judge found that the Information to Obtain the warrant was facially insufficient and that section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached.

However, the trial judge refused to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding disclosure, cross-examination of the affiant, and the exclusion of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions and upholding the admission of the firearm evidence.

Crown's appeal of the acquittal of the respondent on charges of conspiracy to import a narcotic and importing a controlled substance (cocaine).

The respondent was jointly tried with a co-accused who was convicted of the conspiracy count.

The Crown raised two issues on appeal: whether the trial judge wrongly excluded evidence tying the respondent to the conspiracy, and whether the trial judge erred by imposing a reasonable doubt standard at step two of the Carter test for conspiracy membership.

The appellate court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault entered by Justice Quinlan of the Superior Court of Justice on September 23, 2011.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof by assuming the assault occurred as a basis for rejecting a defence argument; and second, that the trial judge erred in failing to explain how she could convict given her comment that the defence theory regarding how some injuries were caused was "equally plausible." The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault-related charges involving his daughter and stepdaughter.

He appealed on four grounds: (1) the trial judge's refusal to sever the counts; (2) the admission of the "teaching" comment as similar fact evidence while excluding the underlying acts; (3) alleged errors in the jury charge; and (4) the exclusion of expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings on severance, similar fact evidence, jury instructions, or the exclusion of the psychological report.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated April 29, 2016.

The appellant, found NCRMD for sexual assault, challenged the Board's decision to continue his detention in a Secure Forensic Unit rather than place him in a general forensic unit or impose a hybrid order allowing discretionary transfer.

The appellant conceded he remained a significant threat to public safety and that detention was appropriate, but argued the Board erred in: (1) failing to provide reasons for rejecting a hybrid order; (2) misapprehending evidence regarding his low risk for coercive sexual contact; and (3) failing to apply the least restrictive disposition test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the Board's disposition.

The appellant was convicted of sexual offences against a complainant who was between 13 and 19 years old at the time.

The appellant, who was in a position of trust, appealed the conviction and the sentence of 7 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) principles and improperly treated the case as a credibility contest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or application of legal principles.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

On a summary conviction appeal from a conviction for failing to comply with a recognizance, the appellant argued the Crown had not proven he was absent from his residence other than under permitted work or school exceptions.

The court held there was evidence supporting the findings that the recognizance was in force and that the appellant was not at home during the compliance check.

However, because the Information expressly pleaded the exceptions, and the police had no knowledge of the appellant’s work or school arrangements and conducted no investigation into them, the Crown failed to negative those exceptions even on a prima facie basis.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.

The applicant sought to quash a common law peace bond imposed by a provincial court judge during a preliminary inquiry.

After the complainant recanted her allegations, the Crown conceded there was insufficient evidence for committal.

The judge, on his own motion, initiated a peace bond hearing based on the complainant's testimony regarding a history of domestic violence.

The applicant consented to the peace bond and was subsequently discharged on the criminal charges.

On review, the Superior Court held that a provincial court judge, acting in their capacity as a justice of the peace, retains the inherent common law jurisdiction to impose a peace bond in a separate proceeding, regardless of the statutory limitations of a preliminary inquiry.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of failing to comply with a probation order by failing to report to his probation officer.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge erred by convicting the appellant based on a failure to notify of a change of address, an offence with which he was not charged.

Furthermore, there was no admissible evidence that the appellant knew he was required to report upon his release from custody, as the evidence relied upon was hearsay.

The court also held that the trial judge did not err in admitting an exemplification of the probation order without notice, as it is admissible at common law.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for breach of probation.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay evidence regarding the self-identification of the person he was associating with, and by relying on in-court identification.

The appeal court found that the admissible evidence, considered as a whole, was sufficient to support the conviction.

The court also upheld the consecutive sentence, noting that the breach of a court order shortly after release from custody was egregious and warranted a consecutive sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and was sentenced to one year of imprisonment.

On appeal, she introduced fresh evidence that her trial counsel failed to advise the sentencing judge of a co-accused's six-month sentence and the immigration consequences of a sentence of six months or more.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, found the appellant's culpability similar to her co-accused, and reduced the sentence to six months less a day to preserve her right to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of breaching a prohibition order by attending a municipal sports facility while children were present elsewhere in the building.

The appeal court held the trial judge erred in all three grounds for acquittal: the incorrect date in the information was surplusage and should have been addressed through submissions and possible amendment; the declaration that the words “community center” were inoperative under s. 161 required a properly noticed constitutional challenge; and the facility met the ordinary meaning of a community center within the statutory purpose of protecting children.

The court declined to enter a conviction because potential defences of due diligence, lawful excuse, and officially induced error had not been determined.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of firearm and drug offences arising from cross-border smuggling trips where she transported drugs to the U.S. and returned with guns.

She appealed her convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on wilful blindness and allowing cross-examination on her knowledge of gun crime in Toronto.

She also appealed her seven-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence to support the wilful blindness instruction and no unfairness in the cross-examination.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed sentence after the trial judge imposed a term exceeding the statutory maximum for unlawful possession of a firearm under s. 91 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the error.

The court held that, applying the proper sentencing range and taking account of fresh evidence of the appellant's institutional progress, a sentence of 45 months was appropriate before credit for pre-trial custody.

Applying enhanced credit under Summers, the court reduced the sentence to 17 months while maintaining the ancillary orders.