Diana M. Lumba

Duy Tam Nguyen was convicted of multiple drug trafficking and firearm possession offences after police found significant amounts of cocaine, methamphetamine, and two firearms in a "stash house" he operated.

The court considered aggravating factors, including a prior criminal record and the sophistication of the operation, and mitigating factors such as rehabilitative prospects and pre-sentence custody conditions.

The judge applied the principle of totality to determine appropriate concurrent and consecutive sentences for the various counts, ultimately imposing a total sentence of seven years and eight months imprisonment, along with ancillary orders for DNA sample and a lifetime firearm prohibition.

Ashley Gallie, a pharmacy technician, was sentenced for multiple criminal and drug charges, including theft over $5,000 and possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking, arising from stealing large quantities of oxycodone from two pharmacies where she was employed.

The court found her guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking for the first pharmacy (Nova) but not for the second (IDA), accepting her addiction but rejecting her claim of sole personal use for all stolen drugs.

The sentencing considered aggravating factors such as breach of trust and the large quantity of drugs, and mitigating factors including her lack of prior record, addiction, and family circumstances.

A penitentiary sentence of four years and six months was imposed for possession for the purpose of trafficking, with concurrent sentences for other charges.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on serious drug trafficking charges, which resulted from the trial judge's exclusion of evidence seized under search warrants.

The trial judge had found the warrants improperly authorized due to insufficient compelling and corroborated confidential source information, leading to a Charter s. 8 violation and s. 24(2) exclusion.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in misapprehending the evidence regarding the compelling nature of the confidential information and misapplying the corroboration requirement.

The Court also found an error in assessing the nexus between the alleged offences and the searched locations.

The appeal was allowed, acquittals set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the searches were deemed legally authorized.

The accused, Duy Tam Nguyen, was charged with multiple drug and firearm offences following his arrest with a co-accused.

Police found methamphetamine, cash, and keys to a rooming house unit on Nguyen.

A subsequent search of the unit revealed more methamphetamine, cocaine, firearms, drug trafficking paraphernalia, and Nguyen's identification documents.

The primary issues at trial were whether circumstantial evidence proved Nguyen's possession of the drugs and firearms and if the cash was proceeds of crime.

A secondary issue was the admissibility and weight of the co-accused's exculpatory statements.

The court found Nguyen guilty of possession of methamphetamine for trafficking (on person and in unit), possession of non-restricted and restricted firearms, and possession of cocaine for trafficking.

He was found not guilty of possession of proceeds of crime due to insufficient evidence.

The appellant, convicted of attempting to import cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, appealed the dismissal of his entrapment claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of the police agent (PA), whose uncorroborated testimony was central to establishing reasonable suspicion for police intervention.

The court highlighted the PA's extensive criminal history, admitted lies, and substantial financial compensation ($400,000 plus monthly fees) as factors requiring a more rigorous credibility analysis.

It also found that the appellant's later eagerness to participate in the scheme did not corroborate the PA's claim that the appellant initiated the criminal activity.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered solely on the entrapment issue.

This judge-alone trial addressed whether the defendant possessed fentanyl for trafficking purposes.

The defendant admitted to trafficking cocaine and possessing proceeds of crime but denied knowing the 100 pills contained fentanyl, asserting he believed them to be Percocet for personal use due to an addiction.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's knowledge of the pills' fentanyl content and his intent to traffic them, based on expert testimony and the defendant's narrative of personal use.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted of fentanyl trafficking but convicted of simple possession of fentanyl, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appellant, Asher Veliz, appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and a related firearm offence, and his global net sentence of 4.5 years.

He argued breaches of his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) concerning arbitrary arrest, an invalid search warrant, and denial of his right to counsel of choice.

He also appealed the sentence, alleging the trial judge imposed a higher custodial sentence for the drug offence than sought by the Crown without allowing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge regarding reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, the validity of the search warrant, or the right to counsel.

The court also found no error in the sentence, noting the global sentence imposed was lower than what the Crown had sought.

The applicant, Dexter Griffith, sought an order under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the appointment of counsel to assist with his conviction appeal, having been denied legal aid due to perceived lack of merit.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court granted the application, finding that the appeal presented arguable grounds, specifically regarding the validity of a search warrant based on the Information to Obtain (ITO) and the permissible amplification of the ITO.

The court also determined that counsel was necessary given the complexity of the legal issues and the applicant's cognitive limitations following a traumatic brain injury.

The appellants, David Brown and Daimian Johnson, appealed their sentences for drug trafficking offences, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient credit for various mitigating factors, including multiple arrests, restrictive bail conditions, and cooperation with authorities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the sentencing judge had properly identified and considered the mitigating factors and that the sentences imposed were reasonable and reflected the circumstances.

The applicant, Orville Palmer, sought to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant, alleging a violation of his s. 8 Charter rights due to insufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO) and a facial invalidity in the warrant's address.

The court conducted a "step six" assessment of the unredacted ITO, applying the Debot criteria, and found that the confidential informant's tip was compelling and sufficiently corroborated, establishing reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

However, the court conceded that the warrant was facially invalid due to a typographical error in the address (Street instead of Avenue), constituting a s. 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant framework for s. 24(2) Charter exclusion, the court balanced the seriousness of the breach (inadvertent error, good faith police conduct), the high impact on the applicant's privacy interests in his home, and society's interest in the adjudication of serious drug trafficking charges with highly reliable evidence.

Ultimately, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and dismissed the application to exclude.

The appellant appealed a sentence of eight years and two months imposed for trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking in heroin, fentanyl, and methamphetamine.

The principal ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in selecting the appropriate sentencing range for mid-level trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, noting the case contained numerous aggravating factors including the appellant's calculated return to commercial trafficking within months of release from custody, the nature and variety of highly addictive substances trafficked, and significant community problems with opioid use.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking (cocaine, cannabis resin, and oxycodone) and sentenced to ten months custody less three days' presentence custody.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal found that the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds for arrest based on reliable confidential informant information corroborated by police surveillance, that the trial judge did not apply uneven scrutiny to Crown and defence evidence, and that the trial judge's findings on the trafficking purpose were supported by the totality of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was allowed based on fresh evidence of a serious medical issue, and the custodial portion was reduced to time served (44 days with credit for pre-sentence custody), with the victim surcharge set aside.

The accused, Andrew Knight, was charged with possessing cocaine and heroin for the purpose of trafficking, found hidden in a car registered to him but also used by his paramour.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove knowledge of the drugs.

The court found Mr. Knight's testimony regarding car ownership and his relationship suspicious but accepted that his paramour also used the car.

Applying principles of circumstantial evidence, the court determined that while an inference of guilt was strong, it was not the *only* reasonable inference, as there remained a reasonable possibility that the paramour placed the drugs without Mr. Knight's knowledge.

Consequently, Mr. Knight was found not guilty.

The appellant appealed his convictions on one count of possession for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal involved two main issues: (1) whether the police violated the appellant's Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) when they arrested and searched him based on information from a confidential informant, and (2) whether certain telephone calls received on seized cellular phones were admissible as evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The trial judge rejected the Charter challenge and admitted the telephone evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Debot test for assessing confidential informant information and finding the telephone calls admissible under the principled exception to hearsay as established in Baldree.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

On appeal, the court found that the Crown engaged in improper conduct during cross-examination and closing address, including eroding the appellant's right to silence by suggesting he should have provided information to police earlier, and mischaracterizing forensic evidence.

The trial judge failed to provide correcting jury instructions to address these issues.

The court found that the cumulative effect of these problems resulted in an unfair trial and a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a question of law alone, arguing that the trial judge applied a categorical rather than contextual approach to assessing whether a Charter section 8 breach had been established.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did apply a contextual approach and therefore no question of law arose on the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded, restricted firearm following a search of his apartment pursuant to a telewarrant.

The trial judge found that the Information to Obtain the warrant was facially insufficient and that section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached.

However, the trial judge refused to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding disclosure, cross-examination of the affiant, and the exclusion of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions and upholding the admission of the firearm evidence.

Crown's appeal of the acquittal of the respondent on charges of conspiracy to import a narcotic and importing a controlled substance (cocaine).

The respondent was jointly tried with a co-accused who was convicted of the conspiracy count.

The Crown raised two issues on appeal: whether the trial judge wrongly excluded evidence tying the respondent to the conspiracy, and whether the trial judge erred by imposing a reasonable doubt standard at step two of the Carter test for conspiracy membership.

The appellate court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault-related charges involving his daughter and stepdaughter.

He appealed on four grounds: (1) the trial judge's refusal to sever the counts; (2) the admission of the "teaching" comment as similar fact evidence while excluding the underlying acts; (3) alleged errors in the jury charge; and (4) the exclusion of expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings on severance, similar fact evidence, jury instructions, or the exclusion of the psychological report.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault entered by Justice Quinlan of the Superior Court of Justice on September 23, 2011.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof by assuming the assault occurred as a basis for rejecting a defence argument; and second, that the trial judge erred in failing to explain how she could convict given her comment that the defence theory regarding how some injuries were caused was "equally plausible." The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments and dismissed the appeal.