Bradley W. Miller

The moving parties sought reconsideration of a prior decision by the Court of Appeal dismissing their appeal, presenting new evidence.

The court dismissed the motion for reconsideration, affirming that such requests are granted only in very exceptional cases and that the new evidence did not undermine the basis for the original appeal dismissal.

Costs were awarded to the responding party.

The appellants, a condominium corporation and its snow removal contractor, appealed a trial decision finding them negligent for a slip and fall injury.

The respondent slipped on an icy roadway that had been plowed but not salted in a timely manner.

The appeal focused on the standard of care, arguing the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence and applied an unreasonable standard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the contractor's delay in applying road salt fell below the reasonable standard of care, given the foreseeable ice formation and the contractor's problematic system for salt application.

Mr. Clare appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

He had pleaded guilty to possession of hydromorphone for trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the plea inquiry transcript and trial counsel's notes, finding that the plea was informed and voluntary.

The court concluded that the appellant had not met the high threshold required to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

Sase Aggregate Ltd. appealed a lower court decision that largely dismissed its claims against Michelle Langdon, wife of a former pit manager who defrauded Sase of over $2.1 million.

Sase sought a constructive trust over the proceeds of sale of a property owned by Langdon, alleging knowing receipt, knowing assistance, and unjust enrichment.

The application judge found Langdon had no knowledge of the fraud and that Sase failed to properly trace its funds into the property, except for an admitted amount of $177,632.38.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Sase's appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that Sase failed to establish the elements for knowing receipt, knowing assistance, or to properly trace the bulk of the funds into the property, and that Langdon's legitimate sources of funds were adequately explained.

The appellant, Thanh Nguyen, appealed his convictions for several possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime offences.

He argued that the verdicts were unreasonable, alleging that the trial judge erred by convicting him on circumstantial evidence that supported innocent inferences, engaged in illogical reasoning, and that the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittal on a firearm charge.

He also contended that the trial judge erred in admitting unqualified opinion evidence from a police officer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable and any error in admitting opinion evidence harmless under the curative proviso.

Kevin Tran appealed his convictions for narcotics, proceeds of crime, and firearm offences.

He argued that the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge erred in not excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the trial judge erred in not staying proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b).

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable, the s. 24(2) decision correct (despite an unconstitutional warrant, evidence was admissible due to good faith), and the s. 11(b) delay justified by exceptional circumstances related to a joint trial.

This endorsement addresses the costs of appeals and a cross-appeal that were previously dismissed.

The appellants proposed an aggregate payment of $300,000 as partial indemnity costs.

The respondents sought higher amounts, with one group seeking full indemnity.

The court found the amounts sought by the respondents to be reasonable and proportionate, noting cooperation among counsel and no duplication of effort.

The court awarded specific partial indemnity costs to each respondent group, totaling $549,082.93.

This appeal arose from a personal injury action where the Town of Milton, a defendant, brought a third-party claim against Milton Hydro Distribution Inc. for contribution and indemnity, alleging negligent removal of a street luminaire.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the third-party claim, finding Milton Hydro owed no duty of care and that the Town of Milton's failure to inspect constituted an intervening act breaking causation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by conflating duty of care and causation analyses and incorrectly applying the intervening act doctrine.

The court emphasized that the passage of time alone does not negate foreseeability and that multiple parties can be responsible for harm.

The third-party claim was remitted for trial with the main action.

The appellant vendor appealed a summary judgment that granted specific performance to purchasers of three townhomes and dismissed the vendor's motion for forfeiture of deposits.

The transactions failed to close on the scheduled date due to delayed mortgage funds.

The motion judge found the vendor in anticipatory breach for prematurely terminating the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS), ruling that the "time is of the essence" clause did not impose a specific closing time and that the vendor acted unreasonably.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the interpretation of the "time is of the essence" clause or the finding of anticipatory breach and bad faith.

The Court also denied leave to appeal the costs award, finding no error in principle or irrationality in the quantum.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to set aside a Notice of Sale and stay a pending sale related to a vendor takeback mortgage default.

They argued the redemption amount was inflated due to an illegal interest rate and unjustified charges, prejudicing their ability to obtain financing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the issue moot as the property had been sold and no stay was sought pending appeal.

The court noted evidentiary problems and stated that the questions of amounts owing were better suited for adjudication in the outstanding mortgage action.

The appellant brought an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario from a Superior Court of Justice order.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as there was no right of appeal to that court from the order below.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction, and the respondent was awarded costs.

The appellant, Belmar Roofing Inc., appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for breach of contract and negligence for a defective roof installation.

The appeal primarily challenged the trial judge's reliance on the respondent's engineer's expert evidence, which the appellant argued was contradicted by a draft report and exaggerated the roof's danger.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's acceptance of the engineer's testimony, as the engineer adequately explained the omission in the final report and maintained his opinion on the roof's hazards.

The court found ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions and no basis to interfere with the damages assessment.

Ali Hilal was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault and sexual interference with his stepdaughter, M.W., from age 9 to 13.

The offences involved multiple incidents, including vaginal intercourse, and occurred over four years, intensifying during pandemic restrictions.

The victim suffered severe long-term emotional and psychological impact, including estrangement from her mother and younger siblings.

The Crown sought 8-10 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 5-7 years, acknowledging ancillary orders.

The court imposed an eight-year term of imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and ordered various ancillary measures including DNA order, SOIRA registration for 20 years, a 10-year s. 161 order, and a lifetime firearms prohibition.

The Limited Partners of YG Limited Partnership appealed a motion judge's order denying them standing to oppose a creditor's (CBRE Limited) appeal of a disallowed proof of claim under s. 135(4) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, holding that limited partners do not possess a direct economic interest in the claim sufficient for common law standing, nor are they granted standing under s. 135(4) or s. 37 of the BIA.

The court emphasized that the BIA is a complete code designed for expeditious resolution of bankruptcy matters, and equity owners are generally excluded from direct participation in creditor claim appeals.

The appellants, Limited Partners of a debtor in a bankruptcy proposal, appealed an order for directions regarding the process for an appeal of a proof of claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as premature, finding that the motion judge had not made any final orders regarding the appellants' standing in the anticipated claim appeal, but rather had made directions "subject to the discretion of the judge hearing the appeal." The court held that the possibility of influence or an incorrect underlying conclusion on discretionary standing was not a basis for appeal.

The appellant, Donavan Locke, appealed orders from the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his second and third actions (alleging deceit and conspiracy against his former common-law partner and her lawyers regarding a property transfer) and dismissing his own motions (including a constitutional question and criminal contempt).

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the motion judge's decision, affirming that summary judgment was appropriate due to the appellant's lack of evidence and damages.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the appellant's motions, noting the constitutional question was "ill conceived" and there was no basis for criminal contempt.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs to each respondent.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's other discreditable conduct in a criminal trial for extortion, uttering threats, assault, sexual assault, and distributing an intimate image.

The proposed evidence included the accused's marital status, gambling problem, reputation for violence, and suicidal threats/attempts.

The court ruled on the admissibility of this evidence, applying the test for discreditable conduct.

The court found all proposed evidence admissible, including the suicide-related conduct, determining its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to appropriate jury instructions against propensity reasoning.

The appellant, Rolling Meadows Land Development Corporation, appealed judgments dismissing its motion to convert applications to an action, finding a purchase and sale agreement binding, and finding no breach of contract by the respondent, Pine Glen Thorold Inc. The appeal raised arguments concerning the refusal to convert applications, a claim of unilateral mistake in signing the contract, and the quantification of renovation costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's decisions.

The court affirmed that the application judge was entitled to adjudicate the issues on the record, that no unilateral mistake was established given the appellant's sophistication and the contract's clarity, and that the renovation quantification was properly determined.

The appellants appealed an order directing funds paid into court to be released to the respondent, which were secured by a mortgage.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding the order to be interlocutory rather than final.

The court reasoned that the order did not finally determine the substantive issues between the parties, such as claims of improvident realization or breach of duty, which remained subject to a separate, unscheduled application.

The husband appealed two spousal support orders made after trial, challenging the quantification of ongoing, lump sum catch-up, and retroactive support, as well as the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding income imputation, retroactive support start date, occupation rent, and calculation methods.

The court found no reversible error of law or material error of fact, emphasizing the narrow scope of appellate review in family law matters.