Andrew Anthony Furgiuele

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion to compel the Crown to disclose details regarding police "pointer car" designations, arguing its relevance to a Charter Section 9 arbitrary detention issue.

The applicant was detained solely because he was driving a vehicle designated as a "pointer car" which may have been an outdated and incorrect designation.

The court found the evidence concerning the purpose, implementation, and removal procedures of the pointer car designation system to be "obviously relevant" to assessing the constitutional validity of the detention.

The motion was allowed, and the Crown was ordered to disclose all requested information.

The appellant, Jeremy Gough, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to rely on post-incident conduct evidence (attending Tim Hortons, sending texts, delivering a skating form) as relevant to intent and planning/deliberation, and by failing to provide a limiting instruction to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the post-incident conduct evidence was relevant and admissible.

The Court found a positive link between the appellant's pre-offence and post-incident conduct, which formed part of a continuous scheme to distance himself from the crime, thereby attenuating the reasoning risks typically associated with such evidence and negating the need for a specific cautionary instruction.

The appellants, Brandon Barreira, Joshua Barreira, and Chad Davidson, appealed their convictions for first-degree murder.

Davidson had admitted to shooting the victim, Tyler Johnson, but claimed manslaughter, while the other appellants denied party liability.

The appeal primarily focused on the trial judge's jury instructions, arguing a failure to adequately relate the evidence to the issues, and the unreasonableness of the first-degree murder verdict.

The Court of Appeal found the jury instructions inadequate for failing to properly summarize and relate the evidence to the specific elements of the offence and party liability.

While the court determined that the first-degree murder verdict was not unreasonable given the evidence, the instructional errors necessitated a new trial.

The appeals were allowed, and a new trial on the charge of first-degree murder was ordered for all appellants.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, possession of a stolen vehicle and licence plates, possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking, and two counts of failing to comply with a probation order.

The appellant, who represented himself at trial, claimed the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance by instructing the jury to disregard a double hearsay statement that the appellant had relied upon in his closing address.

The statement allegedly came from a third party suggesting he had loaned the stolen vehicle to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assisted the self-represented appellant and correctly instructed the jury to disregard the hearsay evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for various firearms offences.

He was arrested on an outstanding warrant during a search incident to arrest, in which a loaded handgun was found.

The appellant challenged the vehicle stop as violating his Charter rights to be secure from arbitrary detention, arguing the police lacked reasonable grounds for investigative detention.

The trial judge found the police had reasonable grounds to suspect a robbery suspect was in the vehicle based on the observation of red clothing matching the suspect's description.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no Charter violation.

The appellant's sentence of six years less 18 months pre-sentence custody (3 years 9 months remaining) was also upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and his indeterminate sentence following guilty pleas to two counts of aggravated sexual assault.

The offences involved failing to disclose his HIV-positive status to two women before having unprotected sex with them, resulting in both women contracting HIV.

The appellant had a lengthy criminal record including convictions for sexual assault causing bodily harm, counselling the murder of a police officer, uttering threats, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

Both Crown and defence psychiatrists assessed him as having antisocial personality disorder with psychopathic traits and marijuana dependence disorder, presenting moderate to high risk for sexual and violent recidivism.

The sentencing judge designated him as a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The Crown conceded two errors: failure to conduct prospective risk assessment at the designation stage and failure to consider Gladue factors.

The appeal was dismissed as there was no reasonable possibility the errors affected the outcome.

The appellant was convicted of firearm possession offences following a search warrant execution at an apartment in Hamilton.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's Charter s. 8 application challenging the warrant's validity on the basis that the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search, finding he had no subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was entitled to rely on the Crown's theory that the apartment was his residence to establish standing under the principles established in R v. Jones.

The court found the trial judge erred by not permitting the appellant to rely on the Crown's own allegations to establish facts necessary for his s. 8 claim, and ordered a new trial.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in the stabbing death of a landlord.

The victim was stabbed 29 times and, while dying, made pointing gestures toward the appellant Nurse before expiring.

The appellants appealed on two grounds: (1) the admissibility of the victim's gestures as hearsay evidence, and (2) the lawfulness of a second forensic analysis of deleted BlackBerry Messenger chats conducted with updated software one year after the initial analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the gestures admissible under the dying declaration and spontaneous utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule, and that the second analysis of previously extracted data did not constitute a fresh search requiring new authorization.

The appellant, E.B., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's credibility, specifically regarding her reaction to the allegations during a police interview and the interpretation of her testimony.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred in concluding that the appellant failed to provide an unequivocal denial and misapprehended her testimony.

These errors were crucial to the verdict, leading to the convictions being set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from a trial decision rendered on June 29, 2015.

The conviction appeal was abandoned by the parties.

On the sentencing appeal, the parties agreed that the appropriate sentence was nine months, with credit for time spent on bail pending trial and appeal, as well as time spent in custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the sentencing appeal and varied the sentence to time served, equivalent to nine months.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and touching a person under the age of 16, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's evidence regarding dreams and inconsistencies in her testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions on credibility and reliability were amply supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The court held that the trial judge properly considered the frailties in the complainant's evidence and reasonably concluded that the events were not dreamt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant was found in the back seat of a car with a small amount of crack cocaine in his wallet.

The Crown alleged he was jointly in possession with two other men of a large quantity of cocaine in a bag in the front of the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the reasonable possibility that the appellant was merely a purchaser of cocaine rather than a drug trafficker.

The court held that the Crown had not negated this reasonable possibility beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore the verdict was unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder on the grounds of Crown non-disclosure.

The Crown failed to disclose medical records relating to the appellant's mother's health until partway through the appellant's cross-examination.

These records were relevant to the appellant's defence that his mother, rather than the appellant, killed the victim.

The trial judge initially dismissed the mistrial application, expecting that expert evidence would neutralize any prejudice.

However, the expert changed his evidence at trial.

The Court of Appeal found a reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure affected the overall fairness of the trial process and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of Keith Brissett.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on four grounds: (1) the instruction on the use of a KGB statement containing hearsay evidence of motive; (2) the provision of Vetrovec warnings regarding two disreputable witnesses despite defence objection; (3) the handling of third party suspect evidence regarding Curtis Murray; and (4) the treatment of eyewitness evidence regarding the shooter's skin colour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions were legally sound and fair.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and break and enter following his participation in a home invasion during which another participant stabbed and killed a man.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the voluntariness of his statement to police, arguing that the interviewing officer's repeated inducements and threats rendered the confession involuntary.

The application judge had found the statement voluntary, concluding there was no quid pro quo because police made no explicit promises of assistance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred by applying too narrow a conception of inducements and threats.

The court held that the officer's veiled inducements of decreased jeopardy for speaking and threats of increased jeopardy for silence constituted an implicit quid pro quo.

Considering the appellant's age, Aboriginal background, repeated assertions of the right to silence, and the coercive nature of the interrogation, the court concluded the statement was not voluntarily made and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography under s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code and acquitted of making child pornography available under s. 163.1(3).

The appellant appealed his conviction on Charter grounds, arguing that the search of his residence and computer violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The Crown conceded the search was unlawful but argued the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The Crown also appealed the acquittal on the making available count, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the mens rea requirement.

The court dismissed the appellant's conviction appeal and allowed the Crown's appeal, ordering a new trial on the making available count.

The appellants appealed their convictions for methamphetamine production and possession, and challenged a pre-trial ruling dismissing their Charter applications.

The appellants obtained a residential property through fraud and converted it into a methamphetamine laboratory.

They were arrested during a police search warrant execution.

The application judge found the appellants lacked standing to bring a section 8 Charter claim and dismissed their section 7 claim as lacking factual foundation.

The Court of Appeal upheld these findings, concluding that the appellants' tenuous connection to the property through fraudulent means, combined with their temporary and illegal use of it, precluded any reasonable expectation of privacy.

The conviction appeals were dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

The appellant was convicted of possession of oxycodone, Percocet, and clonazepam for the purpose of trafficking.

The central issue on appeal concerned the admissibility of text messages extracted from the appellant's seized cellphone.

The Crown sought to admit incoming text messages requesting drugs as hearsay evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The trial judge admitted the messages and instructed the jury they could be used for the truth of their contents.

The appellant appealed, arguing the messages were improperly admitted and the jury was inadequately instructed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the incoming text messages were properly admissible under the principled exception to the hearsay rule based on threshold reliability and necessity, and that the jury charge adequately addressed the dangers of hearsay evidence.

The Crown charged two members of the Men's Fire, a group within the Six Nations community, with assault for forcibly removing a lawyer from a meeting at the Haudenosaunee Development Institute offices.

The defendants claimed the defence of property under section 35 of the Criminal Code, arguing they were acting pursuant to traditional Haudenosaunee governance to remove the complainant from reserve territory.

The court found that while the defendants had a subjective belief they were acting in accordance with traditional governance, the defence of property did not apply because: (1) the defendants did not have peaceable possession of the property given the political conflict; (2) the complainant had a lawful entitlement to be present as an invitee of the HDI; and (3) the use of force was unreasonable in the circumstances, as there was no emergency, alternative remedies were available, and the action was politically motivated rather than necessary for community protection.

Both defendants were convicted of assault.

The appellant was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his girlfriend's daughter and four of her friends, all primary school girls aged 10-12 at the time of disclosure.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in allowing similar fact evidence by failing to properly apply the burden of proof regarding unintentional collusion between the victims.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in not subjecting unconscious collusion to the same evidentiary burden as actual collusion, the error was harmless and did not occasion a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.