88 total
Crown appeal of sexual assault acquittal dismissed; procedural errors in cross-examination caused no prejudice.
The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a single charge of sexual assault.
The Crown argued the trial judge erred by permitting cross-examination on the complainant's prior sexual activity without a section 276 vetting, excluding an out-of-court statement, and misusing evidence regarding the absence of an immediate complaint.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some procedural errors may have occurred regarding section 276, they caused no prejudice to the Crown.
The Court concluded that the Crown's case was very weak and any misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge did not affect the ultimate determination that the evidence failed to meet the reasonable doubt standard.
Sentence varied to two years after trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the nature of the assault.
The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for assault with a weapon.
The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by characterizing the incident as an attack on a stranger, when it actually occurred during a drug transaction.
This misapprehension constituted an error in principle, requiring a fresh assessment of the sentence.
The Court varied the sentence to two years, in addition to four months of pre-trial custody, noting the seriousness of the assault and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.
Convictions quashed and new trial ordered due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, forcible confinement, and uttering threats against his common law partner, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel failed to properly execute an effective cross-examination, failed to cross-examine the complainant on prior inconsistent statements, and effectively abandoned the defence in closing submissions.
Concluding that these failures undermined the reliability of the verdict and the appearance of a fair trial, the Court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial.
Warrantless police search of teacher's work laptop violated section 8; evidence partially excluded under section 24(2).
The appellant, a high school teacher, was charged with possession of child pornography after a school computer technician found explicit images of a student on his work laptop.
The principal seized the laptop and copied the images, and the school board later copied temporary Internet files before handing everything to the police, who searched the laptop without a warrant.
The Court of Appeal held that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal files on the work computer, though modified by the technician's right to maintain the network.
While the school officials did not breach the Charter, the warrantless police search of the laptop and temporary Internet files violated section 8.
Applying the Grant framework, the Court excluded the laptop and temporary Internet files under section 24(2), but admitted the disc containing the images of the student.
Conviction set aside where trial judge relied on post-trial interpretation of inaudible audio recording.
The appellant, a police officer, appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and uttering a threat against an intoxicated person in custody.
At trial, the parties agreed that a crucial portion of an audio surveillance recording was inaudible, and the appellant testified to what he had said.
During deliberations, the trial judge re-listened to the recording, concluded the appellant had said something materially different, and used this finding to reject his credibility and convict him without reopening the trial.
The Court of Appeal held that this denied the appellant the opportunity to make full answer and defence, constituting a denial of natural justice.
The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.
Impaired driving convictions set aside due to trial judge's misapprehension of evidence and improper adverse inferences.
The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm after his truck collided with a van.
He fled the scene and claimed he consumed alcohol only after returning home.
The trial judge rejected his evidence, drawing an adverse inference from his failure to call his mother and a friend to corroborate his post-accident drinking, and finding he lied about a conversation based on a misapprehension of evidence.
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in misapprehending the evidence and improperly drawing an adverse inference against the accused for failing to call confirmatory evidence.
The cumulative effect of these errors resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, while the sentence appeal for failing to remain and public mischief was dismissed.
Appeal dismissed regarding drug trafficking convictions; summary conviction for marijuana possession quashed on consent.
The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession of cannabis resin, arguing that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him following a controlled delivery of a package containing cocaine.
The Court of Appeal found that the police had both subjective and objective reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant after he received the package and left the residence shortly after with a bag capable of carrying it.
The court upheld the trial judge's finding of no Charter breaches under sections 8 and 9.
However, the court quashed the appellant's summary conviction for simple possession of marijuana on consent, as it should not have been tried together with exclusively indictable offences.
Appeal dismissed; fresh psychiatric evidence failed to establish appellant lacked capacity to know conduct was wrong.
The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal harassment and uttering threats.
Years later, he appealed his convictions, seeking to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence to establish he was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR-MD) at the time of the offences.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not meet the fourth criterion of the Palmer test.
The court concluded that the appellant's own writings demonstrated he knew his conduct was morally and legally wrong, meaning the fresh evidence could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result.