Andrew Anthony Furgiuele

This addendum addresses the appellant Ronald Cyr's request for clarification regarding the court's refusal to allow him to advance a new Charter argument on appeal.

The appellant sought to argue that sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required that clause 6 of section 3(1) of the Juries Act be expanded to exclude former auxiliary police officers from jury service.

The court declined to permit this new argument, finding no air of reality to the suggestion of bias and noting that sections 670 and 671 of the Criminal Code provided a complete answer to this ground of appeal.

A police officer with the Niagara Regional Police was convicted of conspiracy to smuggle cheese into Canada from the United States without paying required duties, related customs offences, and breach of trust by a public official.

The appellant organized a scheme with another constable to smuggle approximately $133,000 worth of cheese across the border, evading approximately $325,000 in duties.

The appellant was sentenced to three months' imprisonment for the smuggling offences and one month consecutive for breach of trust.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his breach of trust conviction and sought leave to appeal both sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences regarding the CPIC query were reasonable and the sentences were fit.

The defendant, Jefferey J. Mitchell, was charged with robbery, masked face, and using an imitation firearm following a bank robbery on June 5, 2015.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the robber.

The Crown presented circumstantial evidence, including the defendant's physical description, vehicle, and clothing matching those of the robber, as well as evidence of the defendant's recent possession of dye-stained money from the robbery found at two casinos shortly after the incident.

The court applied the doctrine of recent possession and, considering the totality of the circumstantial evidence, found that the Crown had proven the defendant's identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was found guilty on all three counts.

Three accused were convicted of first-degree murder following a trial involving an undercover police operation.

The appellants challenged the conviction on multiple grounds including: (1) the trial judge's refusal to sever the trial; (2) the admissibility of statements made to an undercover officer; (3) jury management issues during sequestration; and (4) various trial procedure matters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that joint trial was appropriate despite cutthroat defences, the undercover operation did not violate Charter rights, and jury management issues did not constitute a miscarriage of justice.

The applicants, charged with violence and neglect, sought to vacate their election for a judge-alone trial and re-elect for a judge and jury trial.

They argued their initial waiver of a jury trial was not validly informed and that the Crown's refusal to consent to re-election constituted an abuse of process.

The court found the initial election was voluntary and unequivocal, and that the applicants were sufficiently informed, having received some legal advice.

The court also determined that the Crown's refusal to consent did not meet the high threshold for abuse of process, as there was no prosecutorial misconduct that would shock the conscience of the community.

The application to re-elect was dismissed.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion alleging that a search warrant executed at his apartment violated s. 8 of the Charter, seeking exclusion of a loaded handgun under s. 24(2).

The search warrant relied heavily on a confidential informant's tip.

The court conducted a step six Garofoli review using the Debot criteria.

Despite weaknesses in the informant's credibility, the court found the tip was compelling and strongly corroborated by police investigation.

The court concluded the authorizing judge had a proper basis to issue the warrant and dismissed the motion.

The applicant, Trevor William Zachary, sought certiorari to quash a fraud charge (Count 2) on an 18-count indictment following a preliminary inquiry.

He argued the preliminary inquiry judge erred by committing him to trial without evidence of deceit, falsehood, or other fraudulent means, failing to properly test the evidence against the elements of fraud, and not considering all relevant evidence.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit jurisdictional error.

It determined there was sufficient evidence to establish the actus reus and mens rea of fraud under the "other fraudulent means" category, specifically that the applicant, as a City employee, used his position to book ice time for himself at reduced or zero rates, thereby depriving the City of revenue or putting its economic interests at risk.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The accused was charged with manslaughter as a party to a stabbing death that occurred during a parking lot altercation.

The Crown argued the accused was liable under s. 21(1)(a) or s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code because he participated in a group assault during which another individual stabbed the victim.

The court found that the victim's group instigated the confrontation and that the stabber's use of a knife was an unforeseeable intervening act.

The accused was found not guilty.

The appellant was convicted of drug and firearm offences.

He appealed the firearm convictions, arguing that Crown counsel impermissibly relied on a confidential informant's hearsay statement for the truth of its contents during the closing address, despite the statement not being in evidence.

The trial judge compounded the error by repeating the Crown's submission.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the uncorrected improper closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the firearm convictions were vacated, and a new trial was ordered for those charges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to detain him and search his vehicle, alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the traffic stop under the Highway Traffic Act was lawful, even with a dual purpose of intelligence gathering.

The officer was justified in asking the appellant to step out of the vehicle to verify his identity, at which point the drugs were in plain view.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace following the stabbing death of his girlfriend.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on an eyewitness who was highly intoxicated at the time of the offence.

The appellant was also found in a near-comatose state of alcohol intoxication at the scene.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on how the eyewitness's reliability and the appellant's extreme intoxication related to reasonable doubt and the requisite intent for murder.

The appellant also argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and the verdict was one a properly instructed jury could reasonably render.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in finding police had objectively reasonable grounds for his arrest and in failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The police had received a tip and observed the appellant making a series of short stops over two days.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the pattern of conduct, combined with the tip, removed the possibility of innocent coincidence and provided a credibly based probability of drug trafficking.

The appeal was dismissed.

Herbert Adams was convicted after trial of four counts of fraud over $5,000 contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The frauds involved defrauding shareholders of Majestic Supply Company of $5.3 million and three named individuals of $381,000 combined.

Adams personally received $1,610,444 in proceeds of crime.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of five and one-half years on the primary count with concurrent two-year sentences on the remaining counts, along with a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $1,610,444, a restitution order of $5.3 million, a no-contact order, and a DNA order.

The accused was charged with four counts of fraud over $5000 relating to his operation of Majestic Supply Company Inc. and Suncastle Developments Incorporated.

The Crown alleged that the accused made false representations to investors regarding the development and exclusivity of a revolutionary water-based ink and other printing technologies, and that he deliberately thwarted the Ontario Securities Act to avoid filing a prospectus.

The court found the accused's testimony to be untruthful and accepted the evidence of the investors and other witnesses.

The court concluded that the accused made false representations to entice investments and that his deliberate breaches of the Securities Act constituted 'other fraudulent means'.

The accused was found guilty on all four counts.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that had overturned the respondent's conviction by applying the necessity defence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had correctly applied the test for necessity and made factual findings that the defence was not made out.

The summary conviction appeal court judge erred in law by failing to defer to those factual findings and effectively retrying the case.

The convictions were restored.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a minor complainant who alleged he touched her while she slept during an overnight visit.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof in a credibility contest between the complainant and the accused.

The Court of Appeal held that although the trial judge correctly recited the W.(D.) principles, his analysis treated the case as a choice between competing versions rather than determining whether the accused’s evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

Because the reasons showed that the possibility of reasonable doubt was not properly considered, the burden of proof was misapplied.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The offender was convicted after trial of attempted murder and related firearms offences arising from a point‑blank shooting in Toronto.

The victim was shot three times, leaving him a quadriplegic and permanently confined to a wheelchair.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the seriousness of the offence, the offender’s criminal history, and the extreme harm caused.

Despite the offender’s youth and family support, numerous aggravating factors including prior violent offences, breach of bail conditions, and the senseless nature of the shooting justified the maximum sentence.

The court imposed life imprisonment for attempted murder, with concurrent sentences on related firearm and breach offences.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The second offence was committed while he was on release awaiting trial for the first offence.

He was sentenced to consecutive terms of 18 months and 30 months imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, emphasizing that general deterrence and denunciation must be given more significance when an accused re-offends while on release.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and erred in assessing witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual findings regarding the physical abuse of the children were fully supported by the record.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault causing bodily harm, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and failing to provide the necessaries of life in relation to her infant son.

She argued that inculpatory statements made during a police interview should have been excluded because she was psychologically detained and not advised of her right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant was not detained, as she had been told she was free to leave, had previously been given her Charter rights, and went to the station voluntarily.