R. v. Iyeke, 2016 ONSC 7120

CITATION: R. v. Iyeke, 2016 ONSC 7120

COURT FILE NO.: CR-13-10000122-0000

DATE: 20161116

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

– and –

JOHN IYEKE

Applicant

Erin Pancer, counsel for the Crown Respondent

Andrew Furgiuele, counsel for the Applicant

HEARD: November 7-8, 2016

M.A. CODE J.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ON S. 8 [CHARTER OF RIGHTS](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) MOTION

[1] The Applicant John Iyeke (hereinafter, Iyeke) brought a pre-trial Motion alleging that a search warrant executed at his apartment on July 14, 2012 had issued in violation of s. 8 of the Charter of Rights. He sought exclusion of a loaded handgun that was seized during the resulting search, pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter. The Crown seeks to tender the seized gun at Iyeke`s trial on an Indictment alleging possession of a loaded restricted firearm, contrary to s. 95 of the Criminal Code. At the end of the s. 8 Motion, which took place on November 7^th and 8^th, 2016, I gave a short oral ruling with reasons to follow. I held that the alleged s. 8 violation had not been established and that the seized gun was admissible in evidence. A jury trial is now proceeding. These are my reasons for the s. 8 Ruling.

[2] The present trial is a re-trial. Iyeke was previously convicted at a trial before Quigley J. and a jury. Quigley J. dismissed the s. 8 Motion brought at that trial. See: R. v. Iyeke, 2014 ONSC 2208. Iyekes conviction for the s. 95 firearms offence was reversed on appeal. The judgment on appeal turned on a hearsay issue and the Courts Reasons make no mention of the s. 8 Charter issue. See: R. v. Iyeke, 2016 ONCA 349, [2016] O.J. No. 2430 (C.A.).

[3] The parties agree that Iyeke is entitled to relitigate the s. 8 issue, as Quigley J.’s earlier decision was interlocutory and not final, and the Court of Appeal did not address it. See: R. v. Duhamel (1984), 1984 CanLII 126 (SCC), 15 C.C.C. (3d) 491 (S.C.C.); R. v. James (2011), 2011 ONCA 839, 283 C.C.C. (3d) 212 at para. 57.

[4] The parties conducted the s. 8 Motion efficiently and effectively by filing a written record of the materials that were before Quigley J., as well as some additional Affidavit materials. Quigley J. had permitted cross-examination of the search warrant Affiant on one narrow issue and a transcript of that cross-examination was filed before me. No further cross-examination was requested.

[5] The search warrant Information depends substantially on a confidential informant (hereinafter, the C.I.). As a result, there has been a great deal of editing of the disclosed search warrant Information, in order to protect informant privilege. The Crown prepared a draft judicial summary of the portions of the Information that had been edited and conceded that the search warrant could not be upheld on the basis of the Information as edited (at “step five” of Garofoli). The Crown, therefore, sought leave to rely on the unedited Information (at “step six” of Garofoli). See: R. v. Garofoli (1990), 1990 CanLII 52 (SCC), 60 C.C.C. (3d) 161 at para. 79.

[6] I reviewed the Crown’s editing of the search warrant Information and suggested that certain edits could be lifted, without compromising informant privilege. The Crown conferred with the police handler of the C.I. and acceded to most of my suggestions, while resisting a few others and justifying its position on the basis of informant privilege. I also drafted a fresh judicial summary, providing additional disclosure of the general subject matter of the edits, while not disclosing specific details that could implicitly identify the C.I. I provided the draft to the Crown who, once again, conferred with the police handler and acceded to most of my suggested summaries, while resisting a few others and justifying non-disclosure in these areas. The various draft documents exchanged between the Crown and the Court were made sealed exhibits on the s. 8 Motion.

[7] The newly edited search warrant Information, together with the newly drafted judicial summary, were then provided to the defence and the s. 8 Motion proceeded on that basis. I have attached an Appendix to these reasons that sets out the important parts of the edited search warrant Information, together with the judicial summary inserted in square brackets at the places where the Information has been edited.

[8] I recently released two written judgments relating to “step six” Garofoli Motions and so I will not repeat my understanding of the applicable legal principles, as set out in those judgments. See: R. v. Greaves-Bissesarsingh (2014), 2014 ONSC 4900, 314 C.C.C. (3d) 493 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Jaser and Esseghaier, 2014 ONSC 6052. More importantly, the Court of Appeal has now reviewed and explained the governing principles relating to this particular kind of s. 8 Motion in two recent decisions. See: R. v. Crevier (2015), 2015 ONCA 619, 330 C.C.C. (3d) 305 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524.

[9] Applying the principles set out in the above authorities, I am satisfied that the deferential Garofoli standard of review has not been met in this case, that is, on the record filed before me “the authorizing judge could have granted the [search warrant]” because there “continues to be [a] basis for the decision” to grant the search warrant. See: R. v. Greaves-Bissesarsingh, supra at para. 45 and the authorities cited therein.

[10] The parties agree that the Garofoli standard of review in this case turns on the application of the so-called Debot criteria for evaluating an informant’s tip, and for determining whether that tip rises to the level of reasonable and probable grounds. See: R. v. Debot (1986), 1986 CanLII 113 (ON CA), 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207 at 218-219 (Ont. C.A.), aff’d (1989), 1989 CanLII 13 (SCC), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.), as discussed in R. v. Greaves-Bissesarsingh, supra at paras. 33-45. Those criteria analyze the tip on the basis of whether it is credible, compelling, and corroborated.

[11] A “step six” Garofoli review of a search warrant can only proceed if the Applicant is “sufficiently aware of the nature of the excised material to challenge it in argument or by evidence.” Mr. Furgiuele conceded, on behalf of the Applicant, that the disclosure he has received (including the judicial summary of the edited parts of the search warrant Information) is sufficient to allow him to challenge the Debot factors related to “credibility” and “corroboration.” Accordingly, it is agreed that the “step six” Garofoli review can proceed in relation to these two criteria. Counsel submitted that the disclosure indicates that the C.I.’s “credibility” was weak. I agree. The judicial summary states that the C.I. was motivated by “some self-interest” and it also tends to indicate that the C.I. had no past track record of proven reliability and may have been a first time informant. In these circumstances, as in R. v. Greaves-Bissesarsingh, supra at paras. 37-9, the s. 8 Debot analysis depends on whether sufficient strength can be derived from the “compelling” and “corroboration” factors in order to compensate for weakness in relation to the “credibility” factor.

[12] Turning to the “corroboration” criterion, Mr. Furgiuele realistically conceded that there is some corroboration of the C.I. in this case. The disclosure found in the Information and in the judicial summary indicates that the C.I. advised the police of the residence and the car associated with the male target, and also advised “whether or not” the target’s name was known to the C.I. The C.I. then directed the police to the area of the target’s address where the car was parked. The police were able to confirm, by records searches and surveillance, that the address and the car were associated with John Iyeke. It is conceded by Mr. Furgiuele that these investigative steps constitute some corroboration of the C.I. in relation to the issue of identity. It is further conceded that, if the C.I. did provide the male target’s name to the police and if that name was John Iyeke (a detail that has been edited), then there would be considerable corroboration in relation to the issue of identity.

[13] Mr. Furgiuele submitted, as part of a sub-facial attack on this part of the Information, that the description of the male target provided by the C.I. – “male brown with medium complexion” and “short afro-style hair” – was inaccurate and was inconsistent with Iyeke. It was submitted that Iyeke is a “dark black” man and that his hair, while short, was not “afro-style.” These strike me as minor subjective criticisms of a physical description that was not necessarily inaccurate. In any event, the overall body of evidence relating to the identity of the target, derived from both the C.I. and the police investigation, was substantial.

[14] In addition to providing information about the identity of the target, the C.I. advised the police that the target “is dealing a large amount of cocaine.” The C.I. went on to provide firsthand details about the alleged drug trafficking. The police corroborated this aspect of the tip by conducting surveillance. The results of this surveillance were described in the Information as two instances of police observations that both involved “a hand to hand transaction.” Again, the Applicant made a sub-facial attack on the accuracy of this description by referring to subsequent testimony from the two officers who actually made these observations. I am satisfied that the descriptions in the Information may have lacked some detail but they were not inaccurate. Both officers saw Iyeke drive to two locations late at night, stop briefly, a man then approached the car, some kind of very brief transaction or interaction occurred at the driver’s side car window, the man left the car, and Iyeke then drove away. It was not inaccurate to describe both of these incidents, in an abbreviated or succinct fashion, as a “hand to hand transaction.” They certainly amounted to some circumstantial evidence of a “hand to hand transaction” and, therefore, they provided some corroboration of the tip in relation to the male target’s alleged drug trafficking activities.

[15] Finally, the C.I. advised that the male target was “believed to be in possession of a handgun” and was “seen by the source” on a particular date “with … handgun.” Any details and the means of knowledge relating to this allegation of gun possession will be discussed below. However, in relation to the “corroboration” criterion in Debot, the police performed a criminal records check on Iyeke and learned that he had two prior convictions for s. 95 firearms offences, in 2006 and 2009. Accordingly, there was some corroboration of this further aspect of the C.I.’s tip.

[16] For all these reasons, I am satisfied that the Debot “corroboration” criterion was particularly strong in this case. Indeed, it is an unusual case because the actual criminal conduct alleged in the tip – drug trafficking and gun possession – were both corroborated, unlike many s. 8 cases. See: R. v. Greaves-Bissesarsingh, supra at paras. 43-45 where this issue is discussed.

[17] That leaves the final Debot criterion, that is, whether the C.I.’s tip was “compelling.” Mr. Furgiuele submitted that he had insufficient disclosure to allow him to challenge this particular aspect of the s. 8 Debot analysis. Accordingly, he submitted that any “step six” review ought not to be permitted. I cannot accept this submission. The disclosure provided in the edited search warrant Information and in the judicial summary makes it clear that the C.I.’s tip contained considerable detail, that the tip was current, and that some significant part of the tip was based on firsthand knowledge. The C.I. met with the police twice in May 2012, including a trip that he/she took with the police to the residence of the target. The C.I. met again with the police in July 2012 and provided further information, described in the judicial summary as “detailed” and “firsthand” information relating to the target’s “drug trafficking” and “criminal activities.” This disclosure goes some considerable distance towards establishing that the tip was “compelling.” See: R. v. Greaves-Bissesarsingh, supra at paras. 40-42.

[18] The only attack on the adequacy of the judicial summary, in relation to the “compelling” criterion, was that the C.I.’s means of knowledge concerning the target’s alleged possession of a gun was not fully disclosed. I agree that this detail was deliberately left out of the judicial summary because it would have helped to identify the C.I. However, the summary stated that three paragraphs in the Information contained “detailed information about the gun, the C.I.’s means of knowledge in relation to that information, and whether it is firsthand or secondhand.” Accordingly, it was clear from the summary that the Justice of the Peace who issued the search warrant would have known the C.I.’s means of knowledge in relation to the gun and would have known whether it was based on firsthand observations or on secondhand hearsay. I advised Mr. Furgiuele to argue the point in the alternative. He then submitted, correctly, that if the C.I.’s tip about the gun was current and detailed, and was based on firsthand knowledge, then it was “compelling.” If the tip was current and detailed, but was based on secondhand hearsay, then it would clearly be much less “compelling.” See: R. v. Jaser, supra at paras. 90-92; R. v. Greaves-Bissesarsingh, supra at paras. 16-17 and 40. It can be seen that counsel was, in fact, able to make helpful submissions as to whether the C.I.’s tip about the gun was “compelling.”

[19] In R. v. Reid, supra at para. 90, Watt J.A. stated, on behalf of the Court, that a judicial summary “need only make the accused aware of the nature of the redacted material, not its substance and not its details” (italics in the original). R. v. Crevier, supra at paras. 70-81, is to similar effect as Rouleau J.A. stated, on behalf of the Court:

As mentioned, however, at step six, the very details about the confidential informer that satisfied the Debot requirements are often contained in the redacted portions of the ITO. How then can an accused mount a sub-facial attack to challenge whether the redacted details are compelling, credible and corroborated? Such an attack is possible although the information on which the attack is based must be tailored so as not to breach informer privilege, which is near absolute. In other words, an accused is not precluded from launching a sub-facial attack at step six; he or she is simply precluded from accessing the redacted portions of the ITO beyond the description of their general nature set out in the judicial summary.

Despite not having access to the redacted information, the accused, using a well-crafted judicial summary as well as the disclosure received, the redacted ITO, and any cross-examination of the affiant and evidence tendered, will nonetheless be in a position to mount a sub-facial attack and challenge the adequacy of the ITO. The accused can, for example, highlight areas of omission for the reviewing court, attack the steps (or lack thereof) taken to corroborate the information received from the informer, and make arguments in the alternative and on general principles of informer reliability. [Emphasis added.]

[20] In my view, the judicial summary in the present case complied with the above principles set out in Reid and in Crevier, in relation to the issue of whether the C.I.’s tip about a gun was “compelling.” It described the “general nature” of this part of the search warrant Information, but not any identifying “details,” and it allowed the defence to “make arguments in the alternative and on general principles” as to whether the tip was “compelling.” There was no sub-facial attack on this part of the Information, related to Mr. Iyeke’s alleged possession of a gun. In the end, I was satisfied that there was a proper basis on which the issuing justice could conclude that the tip was “compelling.”

[21] In conclusion, the search warrant Information in this case was based on an informant’s tip that was “compelling,” because it was current, it was detailed, and it was substantially based on firsthand information. In addition, the police had taken significant steps to corroborate various aspects of the tip, including the identity, residence and car associated with the target, his alleged drug trafficking activities, and his alleged possession of a gun. Although there were weaknesses in relation to the informer’s “credibility,” the tip was “compelling” and it was strongly “corroborated.” It, therefore, could be found to comply with the Debot “totality of the circumstances” approach to reasonable and probable grounds. See: R. v. Greaves-Bissesarsingh, supra at para. 33.

[22] For all these reasons, I was satisfied that the alleged violation of the Charter was not made out and the s. 8 Motion was dismissed.

M.A. Code J.

Released: November 16, 2016

APPENDIX

BACKGROUND OF THE INVESTIGATION

1. On [the day and date the Affiant spoke with the C.I.] May 2012, the affiant spoke to a confidential source. The confidential source advised the affiant about a male in the City of Toronto that is dealing a large amount of cocaine and believed to be in possession of a handgun.

2. Surveillance was conducted on the male and it was confirmed that he is living in the address [the area where the source stated that the male was living] and driving the vehicle that was described.

3. On [further day and date when the Affiant spoke with the C.I.] 2012, the source contacted the affiant and advised that the male was seen by the source on [date the C.I. saw the male with powder cocaine and a handgun] 2012 with … powder cocaine … handgun [details about the cocaine and the gun].

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE INFORMATION

4. SEE APPENDIX “D” for confidential source information. Confidential source herein after will be referred to as “CI.”

5. The confidential source provided the following information on May [date the C.I. provided the following information] 2012:

(i) [whether or not the C.I. knows the male’s name];

(ii) [whether or not the male uses a name] name is Kareem;

(iii) … is currently living … at 889 Brimorton Drive in the City of Toronto

(iv),(v),(vi) [detailed information about the exterior of the male’s residence];

(vii) [how long the C.I. has known the male and whether or not the C.I. knows how long the male has lived in the area of the address in question];

(viii) [see no. (i) above] was described as 23-26 years old, male brown with very medium complexion, he is 5’10” and has a lanky build. He has short afro style hair;

(ix) [further detailed information about the male];

(x) [further detailed information related to no. (ii) above];

(xi) [further detailed information about the male’s car or cars] has a silver Altima Nissan;

(xii) [further detailed information about the male];

(xiii) [further detailed information about the male’s cocaine trafficking] selling large amounts of cocaine in the province of Ontario;

(xiv) [detailed information about the male’s antecedents];

(xv),(xvi),(xvii) [further detailed information about the male’s trafficking];

(xviii), (xix) [further detailed information about the male’s trafficking and about his gun];

(xix), (xx) [one particular means of knowledge that the C.I. relied on about the male’s trafficking and about his gun, and whether that particular means of knowledge is first hand or second hand];

(xxi) [further detailed information about the male’s gun, the means of knowledge for that information, and whether it is first hand or second hand];

(xxii) [further information about the C.I.’s relationship with the male and about the male];

(xxiii) [further information about the place in question and about the C.I.’s knowledge or lack of knowledge about that place];

(xxiv) [a further means of knowledge relied on by the C.I. about the gun and whether the C.I. does/does not have first hand knowledge about the gun];

(xxv) [further detailed information about the drugs, without stating the means of knowledge];

(xxvi) [implicitly discloses the C.I.’s means of knowledge in relation to no. (xxv) above, and whether it is first hand or second hand];

(xxvii),(xxviii) [further detailed first hand information about the C.I.’s relationship with the male and about the length of that relationship];

(xxviii), (xxix) [further detailed first hand information about the male’s drug trafficking and the C.I.’s means of knowledge in relation to that drug trafficking];

6. The confidential source provided the following information on July [the date when the C.I. provided the following information] 2012:

(xxx) [a general place and a specific date when the C.I. obtained the information, the means of obtaining the information, and whether it was first hand or second hand];

(xxxi),(xxxii),

(xxxiii),(xxxiv),

(xxxv) [further detailed first hand information about the male’s drug trafficking and the means of obtaining the information];

(xxxvi), (xxxvii),

(xxxviii), (xxxix),

(xl), (xli), (xlii) [further detailed first hand information about the male’s criminal activities and the means of obtaining the information];

(xliii) [further information about the male’s criminal activities, the means of obtaining the information, and whether it was first hand or second hand];

POLICE DATABASE INFORMATION

7. On May 9, 2012, I performed several police computer database checks on the name of John Iyeke and learned the following:

8. The CNI info received is as follows:

*CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS CONDITIONAL AND ABSOLUTE DISCHARGES

*AND RELATED INFORMATION

2004-03-02 ASSAULT WITH A WEAPON TIME SERVED (6 DAYS)

TORONT ONT SEC 267(A) CC & PROBATION 18 MOS

(YOUTH JUSTICE & DISCRETIONARY

COURT) PROHIBITION ORDER

SEC 51(3) YOJ ACT FOR 2 YRS

2006-11-03 (1) POSS OF FIREARM OR (1-2) 1 DAY & (361 DAYS

TORONTO ONT AMMUNITION CONTRARY TO PRE-SENTENCE CUSTODY)

PROHIBITION ORDER ON EACH CHG CONC

(2) POSS OF A PROHIBITED OR & PROBATION 2 YRS

RESTRICTED FIREARM WITH & MANDATORY PROHIBITION

AMMUNITION ORDER SEC 109 CC

2009-04-02 (1) POSS OF A WEAPON (1-2) 4 YRS ON EACH CHG

TORONTO ONT (2) POSS OF A RESTRICTED CONC

FIREARM WITH AMMUNITION

(3) POSS OF FIREARM (3-4) 18 MOS ON EACH CHG

WHILE PROHIBITED CONC BUT CONSEC

(4) POSS OF AMMUNITION

WHILE PROHIBITED & MANDATORY PROHIBITION

ORDER SEC 109 CC

(CREDIT GIVEN FOR 3 YRS

PRE-SENTENCE CUSTODY)

(INST MILLHAVEN BATH)

2009-10-13 (1) POSS OF A SCHEDULED (1) $1000

PETERBOROUGH ONT SUBSTANCE

SEC 4(1) CDS ACT

(2) POSS OF PROCEEDS OF (2) $500

PROPERTY OBTAINED BY

CRIME-SEC 354(1)(A) CC

(INST MILLHAVEN)

2010-11-30 STATUTORY RELEASE

2011-08-09 STATUTORY RELEASE VIOLATOR RECOMMITTED

10. On May 9, 2012, I preformed checks on the license plate BNLN 981 and learned the following:

RE: LYC: BNLN981 PG: 01

RIN: I9639-40708-50827 TYPE: I

NAME: IYEKE, JOHN

L4M 1L1 ADDR: 10-393 BLAKE ST, BARRIE

11. The affiant conducted a road statement with the CI on May [date on which the “road statement” was taken from the C.I.] 2012; this is where the CI and the affiant travelled together in a vehicle [the fact that the C.I. directed the police to the area of 889 Brimorton Drive in Toronto]. At that time the CI directed the affiant to the area of 889 Brimorton Dr in Toronto. The CI was able to accurately direct how to get there and appeared it that the CI was in fact familiar with the area [and the Affiant’s assessment of the extent of the C.I.’s knowledge in this regard].

12. 889 Brimorton Dr was a single family home, a raised bungalow. The drive way was on the east side and there was a door on the west side of the house, the main door appeared to be on the east side. [Further detailed information about the address in question and the Affiant’s assessment of the extent of the C.I.’s knowledge in this regard.]

13. In the driveway of 889 Brimorton Dr there was a silver Nissan Altima with Ontario plate BNLN 981. This is the vehicle described by the CI … driven by John Iyeke. The affiant preformed police computer checks on that plate and learned that the vehicle is registered to John Iyeke. This corroborates the information from the CI that John drives a silver Nissan.

14. On May 7, 2012 members of the Gun and Gang Task force team 1C, including the affiant attended the address of 889 Brimorton Dr in the City of Toronto. Members arrived and set up surveillance at the address, the silver Nissan BNLN 981 was parked in the driveway.

15. John Iyeke was observed leaving the house through the west door and walking east along the front of the house and boarding the Nissan alone. Officers conducted surveillance and followed him to Whitby Ontario where Iyeke was observed conducting 2 hand to hand drug transactions.

16. The affiant observed John Iyeke pull his Nissan into the Canadiana Inn located at 723 Dundas Street East. He stopped just off the highway in the mouth of the driveway, vehicle running and waited approximately 20 seconds. At that time a male brown with a dark hoodie and black jeans approached the driver’s window from the area of the Inn, and there a hand to hand transaction took place which took less than 10 seconds. John Iyeke left the area immediately and surveillance was continued.

17. John Iyeke drove just east on Dundas Street east Whitby to Gus Brown Pontiac Buick located at 1201 Dundas Street east Whitby. Iyeke pulled off the road again and DC MacNeil # 90116 observed a male white in his early 40’s appear for an unknown location and approach the Nissan on the driver’s side. A hand to hand transaction took place between Iyeke and the male and that again took less than 10 seconds. Iyeke immediately left the area and surveillance was discontinued a short time later.

18. On July 3, 2012 members of the Gun and Gang Task force team 1C excluding the affiant conducted surveillance starting at 889 Brimorton Drive. DC MacNeil # 90116 advised the affiant that John Iyeke was observed leaving the residence through the west door and entering the Nissan that was in the driveway. Officers including DC MacNeil # 90116 followed John Iyeke to the area of Clearview heights in the City of Toronto and at that point he was misplaced.

19. On Thursday July 12, 2012 members of the Gun and Gang Task force team 1C including the affiant were in the area of 889 Brimorton Drive in an attempt to locate John Iyeke, the vehicle was not found at the address and members continued surveillance on the address. At approximately 10:15pm DC Pala # 8921 observed the silver Nissan belonging to John Iyeke turn eastbound onto Brimorton Drive from Scarborough Golf Club Road. DC MacNeil # 90116 observed the Nissan pull into 889 Brimorton Drive, John Iyeke exited the vehicle alone and entered the door on the west side of the house, a short time later lights were seen coming on through windows in the basement.

20. The physical description of John Iyeke matches the physical description provided by the CI.

21. The affiant has had the chance to look at John Iyeke in person and compared the person he saw to the electronic image of John Iyeke from the MTO data base and confirmed the person driving the Nissan is in fact Iyeke.

22. [Repetition of previous detailed information about the male’s antecedents and whether or not there is corroboration of that information.]

23. [Repetition of previous detailed information about the gun, the C.I.’s means of knowledge in relation to that information, and whether it is first hand or second hand.] Iyeke has an indefinite weapons prohibition stemming from 2 firearms possession convictions and therefore cannot legally possess a firearm. This prohibition is detailed in his CPIC hit and came into effect on 2006.11.08 and does not expire.

24. As such, John Iyeke has committed the offence of Possession of an Unregistered Restricted/Prohibited Firearm, contrary to the Criminal Code.

27

& 28. [Repetition of previous detailed information about the gun, the C.I.’s means of knowledge in relation to that information, and whether it is first hand or second hand.]

Appendix “D”

(i) [Whether or not the C.I. is registered with M.T.P.S.;]

(ii) [Whether or not the C.I. has a criminal record and whether or not the C.I. has outstanding criminal charges before the courts;]

(iii) [Whether or not the C.I. is familiar with the criminal milieu, specifically in relation to guns and drugs;]

(iv) [Whether or not the C.I. has been used before and whether or not the present information is corroborated;]

(v) [The motivation of the C.I. in providing this information, indicating some self-interest.]

(vi) The affiant is confident the information being supplied by the CI is accurate and true.

CITATION: R. v. Iyeke, 2016 ONSC 7120

COURT FILE NO.: CR-13-10000122-0000

DATE: 20161116

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

– and –

JOHN IYEKE

Applicant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

M.A. CODE J.

Released: November 16, 2016