Bruce Willson

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an encounter with the complainant in his truck.

The complainant passed away after testifying at the preliminary hearing, and her prior statements and testimony were admitted at trial.

The accused testified that the encounter was a consensual sex trade transaction and admitted to initially lying to police.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and found that while the accused's evidence was largely rejected, material inconsistencies in the complainant's hearsay evidence, without the benefit of viva voce testimony, left the court with a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused brought an application to sever an animal cruelty charge from an indictment that also included two counts of sexual assault and one count of unlawfully possessing a firearm.

The accused argued that the presence of the animal cruelty charge could cause prejudice.

The court granted the severance, finding that the emotionally powerful evidence related to the animal cruelty, combined with the complexity of the numerous sexual assault allegations, created a significant risk of the jury engaging in forbidden propensity reasoning.

This risk was deemed to outweigh the public interest in a single trial, especially given the lack of a strong nexus between the animal cruelty and sexual assault counts.

B.S. was convicted of indecent assault, a historical offense occurring almost 40 years prior.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 12 to 18 months, while the offender requested a conditional sentence or a "short, sharp" intermittent sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the escalation of abusive behavior, the significant age disparity between the offender (18-20) and the victim (10-13), the victim's vulnerability, and the profound, lasting impact on the victim as detailed in her victim impact statement.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age (56), a positive pre-sentence report, gainful employment, positive community contributions, past efforts to address depression and substance abuse, and no prior custodial sentences.

The court determined that a conditional sentence would not adequately address the principles of denunciation and general and specific deterrence, which are paramount in sexual offense cases against children.

A "short, sharp" sentence was also deemed inadequate.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 18 months, followed by three years of probation with specific conditions, a DNA order, and a 20-year SOIRA order.

A requested order under section 161(1) of the Criminal Code was denied as unnecessary given the offender's history since the offense.

The accused was charged with historical sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and uttering threats against his niece, relating to an alleged incident in 1992 when she was 16.

The trial centered on the credibility and reliability of the complainant's memory after 26 years.

Although the trial judge rejected the accused's evidence, the judge found the complainant's evidence lacked the necessary reliability and accuracy to meet the criminal standard of proof.

The accused was acquitted on all charges.

Ernest McKinnon was convicted of sexual assault, unlawful confinement, voyeurism, and a lesser included sexual assault, along with two counts of breach of recognizance.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as breach of trust in a common-law relationship, the degrading nature of the acts, and severe victim impact, against mitigating factors including the offender's age, lack of related criminal record, and expressed remorse.

The court emphasized deterrence and denunciation as primary sentencing principles for sexual assault.

A global sentence of four years incarceration was imposed for the main offences, with concurrent sentences for related counts, and time served plus one day for the breach of recognizance charges.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, SOIRA order for life, and a lifetime firearms prohibition.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, voyeurism, assault, and sexual assault with a weapon.

The trial judge found the accused guilty of sexual assault (Count 1), unlawful confinement (Count 2), and voyeurism (Count 3).

Count 4 (assault) was stayed as the act constituted sexual assault, which was not an included offence to assault simpliciter.

For Count 5 (sexual assault with a weapon), the accused was found not guilty of the weapon charge but guilty of the lesser included offence of sexual assault, as the black marker used was not deemed a "weapon" under the Criminal Code due to lack of intent to injure or actual injury.

The court assessed consent, credibility, and the "air of reality" test for mistaken belief in consent, ultimately preferring the complainant's evidence.

The applicant, Trevor William Zachary, sought certiorari to quash a fraud charge (Count 2) on an 18-count indictment following a preliminary inquiry.

He argued the preliminary inquiry judge erred by committing him to trial without evidence of deceit, falsehood, or other fraudulent means, failing to properly test the evidence against the elements of fraud, and not considering all relevant evidence.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit jurisdictional error.

It determined there was sufficient evidence to establish the actus reus and mens rea of fraud under the "other fraudulent means" category, specifically that the applicant, as a City employee, used his position to book ice time for himself at reduced or zero rates, thereby depriving the City of revenue or putting its economic interests at risk.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

Constable Glenn McLean, an OPP officer, was charged with theft of a decommissioned Intoxilyzer 5000c.

The Crown conceded that McLean had a color of right to temporarily remove the device due to a lax departmental culture regarding personal use of equipment.

The court found that the charge, particularized to "on or about December 16, 2011," could not be proven as the color of right existed at that time.

Furthermore, the court had a reasonable doubt regarding McLean's mens rea for theft, considering the open use of the device at a party and the general departmental culture.

McLean was acquitted.

Glenn McLean, an OPP Constable, faced charges including theft of gasoline (Count #6).

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence brought an application for a directed verdict on Count #6, arguing insufficient evidence to prove personal use, lack of colour of right, or dishonest purpose.

The Crown conceded Count #2 but opposed the directed verdict for Count #6, relying on circumstantial evidence.

The court applied the Sheppard test, which requires drawing reasonable inferences in favour of the Crown at this stage.

The court found that the Crown's evidence, though circumstantial, was capable of supporting an inference of dishonest use of the gasoline for non-OPP purposes.

Consequently, the application for a directed verdict on Count #6 was dismissed.

The accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude evidence obtained through a police investigation into alleged child pornography offences.

Police obtained subscriber information from an internet service provider through a Law Enforcement Request without prior judicial authorization and subsequently obtained a search warrant for the accused’s residence and computer devices.

The court held that obtaining subscriber information without prior judicial authorization constituted a breach of s. 8 of the Charter under the principles later articulated in R. v. Spencer.

However, applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court admitted the evidence because the police acted in good faith under pre‑Spencer practices and the evidence was essential to adjudicating serious charges on their merits.

The court also rejected the accused’s challenge to the Information to Obtain, finding that an error regarding peer ID numbers was inadvertent and immaterial and that the warrant was otherwise supported by reasonable and probable grounds.

The offender was convicted after trial of dangerous driving causing bodily harm arising from intentionally driving toward a pedestrian on a residential one‑way street and striking him, causing serious injuries that prevented the victim from returning to work.

The court considered aggravating factors including deliberate risk‑taking, serious injuries, flight from the scene, and a criminal record including prior driving offences.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s youth at the time of the offence, dated criminal record, family responsibilities, and evidence suggesting potential for rehabilitation.

The court concluded that denunciation and deterrence were primary objectives but that a penitentiary term would impede rehabilitation.

A custodial sentence of eighteen months followed by probation and ancillary orders was imposed.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon after striking a pedestrian with a vehicle following a dispute involving the complainant’s son.

Evidence established that earlier the accused had engaged in aggressive driving while pursuing the son on a motorcycle.

The court rejected the accused’s version that the complainant had approached wearing brass knuckles and attempted to jump onto the vehicle.

The trial judge found the accused’s driving on a narrow residential street constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver and caused serious bodily harm.

However, the court held there was reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally struck the complainant and therefore acquitted on the assault with a weapon charge.