Stephen T. Goudge

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits for 104 weeks.

The appellant insurer terminated the benefits, arguing the respondent did not meet the stricter test of suffering a complete inability to engage in any employment for which he was reasonably suited by education, training or experience.

The trial judge found the respondent met the test because he lacked the financial resources to train for long-haul trucking, which was identified as a suitable alternative.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a job requiring no substantial upgrading or retraining is a suitable alternative, even if the insured lacks formal qualifications at the time of trial.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had overturned the respondent's conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The trial judge had found that there was a risk of danger because the respondent might continue her journey once her vehicle was pulled from the ditch.

The Court of Appeal held that this finding was open to the trial judge on the evidence and that the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge erred in interfering with it.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction and sentence were restored.

The appellant appealed her convictions for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and aggravated assault for transmitting HIV to her husband through unprotected sex.

She argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding her belief that she was HIV-negative following a Canadian immigration medical assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge misapprehended some evidence, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the two-year sentence by one day to preserve the appellant's right to appeal a potential deportation order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to 4 months' imprisonment and 2 years' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence and a reduction based on time spent on bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that a conditional sentence would not provide sufficient deterrence, and noting no evidence of undue hardship or rehabilitation while on bail.

The appellant purchased 88 lots from the respondent developer.

The parties disputed who was responsible for paying certain development charges to the municipality under their Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The motion judge found the respondent was not required to pay charges due after the registration of the Plan of Subdivision, interpreting 'prerequisite' temporally.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that interpreting the contract as a whole required 'prerequisite' to mean an obligation to pay, giving effect to a clause permitting payment after registration.

The respondent lawyer acted for a purchaser in a fraudulent real estate transaction and delivered a trust cheque payable to the true owner.

The fraudster forged the endorsement and deposited the cheque into an account at the appellant bank.

The respondent sued the appellant bank for conversion and was granted summary judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision, holding that under the Supreme Court's ruling in Boma, a collecting bank is strictly liable in conversion for paying out on a forged endorsement.

The court rejected the bank's defences under the Bills of Exchange Act, finding the payee was not fictitious and the bank was not a holder in due course.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their claim for delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, noting that the appellant did nothing to pursue his claim for 10 years and offered no explanation or excuse.

The court also noted there was no evidence of steps taken to gain entry into Canada to comply with a previous order, and the appellant did not have a strong prima facie case.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle collision.

At trial, the jury found neither the appellant nor the respondent negligent, accepting evidence that an unknown driver cut in front of them and caused the sudden braking.

The appellant's action was dismissed.

On appeal, the appellant argued the unknown driver evidence should have been excluded because it was not pleaded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the evidence was known to the appellant and admitted without objection at trial.

The court also upheld the jury's assessment of damages as defensible based on the evidence of soft tissue injuries.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting his wife.

The trial judge was faced with conflicting versions of events but failed to explain how he resolved the credibility contest, relying on a misapprehended finding about the appellant's sexual appetite.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons were so inadequate that proper appellate review was impossible.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim for slander and libel under Rule 21.

The slander claim was struck because it failed to allege the words were spoken to anyone other than the plaintiff.

The libel claim, based on a letter from the respondents' solicitors, was struck because it failed to specify the exact words complained of and was protected by absolute privilege as it was sent in contemplation of litigation.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order regarding his capacity with respect to treatment, arguing that the Consent and Capacity Board member misunderstood the law and that his case should be heard de novo by a three-person panel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board member properly understood the jurisprudence despite an unfortunate use of terminology, and that the assignment of a single member was reasonable.

The court also declined to award costs to the appellant for the lower court proceedings.

The matter was referred back to the Board.

The appellant appealed an order staying the Ontario proceeding on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The respondent undertook not to raise the expiry of a limitation period if the matter proceeded in Manitoba within 60 days.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's determination that Manitoba was the proper forum and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment maintaining the existing custody and access arrangements for the parties' children.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the best interests of the children required the arrangements to remain unchanged, noting the children were healthy and doing well in school.

The court commended the respondent mother for fostering the children's relationship with their father despite his significant failure to comply with support orders.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a lawyer, represented the respondent Crossen in matrimonial litigation against the respondent Mirkopoulos.

Crossen terminated the retainer and settled with Mirkopoulos, with the agreement stating each party would bear their own costs.

The appellant sued both for her unpaid fees of $217,773.24, alleging collusion.

The trial judge dismissed the collusion claim but found Mirkopoulos liable in contract, reducing the fees to $50,000.

The Court of Appeal allowed Mirkopoulos's cross-appeal, finding the contract claim was not pleaded and unsupported by evidence.

The Court dismissed the appellant's appeal on the collusion claim, finding the settlement was not a secret arrangement designed to defeat the solicitor's claim.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his young nephew and niece.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding the use of evidence from multiple complainants, as the Crown did not allege similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to instruct the jury to keep the evidence of each complainant separate and failed to caution against propensity reasoning.

The misdirection constituted an error in law.

The convictions were quashed, a new trial was ordered on five counts, and an acquittal was directed on one count due to an unreasonable verdict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against the thirteen-year-old daughter of his former partner.

The case turned entirely on credibility, with the trial judge rejecting the appellant's evidence based on three perceived inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence underlying all three bases for rejecting the appellant's testimony.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The respondent, a real estate appraiser, was disciplined by the appellant professional institute.

He successfully sued the appellant at trial, arguing that the discipline process was procedurally unfair because he was not granted a hearing before the Investigating Committee.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no breach of the implied contractual duty of fairness.

The Investigating Committee's role was merely to recommend charges, not to impose sanctions, and the respondent was given an opportunity to respond in writing during the investigation.

Following the dissolution of the law firm representing the plaintiff in a proposed class proceeding, the representative plaintiff chose to retain a new firm formed by some of the former partners.

The appellant, a firm formed by the former supervising partner, brought a motion to strike the notice of change of solicitors and replace the representative plaintiff.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a representative plaintiff has the right to choose counsel, subject to court review based on competence, improper considerations, and prejudice to the class.

The court also stayed a competing class action commenced by the appellant as an abuse of process.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to set aside an order noting them in default.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge failed to consider prejudice or the possible merits of the defence.

Given the lack of prejudice and the defence put forward, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the noting in default, despite the inadequate representation by the appellants' previous counsel.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.