Roy R. McMurtry

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial judge erred in his findings at paragraphs 21 and 33 of his reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were reasonably supported by the evidence.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $8,250 plus disbursements, GST, and the costs of maintaining a letter of credit.

Following the release of its decision on the appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The parties agreed that costs should follow the event but left the determination of the quantum to the court.

The court fixed costs in the amount of $15,000 all-inclusive, payable by the respondent to the appellants.

Tarion Warranty Corporation brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning the validity of regulatory settlements that include terms waiving the right to appeal to the License Appeal Tribunal.

Tarion argued that the decision would impact its own similar licensing regime under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Attorney General of Ontario's intervention under the Judicial Review Procedure Act adequately defended the practice of regulators entering into such settlements, making Tarion's intervention unnecessary.

The Minister of Transportation appealed a final declaratory judgment interpreting a 60-day cure period provision in the Highway 407 Concession and Ground Lease Agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge lacked jurisdiction to grant a final declaration, as the agreement's comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism reserved such interpretations for an arbitrator.

However, the court found the application judge did have jurisdiction to grant an interim order preserving the parties' rights pending arbitration.

The appeal was allowed and the judgment set aside.

Following the release of its judgment regarding a sealing order on search warrant materials, the Court of Appeal was informed that the redacted names were not the subjects of the search warrants, but rather two other individuals mentioned in the materials.

The Attorney General of Canada requested a revised judgment, while the appellant media organization requested an addendum.

The Court agreed with the appellant, releasing an addendum to note the new information and varying the formal order to permit media access to the redacted names.

The appellants, bondholders of BC Tel (predecessor to Telus), appealed a trial decision finding that BC Tel did not breach a 'no financial advantage covenant' when it redeemed bonds using proceeds from a securitization transaction.

The covenant prohibited redemption using funds obtained directly or indirectly through borrowings with an interest cost less than 11.35%.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while the securitization involved a 'true sale' of accounts receivable, the transaction as a whole functioned to raise capital from the public.

Thus, the proceeds applied to redeem the bonds constituted funds indirectly obtained through borrowings at an interest cost to the company of less than 11.35%, violating the covenant.

The appellants, a media organization and a reporter, sought access to the names of individuals whose premises were searched under warrants related to a national security investigation.

The initial judge maintained a sealing order over the names to protect the privacy of innocent persons.

The reviewing judge dismissed an application for certiorari.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found an error of law on the face of the record because the initial judge failed to consider reasonably alternative measures, specifically allowing media access to the names while imposing a publication ban.

The appeal was allowed, and an order was made granting media access to the names subject to a non-publication order.

The Crown appealed a youth court judge's decision to stay proceedings against a young person due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The young person had been in custody for three months from arrest to the scheduled trial date.

The youth court judge found that the Youth Criminal Justice Act created an enhanced duty for speedier trials compared to the Young Offenders Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the youth court judge erred, as the YCJA merely codified existing jurisprudence and did not impose new, stricter timelines.

The Court found the three-month delay reasonable and set aside the stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that set aside the accused's conviction for care and control of a motor vehicle.

The accused's vehicle was half in a ditch, and he had called a tow truck.

The appeal court judge had ruled that the conviction could not stand because the accused did not intend to set the car in motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge reasonably found a risk of danger that the accused might drive off or inadvertently set the car in motion once it was extricated.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their action against a police officer and the Police Services Board as statute-barred by a six-month limitation period.

The central issue was whether the appellants' solicitor ought to have discovered the officer's identity on March 10, when a junior secretary picked up a letter identifying him, or on March 11, when the solicitor actually read it.

The Court of Appeal held that reasonable diligence did not require the solicitor to read the letter on March 10.

The appeal was allowed with respect to the officer, permitting the action against him to continue, but the dismissal against the Board was upheld on consent.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment awarding sole custody of the children to the respondent mother, arguing he should have been awarded joint or sole custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions—that the parents had a genuine inability to communicate, the mother was genuinely afraid of the father, and the mother had provided the great majority of care—were reasonable and justified the custody order.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $3,000 awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the decision of the motion judge, who ordered that claims involving the parents should not be joined in the Family Law action.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge properly exercised her discretion and dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision regarding custody, pension valuation, and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the arguments regarding custody and pension valuation.

The court held that the spousal support order was open to the trial judge, noting the appellant could move to vary it if she failed to reach the anticipated level of self-sufficiency despite her best efforts.

The appeal was dismissed, the stay on the sale of the matrimonial home was lifted, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his 15-month custodial sentence.

He had been denied bail on a second set of charges and refused a lifting of bail on his first charge.

The second set of charges was later withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge should have considered the six months served on the withdrawn charges as relevant information under section 726.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court agreed with the 15-month sentence but granted 12 months of credit (at a 2:1 ratio) for pre-trial custody.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for an offence involving the theft of jewellery and the alleged use of an imitation gun.

He argued the trial judge failed to distinguish between credibility and reliability, ignored his statement to police, and that the Crown's cross-examination was improper.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and that, while there were improprieties in the cross-examination, they did not destroy the appearance of a fair trial in a judge-alone proceeding.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The Children's Lawyer for Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision that dismissed its application for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order.

The Commissioner had ordered the disclosure of certain records requested by a former client of the Children's Lawyer.

On judicial review, the Commissioner defended her decision on a new ground, arguing the Children's Lawyer was not acting as Crown counsel.

The Children's Lawyer challenged the Commissioner's standing to raise this new argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court properly exercised its discretion under the Judicial Review Procedure Act to grant the Commissioner full standing to ensure a fully informed adjudication.

The appellant employee took a stress leave from her position as a service advisor at an automobile dealership.

Upon her return, the employer failed to place her in her former position or pay her the agreed-upon rate, instead assigning her menial tasks.

The trial judge found the employee did not wish to return to work and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the employer unilaterally changed the fundamental terms of employment, constituting constructive dismissal.

The Court awarded 10 months' salary in lieu of notice, but declined to award Wallace damages as there was no bad faith.

Two competitors in the outbound international mail industry brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning the interpretation of the Canada Post Corporation Act's exclusive privilege provisions.

The moving parties sought to be added as parties or friends of the court, arguing they had a direct interest as they were facing similar injunction proceedings by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, adding the moving parties as intervenors with the right to augment the record, finding they had a sufficient interest and common questions of law with the main proceeding.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found a mutual mistake in a soil disposal contract and implied an industry standard for calculating volume.

The respondent had billed the appellants based on truck capacity rather than actual soil removed, resulting in a significantly higher invoice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding mutual mistake, the ability to calculate volume from weight, and the industry standard.

The Court held the contract was clear on its face and the appellants were only liable for the actual volume of soil removed.

The appellant purchased a used truck from the respondent dealership, financed by the respondent bank.

After discovering engine problems and a rolled-back odometer, the appellant abandoned the truck and sued for fraud, seeking rescission and damages for lost earnings.

The trial judge awarded the appellant $8,000 for engine repairs but dismissed the fraud and consequential damages claims, while granting the bank's counterclaim for the balance of the loan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings that there was no evidence of a vehicle switch or conspiracy to defraud.