Robert Craig Bottomley

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal raised four grounds: (1) whether the first case management judge erred in denying leave to cross-examine the affiant; (2) whether the second case management judge erred in dismissing the motion to relitigate the cross-examination application; (3) whether the application judge erred in rejecting the Charter section 8 challenge to the search warrant; and (4) whether the application judge erred in admitting evidence despite a violation of the appellant's section 10(b) rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

Following conviction on two counts of dangerous driving causing death and two counts of impaired driving/over 80 causing death arising from a motor vehicle collision that killed two young women, the court imposed a global sentence of six years custody on the impaired driving counts and five years custody on the dangerous driving counts, all running concurrently.

The court rejected both the Crown's submission for 7-8 years and the defence submission for 4 years, balancing denunciation and deterrence against the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and strong rehabilitative prospects.

The court also imposed a 12-year driving prohibition and a non-communication order.

The court rejected the defence argument that the impaired driving counts should be stayed under the Kienapple principle, finding that impaired driving and dangerous driving address different aspects of road safety.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of expert evidence from Cara Shepard, a forensic toxicologist, in the trial of Aysar Younes for impaired and dangerous driving causing death.

The court found that while Ms. Shepard’s evidence regarding cocaine use was necessary and within her expertise, it lacked probative value on the issue of impairment or crash phase at the time of the collision and was therefore inadmissible for that purpose.

However, the court allowed the evidence for the limited purpose of establishing continuity of the blood sample.

This decision concerns the prosecution of Aysar Younes for two counts each of impaired driving/over 80 causing death and dangerous driving causing death, arising from a fatal collision on Highway 2 in Trenton, Ontario.

The court addresses the admissibility and reliability of blood alcohol evidence, the continuity of evidence, and the legal standards for impaired and dangerous driving causing death.

The court finds the evidence of blood alcohol concentration and impairment reliable and sufficient, and concludes that Younes' conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care, resulting in conviction on all counts.

The accused, Aysar Younes, faced charges of operating a conveyance causing death while impaired/over 80 and dangerous operation causing death.

This ruling addressed two Crown applications: to declare a statement made by Younes to police voluntary, and to determine the admissibility of evidence from a friend regarding the normality of cocaine use in their social group.

The court found the statement voluntary for cross-examination purposes, as conceded by the defence.

However, the court dismissed the Crown's application to admit evidence about the normality of cocaine use, finding its probative value low and the risk of moral prejudice high, particularly in a jury trial.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained by police following a fatal motor vehicle collision, alleging breaches of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the warrantless seizure of airbag control module (ACM) data was lawful under s. 489(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, as police had reasonable grounds to believe it would provide evidence of an offence.

Similarly, the production order for medical records and search warrant for blood vials were deemed valid, as reasonable grounds existed to suspect impairment.

However, the search warrant for the applicant's cell phone was found to be overly broad and the subsequent search unlawful, infringing s. 8.

Applying the Grant factors, the court admitted the ACM data, medical records, and toxicology reports, but excluded all evidence obtained from the cell phone search due to the seriousness and impact of the breach.

The appellant, Elias Gibb, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, raising three grounds: the constitutionality of the Criminal Code's provocation provision (s. 232(2)), the trial judge's failure to provide a free-standing instruction on intoxication's impact on mens rea for murder, and an error in the W.D. instruction for co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge based on a companion case.

Regarding intoxication, the court found no error, noting the defence strategically chose to integrate intoxication into the provocation defence rather than seeking a separate instruction.

The court also found that while the W.D. instruction was imperfect in its wording, it did not lead to an unfair verdict when read in context, as the jury was otherwise properly instructed on separate verdicts for each accused.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Marcia Motayne, appealed her conviction for fraud over $5,000, stemming from a large-scale payroll fraud exceeding $900,000 perpetrated through her employer's system.

The appellant, as Director of Finance, had exclusive control over the payroll, and the fraudulent transfers were linked to her bank accounts and directly benefited her and her family.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding reasonable doubt, the elements of fraud, and motive, and demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, when viewed functionally, was adequate.

The court held that any minor errors in the charge were harmless given the overwhelming evidence against the appellant, to which the curative proviso applied.

Furthermore, the court found no basis for a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The appellant, Adam Kaup, appealed his convictions for drug possession and trafficking, arguing two main points: that the search warrant for his home was invalid due to insufficient grounds and misleading information in the Information to Obtain (ITO), and that the trial judge erred in finding he had constructive possession of drugs found in the basement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision.

The court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the ITO, concluding that it provided sufficient grounds for the warrant when viewed holistically.

Regarding constructive possession, the court affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the law, considering all circumstantial evidence beyond mere occupancy, and reasonably concluded that the appellant had knowledge and control of the drugs.

The appellants, committed to trial for second-degree murder, successfully appealed a judicial review order that had quashed their preliminary inquiry judge's decision and directed committal for first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found the reviewing judge erred by substituting his view of the evidence for that of the preliminary inquiry judge, incorrectly identifying jurisdictional errors.

The preliminary inquiry judge had correctly applied the law and did not commit jurisdictional error by finding insufficient evidence for first-degree murder.

The appeal was allowed, the judicial review decision quashed, and the original committal for second-degree murder reinstated.

The appellant, Michael Trought, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised two grounds: unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 11(b) appeal, finding the transitional exceptional circumstance applied and prejudice was not sufficiently established.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the ground of ineffective assistance, concluding that trial counsel failed to properly advise the appellant on the concept of constructive possession and agreed to a "blended procedure" (where voir dire evidence applied to the trial proper) without the appellant's informed consent.

This failure undermined the appellant's fundamental right to decide whether to testify and rendered the trial unfair.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Kevin Faudar, appealed his convictions for various firearms offences, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

His grounds included a conflict of interest due to counsel's prior representation of a key witness (X.Y.), improper advice to testify, and general incompetence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no actual conflict of interest that impaired trial fairness, that the decision for the appellant to testify was a reasonable strategic choice given the strong circumstantial evidence of constructive possession, and that counsel's overall performance did not fall below the standard of reasonableness or result in a miscarriage of justice.

The court affirmed the convictions and the sentence.

The accused was convicted at trial of incest and sexual interference against the complainant, his daughter.

The accused appealed on the basis that the trial judge improperly extended or relied upon principles from governing cases regarding the timing of complaint, thereby sidestepping inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, and that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons on how he resolved those inconsistencies.

A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the further appeal, substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal.

Four co-accused appealed convictions arising from a large-scale police investigation into criminal gang activity in Toronto (Project Battery and Project Rx).

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The key issues involved: (1) material non-disclosure regarding the use of a Mobile Device Identifier (MDI); (2) warrantless police entries into common areas of condominium buildings; and (3) warrantless installation of hidden surveillance cameras in condominium hallways.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions but found that the warrantless installation of hidden cameras violated section 8 rights.

However, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants' convictions were dismissed except for a one-year sentence reduction for one appellant due to the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence regarding drug quantities.

Two members of the YBK (Young Buck Killers) criminal organization appealed their convictions for gang-related offences including trafficking in firearms and drugs.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on trafficking charges, territorial jurisdiction, and hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions, finding no misdirection on the trafficking charges, no jurisdictional error as the offences had meaningful connections to Ontario, and no error in the admission of hearsay evidence.

The applicant's leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence of 13 years' imprisonment was upheld as proportionate to the serious offences committed in furtherance of a violent criminal organization.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud under $5,000 and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to obtaining a false driver's licence under a false name, which was subsequently presented to police after two car crashes.

The appellant challenged the validity of his guilty plea, arguing it was uninformed, that the facts did not establish the necessary element of "risk of loss or deprivation," that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance as a self-represented litigant, and that the sentencing was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and dismissed both the appeal and the leave to appeal sentence.

The accused appealed his fraud conviction, arguing that the trial judge wrongly admitted non-expert opinion evidence.

The Court held that the appellate court properly applied the curative proviso even though it was not explicitly named in the Crown's submissions, because the substance of the point was argued.

It concluded no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The conviction was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Paul Redmond, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by incorrectly placing the onus on the appellant to prove his alibi on a balance of probabilities, thereby skewing the credibility assessment.

Additionally, the trial judge misapprehended and misused medical records, which documented symptoms but did not confirm an injury, and improperly treated the complainant's prior consistent statements in the records as proof of truth.

The appeal was allowed, the finding of guilt quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a tax return preparer, was convicted of fraud over $5,000 for filing false claims of charitable donations on behalf of his clients to a registered charity called Tractors for Daily Bread.

The appellant claimed he believed the donations were valid and had relied on the charity's director to verify them.

He was sentenced to 30 months in custody.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of non-expert opinion evidence from a Canada Customs and Revenue Agency investigator, the trial judge's instruction on mens rea, and the instruction on prior inconsistent statements.

The majority dismissed the conviction appeal and sentence appeal, while the dissent would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

Appeals from conviction and sentence in a complex fraud case involving a scheme to divert millions of dollars from the Canadian Revenue Agency.

The appellants were convicted of fraud over $5,000 following a four-month jury trial.

The appellants challenged their convictions on multiple grounds including delay, issue estoppel, evidentiary rulings, and jury instructions.

The Crown appealed the quantum of the fine in lieu of forfeiture imposed on one appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals and the sentence appeals, but granted leave to appeal on the sentencing issues.