Robert A. Blair

The appellant pleaded guilty to eight drug-related offences, including production and possession for the purpose of trafficking marijuana and cocaine, and breaches of recognizance.

He was sentenced to 16 months in prison pursuant to a joint submission.

He appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the guilty pleas were voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant failed to demonstrate that the joint submission was contrary to the public interest or that the sentence was disproportionate given his criminal record.

The appellant appealed his sentence, introducing a Gladue report as fresh evidence to provide context regarding his Aboriginal background.

The Court of Appeal considered the fresh evidence and the appellant's rehabilitative efforts but found no error in principle in the trial judge's reasons.

The trial judge had already rejected a penitentiary sentence in favour of a reformatory sentence with probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding the sentence was fit and fully reflected the principles mandated by Gladue and Ipeelee.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and using forged documents after obtaining a fraudulent mortgage using her half-sister's identity.

She appealed her convictions, arguing they violated the Kienapple rule, and her 3.5-year sentence.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's refusal to order a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no legal nexus between the offences.

While the trial judge erred in principle during sentencing, the 3.5-year sentence was upheld as fit given the breach of trust and the appellant's history.

The Crown's appeal was allowed in part, with a $10,700 fine in lieu of forfeiture ordered based on the limited evidence of the appellant's control over the unrecovered funds.

The appellant tenant appealed a summary judgment decision that found it had not validly exercised its lease renewal option.

The motion judge concluded that the parties' conduct did not amount to a waiver of the notice requirement and that post-deadline negotiations were for a new lease, not a renewal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the record supported the motion judge's conclusions and that the landlord did not act in bad faith by considering other tenant options.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault and breach of probation after attacking a man with a tire iron who intervened when the appellant approached his ex-wife.

He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment less pre-trial custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by treating a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and by finding a high risk to reoffend without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge merely rejected remorse as a mitigating factor and reasonably inferred a high risk of reoffending from the appellant's escalating aggressive conduct.

The Crown appealed a 14-month conditional sentence imposed for aggravated assault.

The respondent conceded that a conditional sentence was not legally available for this offence.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a sentence of incarceration was appropriate but, noting the respondent had already served 11 months of the sentence, his strong rehabilitative potential, and Gladue principles, varied the sentence to 11 months' time served plus 12 months' probation.

The appellant pled guilty to possession of stolen property after purchasing six tractor trailer loads of stolen commercial goods worth $500,000.

He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment and three years' probation.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by overemphasizing general deterrence and failing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the sentence was within the appropriate range given the magnitude of the crime and the motivation of greed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in declining to impose a conditional sentence and seeking to introduce fresh evidence of his rehabilitative efforts while on bail.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting the sentencing judge adequately considered the appellant's family circumstances and the nature of his crimes.

The fresh evidence was deemed an extension of what was expected at sentencing and did not change the outcome.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pled guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to nine years globally, with a net sentence of seven years after credit for pre-trial custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in his treatment of mitigating factors and in failing to provide 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the treatment of mitigating factors but concluded the sentencing judge made a mathematical or principled error by failing to apply the intended 2:1 credit.

The appeal was allowed and the net sentence was varied to five and a half years.

The self-represented appellants appealed an order striking their amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the pleading contained overly broad, conclusory allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and negligence without supporting material facts.

The Court also noted that many allegations were attempts to re-litigate previously determined issues, and the defects could not be cured by further amendment.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 12 months' incarceration and two years' probation for multiple offences, including forcible entry, assault causing bodily harm, and uttering death threats.

He argued the sentence was harsh, failed to adequately apply the Gladue analysis, and violated the jump principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's application of Gladue or the jump principle, and concluding the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellants appealed the motion judge's refusal to certify a class action against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion under s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act to hear the appeal regarding the refusal to certify the action against the College, Farnsworth, and the Estate of Haig.

The court directed that the appeal involving those parties be transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for several offences, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in the Secure Forensic Service at Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences.

The appellant argued he should receive an absolute discharge and that the Board erred in applying the test for the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's assessment of the evidence reasonable and concluding that the transfer to the Secure Forensic Service was actually less restrictive due to a higher staff-to-patient ratio allowing for greater freedom.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault with a weapon after attacking his adoptive parents.

Following psychiatric assessments, the trial judge found the appellant not criminally responsible (NCR) due to a mental disorder, likely schizophrenia.

The appellant appealed the NCR verdict, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel's strategy was professional and caused no prejudice, and that the NCR verdict was well-supported by the evidence of the appellant's mental decline, bizarre behaviour, and expert testimony.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing his actions did not constitute a criminal attempt.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to distinguish between the actus reus and mens rea of an attempt.

The Court held that the appellant's inquiries, lacking any follow-up conduct, did not go beyond mere preparation and therefore the actus reus for an attempt was not established.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and acquittals entered.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 9 years (8 years for aggravated assault) less 3 years credit for pre-trial custody.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by inappropriately balancing his mistreatment in pre-trial custody against the severe injuries inflicted on the victim.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge's comments were unfortunate, he did not err in principle in exercising his discretion to assess the appropriate credit for pre-trial custody.

The sentence was fit and within the range for the offences committed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent mortgagee payment under a charge and possession of the charged property.

The appellants argued that being late with payments constituted 'arrears' rather than 'default', and that the mortgagee made unauthorized changes to the charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no distinction between late payments and default in the mortgage terms, and confirming that a single event of default was sufficient to accelerate the mortgage debt.

The trustee in bankruptcy suspected the bankrupt was hiding assets using a third party.

The trustee sought an order compelling the bankrupt and his lawyer to disclose the identity of the person paying the bankrupt's legal fees for a previous motion.

The motion judge granted the order, finding the information was not privileged.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that administrative information relating to the solicitor-client relationship, including the identity of the person paying the lawyer's bills, is presumptively privileged.

The court found the presumption was not rebutted because the information was relevant to the merits of the underlying dispute and its disclosure would reveal confidential communications.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree and second-degree murder.

He appealed, arguing that the Crown's closing address was improper, that opinion and hearsay evidence from a police agent was wrongly admitted, and that the Crown's theory of motive was based on speculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's addendum to the jury charge effectively cured any defects in the Crown's closing address, the police agent's evidence was necessary narrative, and the Crown's theory of motive was based on proper inferences from the evidence.

The appellant financed the respondent's purchase of equipment through a lease agreement.

The respondent sued, alleging the equipment was defective, and the appellant counterclaimed for default under the lease, moving for summary judgment.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's motion and counterclaim, finding no contract existed due to delay in acceptance and intervening defects.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding there were triable issues regarding whether the contract was accepted by conduct and whether the goods' condition changed, and restored the counterclaim for trial.