Robert A. Blair

The appellant appealed her 9-year sentence for manslaughter, arguing it was outside the appropriate range and failed to give meaningful effect to her Aboriginal status under Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly considered and distinguished relevant case law, and appropriately balanced rehabilitative and Gladue objectives with the paramount need for public safety given the appellant's substance abuse and risk to the community.

In an addendum to a previous appeal decision, the Court of Appeal accepted a joint submission regarding the time to pay a $10,700 fine imposed in lieu of forfeiture.

The offender was granted two years to pay the fine following her latest date of release from custody in relation to her current and pending sentences.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's refusal to award augmented costs under s. 258.6(2) of the Insurance Act following a successful motor vehicle accident claim.

The trial judge had concluded the provision did not apply because the respondent municipality was not an insurer.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence demonstrating that the municipality's legal department was acting on behalf of its insurer, who had received notice of the claim and failed to respond to repeated requests to mediate.

The appeal was allowed, and the trial costs award was increased by $20,000 to reflect the insurer's failure to mediate.

The appellant law firm appealed an order refusing to set aside a consent order that referred its account to an assessment officer.

The client had retained the firm under a contingency fee agreement to pursue a long-term disability claim, which settled.

The client later sought an assessment of the account.

A dispute arose over the validity of the contingency fee agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that an assessment officer generally lacks jurisdiction to determine disputes regarding the validity or effect of a retainer agreement, including contingency fee agreements.

Such disputes should be determined by a judge.

The appeal was allowed, the consent order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Superior Court of Justice.

The first mortgagee, BDC, successfully applied for the appointment of a receiver over the debtor's assets.

The debtor and the second mortgagee sought to appeal the order, arguing the second mortgagee was entitled to exercise its rights under s. 22 of the Mortgages Act to put the first mortgage in good standing without paying HST arrears.

The Court of Appeal held that there is no automatic right to appeal a receivership order under s. 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court clarified the test for granting leave to appeal under s. 193(e) and denied leave, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious and would unduly hinder the timely sale of the property.

Following a successful appeal that set aside a default judgment, the appellant requested additional remedies including setting aside the noting in default, lifting a writ of seizure and sale, setting aside costs, and extending the time to file a statement of defence.

The Court of Appeal granted these requests, finding they flowed naturally from the order setting aside the default judgment.

The Court declined the respondents' request to impose a timetable for further procedural steps, leaving such matters to the Superior Court.

The appellant mother appealed an order dismissing her appeal for delay.

Her original appeal was from a summary judgment finding her child in need of protection.

The mother failed to perfect her appeal within the 14-day period mandated by Rule 38(22), mistakenly believing she needed a transcript of submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle by the status hearing judge, as the paramount consideration was the best interests of the child and the need for expeditious resolution of placement and access issues.

The appellants, a nurse and a hospital, appealed a jury verdict finding them liable for a brain injury suffered by an infant during birth.

The jury found the nurse 75% liable and the hospital 25% liable, while dismissing claims against the delivering physician.

The appellants argued the verdict was unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of causation and lack of expert evidence on the hospital's standard of care, and that the trial judge erred in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury was entitled to determine the hospital's standard of care without expert evidence, that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of causation based on a robust and pragmatic application of the 'but for' test, and that the jury charge contained no reversible errors.

The appellant appealed convictions for prolonged sexual abuse of his stepdaughter and appealed sentence, seeking to rely on fresh Gladue evidence.

The court held there was no reviewable error in the trial judge’s application of the credibility principles in W.D. and dismissed the conviction appeal.

Although the Crown consented to admission of the fresh Gladue report, the court found the appellant’s claim to Gladue consideration weak, the report speculative on causation, and the offences so serious that Aboriginal background did not materially affect sentence fitness.

Both conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim against the Bank defendants for wrongful termination of his loan facilities and granting the defendants' counterclaim for the outstanding balance.

The Bank defendants cross-appealed the awards of pre-judgment interest and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding the Bank had broad contractual powers to cancel the facilities based on credit risk.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal regarding pre-judgment interest, varying the judgment to provide for interest at the contractual rate of 7.5% per annum, but denied leave to appeal costs.

The Bank defendants were awarded substantial indemnity costs of the appeal.

The Crown appealed a six-year sentence imposed following convictions on 32 counts arising from prolonged domestic violence and sexual assaults against an intimate partner and children.

Applying the deferential sentence appeal standard, the court held that the sentence was manifestly unfit given the number of offences, the duration and escalation of the abuse, the use of weapons, the vulnerability of the victims, and the severe impact on them.

The court compared the case to prior appellate authorities involving severe spousal abuse and sexual violence, while emphasizing the additional aggravating feature of multiple child victims.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to a global sentence of 12 years' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellants were ordered to pay costs to the respondent Diocese in the amount of $20,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant mother appealed an order directing the return of her child to Australia pursuant to the Hague Convention.

The application judge found the child was habitually resident in Australia and that returning the child would not pose a grave risk of harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of habitual residence or the grave risk of harm threshold.

The parties' Agreement to Arbitrate provided for an appeal directly to the Court of Appeal on a question of law.

The appellant filed the appeal in the Court of Appeal, but the court held that it lacked jurisdiction, as parties cannot confer jurisdiction by agreement and the Arbitration Act does not provide for direct appeals to the Court of Appeal.

The court declined to transfer the matter under s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act, leaving the appellant to pursue remedies in the Superior Court.

The appellants pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and forcible confinement after subjecting a vulnerable victim to 17 days of torture.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission for one appellant and the Crown's proposal for the other, imposing significantly higher sentences without providing reasons or allowing counsel to make submissions.

The Court of Appeal found this was an error in principle, as a joint submission should not be rejected unless it is contrary to the public interest and brings the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeals were allowed and the sentences were reduced to align with the original submissions.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for robbery with a firearm and use of a firearm during the commission of an offence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant and the Crown that the conviction under s. 85(1)(a) was statute-barred because its wording specifically excludes a s. 344 offence.

The court set aside the s. 85(1)(a) conviction and entered an acquittal.

The court also agreed that the concurrent sentence for the s. 85(1)(a) offence was illegal.

However, the court upheld the eight-year sentence for robbery with a firearm, which was based on a joint submission, dismissing the sentence appeal.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for certiorari of a preliminary inquiry judge's decision committing them to stand trial for bid rigging and conspiracy.

They argued that the Requests for Proposals were not calls or requests for bids or tenders under s. 47 of the Competition Act because they did not result in a contractual entitlement to perform services.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed trier of fact could conclude that the procurement process created a bidding contract and that the appellants had made bids in response to a call or request for bids or tenders.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay 17 charges, including human trafficking, against the respondent.

The trial judge found that police had fabricated evidence by planting false identification in the respondent's wallet and that an officer lied about it in testimony, constituting an abuse of process and a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or his conclusion that the egregious police conduct warranted a stay of proceedings to preserve the integrity of the judicial system.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision refusing him leave to amend his statement of claim to add a claim for constructive dismissal against his former employer.

The motion judge had found the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, concluding the appellant knew or ought to have known of the claim on the date his lawyer sent a letter indicating his readiness to return to work.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge's conclusion unreasonable as the employer required a reasonable time to respond to the letter.

The limitation period issue was left for determination at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for uttering a threat to cause death, criminal harassment, and failing to comply with an undertaking, as well as his global sentence of seven months' incarceration.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable due to flawed credibility assessments and that the trial judge created an appearance of bias by extensively questioning witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the credibility assessments were open to the trial judge and the questioning was merely to clarify testimony from unsophisticated witnesses.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.