Timothy Kinnaird

The applicant sought a declaration that the respondent's hydro conduit and protective metal sleeve (U-guard) encroached upon her right of way and an order for their removal.

The parties owned neighbouring properties with a mutual driveway easement.

The applicant claimed the U-guard prevented her from using the right of way to park her vehicle.

The court found that the hydro conduit and U-guard were necessary fixtures and did not constitute an encroachment, as the measured width of the right of way remained sufficient.

Even if it were an encroachment, it did not cause substantial interference with the reasonable use of the right of way.

The application was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The defendant, Kyriacos Lakkotrypis, sought leave to amend his statement of defence and add a counterclaim, which the plaintiff opposed.

The proposed amendments included withdrawing admissions and advancing a counterclaim potentially outside the limitation period.

The court granted leave to amend the statement of defence, finding that most amendments did not constitute a withdrawal of admissions and that the few that did met the test for withdrawal, given the defendant's self-representation and lack of legal advice.

The court also allowed the counterclaim to proceed, determining that the limitation period issue was a triable question of fact not suitable for determination on a pleadings motion.

The motion to amend for the corporate defendants was adjourned.

The applicant filed a Contravention of Settlement Application alleging the respondent failed to pay $3,000 in general damages agreed to in Minutes of Settlement.

The respondent admitted to the non-payment but cited financial hardship as the reason.

The Tribunal found that financial strain does not excuse compliance with a binding settlement agreement.

The application was granted, and the respondent was ordered to immediately pay the $3,000 owed, along with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

The respondent in a human rights application requested an order compelling the Toronto Police Services Board to produce video statements of the applicant, respondent, and two witnesses.

The Tribunal found the statements arguably relevant and ordered the police to produce them to the respondent's counsel, who must then share them with the applicant's counsel.

Following an earlier endorsement awarding substantial indemnity costs, the court determined the allocation and quantum of costs arising from a family law motion.

The court considered whether the respondent’s counsel should personally bear responsibility under rule 24(9) of the Family Law Rules for unnecessarily increasing litigation costs.

The judge found that both the respondent and his lawyer engaged in unreasonable conduct that created unnecessary legal work for the applicant.

The applicant’s bill of costs was accepted in full.

Responsibility for the costs was divided equally between the respondent and his counsel.

The respondent in a human rights application filed a Request for Order During Proceedings seeking the names and addresses of the applicant's spouse and a relative/friend who were present at a specific meeting.

The Tribunal denied the request as premature, noting that under Rule 17 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure, the parties were not yet required to file their witness information and statements.

The Tribunal also reminded the applicant of the proper procedure for amending her application to include new Code grounds.

Following a successful appeal that set aside a default judgment, the appellant requested additional remedies including setting aside the noting in default, lifting a writ of seizure and sale, setting aside costs, and extending the time to file a statement of defence.

The Court of Appeal granted these requests, finding they flowed naturally from the order setting aside the default judgment.

The Court declined the respondents' request to impose a timetable for further procedural steps, leaving such matters to the Superior Court.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether it was in the interests of justice to set aside the default judgment.

The Court noted that the damage award exceeded the simplified rules limit, and there were issues regarding statutory deductibles and whether the claim met the threshold.

The default judgment was set aside.

The defendant moved to set aside a default judgment arising from a motor vehicle accident action in which the plaintiffs obtained judgment following an undefended trial.

The court considered whether service of the statement of claim was regular and proper under an order for substituted service and whether the defendant satisfied the three-part test under Rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the plaintiffs complied with the substituted service order and the defendant failed to rebut the presumption of proper service.

The defendant also failed to provide a plausible explanation for the default or establish an arguable defence on the merits.

The motion to set aside the default judgment was dismissed.