Bois Wilson

The court considered whether Parkland Corporation was entitled to a permanent injunction and other relief against 2700455 Ontario Inc. for breach of an exclusive fuel supply agreement.

The court found that 270 breached the agreement by failing to provide a security deposit and by selling non-Parkland fuel.

The court rejected arguments of frustration and fundamental breach, held the exclusive supply clause enforceable, and granted a permanent injunction prohibiting 270 from selling non-Parkland fuel.

Damages were left for trial, and costs were awarded to Parkland.

Following the successful dismissal of a medical malpractice action on summary judgment due to the expiry of the limitation period, the defendants sought their costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendant doctor, finding the amounts claimed reasonable and proportionate.

The defendant clinic was awarded substantial indemnity costs from the date of its offer to settle, as the plaintiffs' continued opposition to the motion was unreasonable given their failure to produce an expert report.

The defendants, a doctor and a medical centre, moved for summary judgment to dismiss a medical negligence action, arguing it was statute-barred and lacked expert evidence.

The plaintiffs sought a further adjournment, claiming COVID-19 travel restrictions prevented them from obtaining necessary evidence from Nigeria.

The court denied the adjournment, finding the plaintiffs' reasons vague and the sought evidence irrelevant to the limitation period or the Canadian standard of care.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, concluding there was no genuine issue for trial regarding the limitation period and the absence of a qualified expert report.

Following a successful summary judgment motion enforcing a personal guarantee, the plaintiff sought costs of approximately $25,000, including legal fees, disbursements, and HST.

The defendant conceded entitlement to disbursements but argued that total costs should be limited to $15,000 inclusive.

Applying the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, the court considered the relative simplicity of the matter and what costs the losing party could reasonably have anticipated.

The court fixed the plaintiff’s costs at the lower end of the anticipated range.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a personal guarantee executed by a defendant in respect of a small business loan to a corporation operating a pub.

The guarantor argued that the guarantee was conditional upon finalizing a business arrangement with another participant and alternatively that the document was to be held in escrow.

The court held that the guarantee was expressly described as continuing, absolute, and unconditional and required any alteration or waiver to be in writing.

Applying the parol evidence rule and authorities from the Supreme Court of Canada, the court found that alleged oral conditions or collateral agreements could not vary the written terms of the guarantee.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the bank for the guaranteed amount plus interest.

Following a successful appeal that set aside a default judgment, the appellant requested additional remedies including setting aside the noting in default, lifting a writ of seizure and sale, setting aside costs, and extending the time to file a statement of defence.

The Court of Appeal granted these requests, finding they flowed naturally from the order setting aside the default judgment.

The Court declined the respondents' request to impose a timetable for further procedural steps, leaving such matters to the Superior Court.

The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief confirming that they retained a valid and subsisting mortgage after a loan secured by assignment of that mortgage had been sold to a third party.

The court found that the requested declaration would affect the rights of a mortgagor that was not a party to the proceeding, making such relief inappropriate.

The court also concluded that no viable cause of action existed between the plaintiffs and the remaining defendant.

The defendant’s counterclaim seeking repayment of the loan more than a decade after default was barred by the Limitations Act due to the long delay and absence of any demand.

Both the main action and the counterclaim were dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision finding that two related corporations were privies, and that issue estoppel prevented the second corporation from re-litigating issues decided in a default judgment against the first.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The companies shared the same controlling mind, business, location, and key employees.

The controlling mind knew the respondent had initially sued the wrong corporate entity but failed to disclose it, and the second corporation was bound by the first's deliberate choice not to defend the action.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion for partial summary judgment.

The defendants had argued that the plaintiffs' claim for pecuniary loss arising from a motor vehicle accident was statute-barred, relying on the assertion that separate limitation periods apply to pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision that the limitation issue should be resolved on a full factual record at trial.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly concluded that the appellants made a deliberate choice not to file a statement of defence.

Applying established jurisprudence, the court held that an intentional refusal to defend stands as a permanent bar to intervention.

The court also declined to interfere with the punitive damages award, noting the appellants provided no authority to support the contention that it was excessive.

Following a judicial review application, the respondent developers and the Ontario Municipal Board sought costs.

The applicants argued they should be absolved from paying costs.

The court rejected the applicants' argument, noting that fixing costs must respond to the reasonable expectations of the parties.

The court awarded costs to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis, fixing costs at $10,500 for the developers and $1,000 for the Ontario Municipal Board.

The applicant union referred two grievances to the Board under section 124 of the Labour Relations Act.

The respondent employer objected to the Board's jurisdiction, arguing it did not operate a business in the construction industry.

The respondent's business involved fabricating and setting up temporary display structures for shows and exhibitions.

The Board applied the fixture versus chattel distinction and found that the temporary, moveable display structures were chattels rather than fixtures or real property.

Consequently, the Board held that the respondent was not an employer in the construction industry and dismissed the applications for lack of jurisdiction.