Robert A. Blair

The appellant was convicted by a jury of selling imported liquor, smuggling spirits, possession of property obtained by crime, and trafficking in cocaine following an undercover investigation.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by discharging a juror for internal strife, giving a Browne v. Dunn instruction, excluding him from an in camera stay proceeding, failing to properly instruct on reasonable doubt, and failing to leave an 'agent for the purchaser' defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion under s. 644 of the Criminal Code to discharge the juror and made no reversible errors in her instructions or procedural rulings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 12-month custodial sentence was fit for the offences.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the respondent for possession of stolen property.

The trial judge imposed too high a standard by requiring the officer to know the specific modality of the crime.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in concluding that a Charter breach on the first arrest necessarily tainted a subsequent arrest and search by another officer relating to separate incidents.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed the extradition judge's dismissal of two preliminary stay applications and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The stay applications alleged abuse of process due to political or religious motivation and challenged the certification of the Record of the Case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the extradition judge correctly held that political motivation allegations are for the Minister to consider at the surrender stage, and that certification concerns related to reliability rather than admissibility.

The application for judicial review was also dismissed, as the Minister reasonably concluded there was no general policy of neglect for due process in the requesting state and no factual basis to suggest extradition was sought for an improper purpose.

The Crown applied to review an order granting the respondent judicial interim release pending his retrial on two counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown argued the application judge erred by failing to appreciate the legal significance of the respondent's failure to provide a supporting affidavit as required by the rules.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the affidavit requirement to be purely procedural.

The Crown could have insisted on the affidavit prior to the hearing but did not, and the record contained sufficient information to satisfy the onus for release under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant received a retroactive lump sum payment for a Canada Pension Plan disability pension and brought a proposed class action claiming interest on the payment.

The Attorney General moved to strike the statement of claim.

The motion judge struck the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment but allowed the claims based on constructive trust and the inherent power of the court to award interest to proceed.

On appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal held that it was plain and obvious that none of the claims could succeed, as the comprehensive statutory scheme of the Canada Pension Plan does not provide for the payment of interest on benefits.

The appeal was dismissed, the cross-appeal was allowed, and the action was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a youth court decision that struck down provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) requiring a young person convicted of a presumptive offence to prove that a youth sentence is sufficient and to justify maintaining a publication ban.

The youth had pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the onus provisions violate section 7 of the Charter by presuming adult treatment and reversing the burden of proof for aggravating sentencing factors.

The Court also upheld the youth sentence imposed but quashed the trial judge's order requiring the Crown to pay the youth's costs for the Charter application.

The appellant failed to appear for the appeal hearing.

The respondent had declared bankruptcy after the proceedings commenced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs of $500 to the respondent.

The respondent successfully sued the appellant for workplace defamation, being awarded damages and costs at trial.

On appeal, the appellant argued for the first time that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute arose in a unionized workplace governed by a collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Superior Court had concurrent jurisdiction and that the jurisdictional objection was raised too late to be entertained.

The appeal regarding costs was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a judgment granting an order pursuant to s. 50(3) of the Arbitration Act enforcing a family arbitration award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge as all conditions in s. 50(3) were satisfied.

The Court noted that the appellant's arguments focused on the merits of the award, which is a matter for judicial review, and that the arbitrator had jurisdiction under the separation agreement.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The parties reached a settlement prior to the hearing.

The Court of Appeal ordered that an order go in terms of the settlement letter dated March 22, 2006.

The appellants, a tree harvesting company and its principal, sued the respondent pulp and paper company for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract after suffering financial ruin following the mechanization of their operations.

A jury found in favour of the appellants, awarding substantial damages.

However, the trial judge subsequently granted the respondent's reserved motion for non-suit on the negligent misrepresentation claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in granting the non-suit by weighing the evidence rather than determining if a prima facie case existed.

The Court reinstated the jury's verdict and dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal, holding that the jury's findings were supported by the evidence.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing Minutes of Settlement signed after mediation.

They argued their solicitor lacked authority to settle, the agreement was signed under duress, the settlement should not have been approved for the minor plaintiffs, and the agreement was not binding because a release was never signed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the solicitor had ostensible authority, there was no evidence of duress, the motion judge did not err in approving the settlement for the minors, and the requirement to sign a release did not prevent the Minutes from being a binding agreement.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that disputed lands had been dedicated and accepted for public uses as a park.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings regarding public use.

Furthermore, the Court held that the respondent Township had established title to the lands through adverse possession, as it had erected a fence in 1990 with the intention of excluding the appellant and had maintained actual possession since that time.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them personally liable for an unpaid restaurant account for food services provided to them, their family, and business associates.

At trial, the appellants argued that a corporation (SLM) was solely responsible, which the trial judge rejected.

On appeal, they attempted to argue they were only liable for meals when they were present.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no error and that the appellants could not shift their legal position on appeal, especially since it would require a reference to develop new evidence.

Costs of $8,803.43 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a final order granting the respondent mother sole custody and child support.

The final order was made in the appellant's absence immediately after his solicitor was removed from the record.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant was unaware of his solicitor's motion to be removed and the respondent's motion proceeded without personal service.

The Court held that the resulting procedural unfairness tainted the proceedings, warranting the setting aside of the default orders.

The appellants, tree harvesters, sued the respondent forestry company for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract, alleging they relied on the respondent's assurances when incurring significant debt to mechanize their operations.

A jury found in favour of the appellants and awarded damages.

However, the trial judge subsequently granted the respondent's reserved motion for non-suit, dismissing the negligent misrepresentation claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by weighing the evidence rather than assessing if a prima facie case existed.

The Court set aside the non-suit, dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal challenging the jury verdict, and restored the jury's damages award.

The trustee in bankruptcy appealed an order restricting it from providing the bankrupt estate's inspectors and creditors with access to the bankrupt's documents.

The restriction was initially imposed due to concerns that an inspector, representing a competitor creditor, would use the information for collateral purposes.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that inspectors require access to documents to fulfill their statutory supervisory duties.

The court ruled that the proper remedy for concerns about misuse of information is to restrain the collateral use of the documents or remove the inspector, rather than denying access entirely.

The appellant pleaded guilty to making and distributing child pornography after creating a sexually explicit collage of his 15-year-old former girlfriend and sharing it online.

He was sentenced to two years in a penitentiary.

On appeal, he sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the plea was valid and no miscarriage of justice occurred.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, with the court finding the two-year term excessive for a youthful first-time offender whose actions were an immature response to a breakup.

The sentence was reduced to time served of eight months.

The appellants appealed an order requiring indemnification under an all risk insurance policy for losses of perishable food following a massive power failure in southern Ontario.

The court held that the blackout, not the lack of refrigeration, was the proximate cause of the direct physical loss.

It agreed that ambiguity in the exclusion clauses had to be construed in favour of the insured and distinguished prior authority based on materially different policy wording.

The appeal was dismissed, and appeal costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order granting a divorce judgment, arguing that the respondent was improperly served.

The appellant had served the respondent's solicitor's clerk with the divorce petition, but the respondent did not file an acceptance or admission of service.

The Court of Appeal found that there was no proper service under Rule 6(3)(b) of the Family Law Rules, as service of the application initiated a new case and there was no lawyer 'in the case' yet.

The appeal was allowed, the divorce judgment was set aside, and costs were awarded to the appellant.