Robert A. Blair

The appellant, a lawyer, was acquitted of sexual assault charges and subsequently sued the Crown, police, and others for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts.

The motion judge struck the statements of claim and refused leave to amend.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against Her Majesty the Queen due to failure to provide the required 60 days' notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

However, the Court set aside the order striking the claim against the Crown Attorney and Police defendants, finding that while the pleading was deficient, the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend, as the allegations, if properly pleaded with material facts, could support valid causes of action.

The Municipality of Clarington appealed a judgment allowing an application by Newcastle Recycling Ltd. and others for a declaration that they had the right to continue operating an auto wrecking, scrapyard, landfill, and garbage collection business on certain property.

Clarington also appealed the dismissal of its counter-application for an injunction.

The respondents cross-appealed the finding that they did not have the right to carry on their business on other portions of the property.

The Court of Appeal allowed Clarington's appeal in part, finding the application judge erred by resolving material credibility issues on affidavit evidence instead of directing a trial of an issue.

The cross-appeal was dismissed, and a permanent injunction was granted in respect of portions of the property.

The appellant, a police Staff Sergeant, sued her employer and colleagues for discrimination and defamation.

The motions judge dismissed the action, finding the essential character of the dispute was workplace-centred and governed by the collective agreement and the Police Services Act.

On appeal, the appellant limited her claim to defamation, arguing it belonged in the courts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the essential character of the dispute was workplace discrimination and harassment, not defamation, and was therefore subject to the collective agreement's grievance procedure.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision striking their statement of claim against the respondents, who were patent agents for the appellants' competitors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the statement of claim disclosed no viable causes of action.

The court found no fiduciary duty or duty of care owed by the respondents to the appellants, no basis for a constructive trust, no pleaded conspiracy, no conversion, and no statutory cause of action for false statement since the respondents were not competitors.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed from three orders: denying the corporate plaintiff the ability to be represented by its sole shareholder, ordering security for costs against the individual plaintiff personally, and dismissing the action for failing to pay the security.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in denying the sole shareholder the right to represent the corporation as the criteria appeared to be met.

The court also found an error in the security for costs order because the judge failed to consider whether the individual plaintiff's explanation was frivolous under rule 56.01(1)(c).

The three orders were set aside, and the dismissal of the application was reversed.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to rectify Minutes of Settlement.

They argued the parties intended to include their respective house lots in the equalization of partnership assets.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was insufficient evidence of a mistake at the time the Minutes were signed, as the document specifically addressed the lots.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding the right of limited partners to vote on the election of a new general partner, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The Court of Appeal fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis, awarding $17,000 to Chalmers, $8,000 to the liquidator, and $5,000 to the respondent, plus disbursements and GST, all payable by the appellant.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found crack cocaine in the bathroom of an apartment she shared with a co-occupant.

The appellant had been absent from the apartment for 32 hours prior to the search.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence establishing constructive or joint possession.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error and that the circumstantial evidence supported the inference of knowledge and control.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statements of defence for failing to comply with a peremptory order to produce documents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision to enforce the strict terms of the prior peremptory order after the appellants failed to meet their production obligations.

The appellant, convicted of armed robbery, sought to reopen and reconsider a sentence appeal decision that reduced his life sentence to 16 years but imposed a 7-year period of parole ineligibility.

Duty counsel argued the court incorrectly applied its discretion under the Criminal Code regarding the length of the parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal denied the request, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to reopen an appeal once it had been heard on the merits and the final order had been entered.

The court noted that such a challenge to the correctness of the decision must be directed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellant bank appealed an order dismissing its action on the basis of res judicata.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that a prior determination by another judge, which concluded the property was validly held in trust, subsumed the issue of whether the trust was a sham.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant lessor and the lessee were both named insureds under an automobile insurance policy.

The lessee unilaterally directed the insurer to delete all coverage except fire and theft.

The vehicle was subsequently destroyed in an accident.

The insurer denied the lessor's claim on the basis that coverage had been deleted.

The Court of Appeal allowed the lessor's appeal, holding that the insurance contract provided several, not joint, coverage.

Therefore, one co-insured could not unilaterally cancel the coverage of the other without the insurer providing 15 days' prior notice and obtaining the express or implied consent of the co-insured lessor.

The appellant was convicted of assault and uttering a death threat against his wife.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed his appeal.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to give sufficient reasons for his decision.

The trial judge did not explain why he believed the complainant despite inconsistencies in her evidence, nor did he reference the W.D. test or the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

In a CCAA restructuring of Stelco Inc., the appellants, representing subordinated debenture holders, sought to be classified as a separate class of creditors for voting purposes on the proposed plan.

They argued their interests conflicted with senior debt holders due to a turnover payment provision requiring them to remit distributions to senior debt holders until the senior debt was paid in full.

The supervising judge dismissed the motion, finding no material distinction in their legal rights vis-à-vis the debtor company.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, affirming that creditor classification under the CCAA is determined by the creditors' legal rights in relation to the debtor company, not their rights as creditors in relation to each other.

In a CCAA proceeding regarding Stelco Inc., the Informal Independent Converts' Committee appealed an order denying them a separate class of creditors.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error or error in principle in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants lacked a different legal or practical interest from other unsecured creditors vis-à-vis the debtor.

The appellant appealed from his conviction and sentence for a serious domestic assault.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and no basis to reduce the period of probation, concluding that the sentence was entirely fit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a custodial sentence imposed following a guilty plea to child luring arising from sexually explicit internet communications with an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old girl.

The court held that while denunciation and deterrence will ordinarily require institutional incarceration for child luring, this was one of the rare cases where a conditional sentence was fit because the sentencing judge overemphasized punitive objectives and failed to give proper weight to uncontradicted expert evidence of negligible risk of reoffending, rehabilitation, and the devastating impact of the proceedings on the offender and his family.

Fresh evidence established the appellant's fragile mental and physical condition, prior assaults in custody, and the detrimental impact incarceration would have on his children.

Leave to appeal was granted, the sentence was varied to an 18-month conditional sentence with house arrest followed by probation, and the s. 161 order was reduced to ten years with modified terms.

The appellant distributor sued the respondent manufacturer for wrongful termination of an exclusive distributorship agreement.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the distributor breached an implied duty of good faith by failing to disclose a change in its ownership, which gave the manufacturer 'just cause' to terminate without notice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that employment law concepts like 'just cause' should not be imported into commercial distributorship agreements.

Instead, ordinary contract principles apply, and a contract can only be terminated without notice if the breach amounts to a fundamental breach.

The Court found the distributor's failure to disclose the sale did not substantially deprive the manufacturer of the whole benefit of the contract, and thus did not constitute a fundamental breach.

The appellants, former senior officers and directors of Hollinger Inc., appealed an order compelling them to submit to questioning by an Inspector appointed under the Canada Business Corporations Act.

They argued that being compelled to answer questions in Canada would violate their Charter rights against self-incrimination, as their answers could be used against them in ongoing criminal proceedings in the United States.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants were not entitled to a constitutional exemption because the Canadian inquiry was fact-finding rather than prosecutorial.

The Court also declined to stay the order, noting that the application judge had established a procedure to rule on specific questions and craft protective mechanisms on a case-by-case basis.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision declining jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decision that the appellant failed to demonstrate Ontario was the forum conveniens.

The court also refused leave to appeal the costs award, finding no error in principle.