Michael William Lacy

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of his pregnant wife who drowned in a bathtub.

He was charged with first degree murder but convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction on the ground that the trial judge misapprehended a jury question during deliberations and introduced a new theory of liability based on section 215 of the Criminal Code (failure to provide necessaries of life) that was not previously advanced at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's answer to the jury's question introduced an alternative route to conviction that was incompatible with how the trial had been conducted, thereby compromising trial fairness.

The court allowed the appeal and directed a new trial on the charge of manslaughter.

The appellant was convicted of historic sexual offences against his cousin committed when she was a young girl.

He was sentenced to two years less a day in jail and three years' probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction arguing the trial judge engaged in an unbalanced approach to evidence resulting in a reversal of the burden of proof and failure to give effect to the presumption of innocence.

The Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence, arguing the trial judge improperly applied Gladue principles and underemphasized deterrence and denunciation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and the sentence imposed, including a 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

The appellant killed his mother by striking her with a baseball bat and stabbing her repeatedly with a knife.

The trial judge instructed the jury on the statutory partial defence of provocation.

The jury rejected the provocation defence and convicted the appellant of second-degree murder.

On appeal, the appellant raised four grounds of appeal regarding the trial judge's charge to the jury, the admission of evidence, and the period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The defendants applied to replace police bail conditions imposed under section 503(2.1) of the Criminal Code with a judicial bail order under section 515.

The defendants were charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and public mischief arising from an altercation with a civilian.

The Crown sought to maintain three contested conditions: residency in Ontario, a curfew from 10:00 pm to 6:00 am, and abstention from alcohol consumption.

The court found that the residency condition was unnecessary to ensure attendance in court, the curfew was punitive and unnecessary given the situational nature of the alleged offence, and the alcohol prohibition lacked evidentiary support and was not necessary to address public safety or confidence in the administration of justice.

The court replaced the police bail with a judicial bail order removing the three contested conditions while maintaining no-contact provisions, weapons prohibitions, and notification requirements.

The appellant was convicted of 40 counts including drug trafficking, criminal organization offences, weapons offences, proceeds of crime, extortion, and criminal interest rate offences.

He was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment with a 9.5-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld most convictions but allowed the appeal in part.

The court found no Charter violations regarding search and seizure or trial delay.

However, the court quashed convictions for entering into criminal interest rate agreements, finding the trial judge erred in applying a presumption of knowledge without requiring proof of mens rea.

The court also reduced the sentence from 19 to 15 years and set aside the parole ineligibility order except for criminal organization convictions.

An applicant convicted of two counts of first degree murder sought reconsideration of a prior decision denying his application for appointed counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued material changes in circumstances had occurred since the initial denial.

The court found that the applicant had demonstrated material changes, including: the inmate duty counsel program's refusal to assist; provision of previously missing financial documents to Legal Aid; and evidence addressing concerns about a property foreclosure proceeding.

The court determined both criteria under s. 684(1) were satisfied: it was desirable in the interests of justice to appoint counsel given the complexity and arguability of the appeal, and the applicant lacked sufficient financial means to retain counsel.

Counsel was appointed.

Jordan McPhee pleaded guilty to sexual assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and robbery.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation.

The court, considering McPhee's criminal record, a subsequent aggravated assault conviction, and a psychiatric risk assessment, found him to be a dangerous offender based on a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a likelihood of causing death, injury, or severe psychological damage.

The court imposed a determinate sentence of six years imprisonment (less pre-sentence custody) followed by a ten-year Long Term Supervision Order, with specific recommendations for conditions to the parole board.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Ontario, brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action on the ground that it was barred by a limitation period.

The plaintiffs, police officers, alleged negligence and misfeasance in public office by Crown counsel.

The court, applying the principles from Beardsley v. Ontario Provincial Police, found that the limitation period issue involved legal and factual complexities, including the discoverability of a potentially novel claim, and therefore should not be determined at a preliminary stage before pleadings were closed.

The preliminary question was decided in favour of the plaintiffs, and the motion to dismiss on this ground was denied.

The applicants, three police officers charged with sexual assault, sought to vary a sealing order to prohibit publication of information from an Information to Obtain (ITO) DNA warrants, arguing it was necessary to preserve trial fairness and prevent witness tainting and stigmatization.

The Crown supported the ban for consistency with a prior publication ban on conflict motion materials.

The media respondents opposed the ban.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicants failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet the Dagenais/Mentuck test for a publication ban, which requires demonstrating a serious risk to the proper administration of justice that cannot be prevented by alternative measures, and that the salutary effects outweigh the deleterious effects on freedom of expression and public right to know.

The court emphasized the presumptive openness of warrant materials and the public interest in the investigation of police officers.

In a criminal bribery prosecution, the appellant international financial organization challenged a third party production order and subpoenas issued in support of a Garofoli wiretap challenge.

The Court held that archival and personnel immunities under the Bretton Woods and Related Agreements Act applied to records and investigators of the organization’s integrity unit, and no waiver was established.

The Court further held that, in the Garofoli context, third party production requires a reasonable likelihood of probative value to the affiant-knowledge issues, not broad relevance to trial truth.

Because that threshold was not met, the production order was set aside.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision imposing a $10,000 fine on a defendant convicted of dealing in mortgages without a licence under the Mortgage Brokerages, Lenders and Administrators Act, 2006.

The defendant, a former licensed mortgage broker whose licence had been revoked, continued to conduct mortgage brokering activities through a separate company while unlicensed, generating $48,967.20 in commissions over 14 transactions.

The Crown sought a fine of $100,000 at trial and $75,000 on appeal, arguing the sentence failed to give appropriate weight to general deterrence.

The appellate court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered deterrence and other relevant sentencing principles, and that the $10,000 fine was fit and appropriate given the circumstances of the offender and the nature of the strict liability offence.

The appellant appealed her sentence for careless driving resulting in the death of a pedestrian.

The trial judge imposed a 20-day intermittent jail sentence and a 24-month driving suspension.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred in principle by sentencing the appellant based on facts not admitted or proven, specifically that she was using a hand-held device at the time of the collision.

The appellant had only admitted to holding the device, not using it.

The appeal court allowed the appeal and substituted a $2,000 fine and 18-month driving suspension.

In a murder prosecution, the court considered a voir dire on the voluntariness of several statements given by the accused to police in 2002.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary due to lack of a proper caution, deceptive investigative tactics, and the police use of evidence previously obtained in breach of the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights.

The court held that the absence of a caution and police deception did not undermine voluntariness, as the accused understood her right to silence and demonstrated sophistication during the interviews.

However, fairness concerns arose where police referenced material seized unconstitutionally from a gun locker.

The court ruled the statements voluntary but ordered that portions referring to that material be excised.