Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding the appeal judge misapprehended the appellant's trial evidence by concluding he admitted to an assault.

However, the appeal was dismissed because the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and disclosed no error, including the proper use of the appellant's prior inconsistent statements to police and on a 911 call.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider defence evidence that could have raised a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to the issue and properly accepted the appellant's admissions to the police, which formed the core of the Crown's case.

The Court held that the trial judge's treatment of the evidence was adequate and there was no need to explicitly subject a minor part of the testimony to a separate W.(D.) analysis.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and failing to consider the defence of mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly treated the case as a credibility contest between diametrically opposed accounts.

The court held that the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence was reasonable and that the defence of mistaken belief in consent did not arise on the facts.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for threatening death, assault, sexual assault, and breach of probation against his former intimate partner.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge imposed a sentence substantially higher than the Crown's suggested range without providing reasons or an opportunity for submissions.

The global sentence was reduced from 6 years to 3 years and 8.5 months.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision regarding a franchise dispute.

They argued that the trial judge erred in deducting rent and related expenses under s. 6(6)(a) of the applicable Act, and in finding that a letter dated May 2, 2007, constituted a five-year franchise agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the damages calculation and concluding that the trial judge's finding regarding the letter was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

Costs of $8,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant pleaded guilty to break and enter, robbery, forcible confinement, and assault resist arrest following a home invasion involving an 86-year-old victim.

He was sentenced to eight years in addition to nine months of pre-trial custody.

On appeal, he argued the sentence was unfit because it exceeded the Crown's requested eight-year range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered a mental health and risk assessment report indicating a high risk to re-offend, and that the sentence fell within the established range for home invasions.

The appellant brought a motion to reinstate his appeal against conviction and sentence for sexual offences, which he had previously abandoned in 2003.

A prior motion to reopen the appeal was dismissed in 2005 after the appellant failed to file a factum.

In the current motion, the appellant argued the appeal should be reopened because the Crown fraudulently concealed relevant case law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no merit to the allegations of concealment and no error by the trial judge that would justify granting the relief.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on various firearms charges relating to his possession of an airgun.

The trial judge, relying on previous jurisprudence, held that the Crown had to prove the airgun was a 'weapon' (used or intended to be used to cause injury or intimidate) before it could be classified as a 'firearm'.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, overruling its previous decision in McManus.

The Court held that any barrelled object capable of causing serious bodily injury or death meets the definition of a 'firearm' and is automatically deemed a 'weapon' under the Criminal Code, regardless of the possessor's intent.

The respondent corporation pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death after a swing stage collapsed at a construction site, killing four workers.

The sentencing judge imposed a fine of $200,000, relying on the range of fines under the Occupational Health and Safety Act and the corporation's ability to pay.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge erred by relying on regulatory fine ranges that do not reflect the higher moral blameworthiness of criminal negligence, and by treating the corporation's ability to pay as a statutory prerequisite.

The Court increased the fine to $750,000 to properly reflect the gravity of the offence and the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The appellants, representing members of a church congregation who voted to leave the Anglican Diocese of Huron due to theological differences, appealed a trial decision declaring that the diocese held the church property and a charitable foundation in trust for the static parish, not the departing members.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that 'parish' refers to a static entity that continues in perpetuity regardless of changes in membership, and that the departing members could not take the property with them.

The Court also allowed the diocese's cross-appeal on costs, finding that the costs judge erred in ordering each party to bear its own costs to promote harmony, and awarded $100,000 in costs to the diocese.

The appellant appealed her conviction and seven-year sentence for importing 500 grams of heroin.

The trial judge rejected her evidence that she did not know the package contained heroin and was picking it up as a favour.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support a finding of actual knowledge or wilful blindness, noting the package was addressed to her, she attended twice to pick it up, and she provided a false address upon receipt.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that awarded him $3,789.93 in damages based on a 15-day notice termination clause in his agreement with the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings or her interpretation of the clear language of the agreement, which allowed termination for any reason on 15 days' written notice, regardless of whether the appellant was an employee or an independent contractor.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

The conviction rested primarily on the competing credibility of the appellant and the complainant regarding whether sexual activity on a boat was consensual.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the jury instructions on reasonable doubt and expert evidence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence from his son, who was present on the boat but did not testify at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the grounds relating to jury instructions but admitted the fresh evidence.

The Court found the son's evidence was sufficiently cogent to potentially affect the verdict and accepted the appellant's explanation that he did not call his son at trial to protect him from the stress of testifying amid high-conflict family proceedings.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant insurer sought leave to appeal an order requiring it to pay the legal fees of Nortel's executives without reference to a $10 million retention amount or a directors and officers trust fund.

The motion judge had found that the indemnification was a pre-filing claim subject to the CCAA stay, and that allowing access to the trust would improperly elevate the insurer's priority.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding the motion judge's conclusions were within his expertise and entitled to deference, and the issues were specific to the case rather than of broader interest.

The Court also declined to consider fresh evidence filed by the applicant because no motion for leave to admit it was brought.

The parties separated after a 36-year marriage during which they operated a dairy farm.

The application judge ordered a lump sum spousal support payment, refused to allow the husband to deduct future disposition costs from his net family property, found a milk quota transfer was not a gift, and ordered the in specie division of six jointly owned farm properties.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in refusing the disposition costs deduction and in ordering the in specie division of the properties under the Family Law Act and Partition Act.

The properties were ordered to be sold.

The appeal regarding the milk quota and spousal support was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearms offences after police found guns in a duffle bag at his mother's house.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting a recanting witness's videotaped statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, by improperly using his pre-trial silence to reject his testimony, and by entering multiple convictions for the same delict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the convictions, finding the hearsay statement met threshold reliability and the trial judge did not rely on pre-trial silence.

However, the court applied the Kienapple principle to enter conditional stays on several duplicate counts.

The trial judge found the accused guilty of gun-related offences and adjourned for sentencing.

Months later, the trial judge stated he had reconsidered the findings of guilt, reopened the matter, and entered acquittals without hearing submissions from the Crown.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that while a trial judge sitting alone has jurisdiction to vacate a conviction prior to sentencing in exceptional circumstances, the judge erred in law by entering an acquittal without giving the parties an opportunity to make submissions.

The appropriate remedy was to declare a mistrial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after her girlfriend killed the appellant's boyfriend with an axe.

The Crown alleged the appellant planned the murder and manipulated her girlfriend into committing it.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred by giving a Carter instruction (co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule) because the alleged conspiracy involved only two people.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed its prior decision in Bogiatzis, holding that the Carter instruction applies to two-person conspiracies.

The Court found no reversible error in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the Carter framework, post-offence conduct, or party liability.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a finding of incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The Court of Appeal found that the Consent and Capacity Board's decision was unreasonable because there was no evidence that the proposed treatment would benefit the appellant, nor any evidence of the consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was allowed and the finding of incapacity was set aside.

Following the release of the court's decision on the appeal, the parties reached an agreement regarding costs.

The court ordered costs of the appeal to the respondent in the agreed amount of $21,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and all applicable taxes.