Maija C. Martin

The young person pleaded guilty to second degree murder for his role in a planned and fatal stabbing.

The court considered the youth's chaotic upbringing, mental health diagnoses, and progress in pre-trial custody.

Applying the sentencing principles of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the court imposed the maximum youth sentence of seven years, apportioned as three years in secure intensive rehabilitative custody and four years under conditional supervision, declining to strictly deduct pre-sentence custody to ensure sufficient time for rehabilitation.

Three appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in the 2018 shooting death of Nnamdi Ogba.

The appellants appealed on seven grounds, including challenges to jury instructions on modes of participation, admissibility of expert gang evidence, after-the-fact conduct evidence, firearm videos, W.(D.) instructions, Browne v. Dunn breaches, and jury roll compilation errors.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions on modes of participation under sections 21(1)(b) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code were deficient and that there was no air of reality to section 21(2) liability.

The court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The court upheld the admissibility of expert gang evidence and other evidentiary rulings.

The appellant, Kyle Watson, appealed his sentence for robbery and failure to comply with a release order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s application of the principles of restraint and consideration of the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody.

The sentencing judge had taken into account the appellant’s Indigenous identity, personal history, and the conditions of pre-sentence custody, and provided appropriate credit for time served.

The sentence imposed was found to be within a reasonable range given the circumstances.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown's appeal from sentence, finding that the sentencing judge erred by imposing a two-year weapons prohibition under s. 51(3) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) following a youth's guilty plea to first-degree murder.

The Court held that the correct provision was s. 51(1), which requires a longer prohibition for offences subject to mandatory orders under s. 109 of the Criminal Code.

Both parties agreed to set aside the two-year prohibition and impose a 12-year weapons prohibition.

The Court substituted the appropriate order, noting the respondent's planning and aggravating circumstances.

The defendant, Cassandra Gordon, was sentenced after being found guilty by a jury of importing cocaine from Aruba into Canada.

The offence involved a significant aggravating factor, as the defendant used her twelve-year-old son to help carry the drugs.

The court considered the defendant's highly vulnerable background, which was detailed in an enhanced pre-sentence report and included experiences of childhood sexual abuse, poverty, and systemic anti-Black racism.

Balancing the need for deterrence and denunciation with the principle of rehabilitation, the sentencing judge departed from the standard sentencing range and imposed a sentence of three and a half years of incarceration.

This decision addresses a constitutional challenge to section 9(5)(a)(i) of the Cannabis Act, which prohibits discharges for indictable offences of possession of cannabis for the purpose of distribution.

The court upholds the constitutionality of the provision, finding that the infringement on liberty is not grossly disproportionate or overbroad, does not impose a grossly disproportionate sentence, and does not create a distinction based on race in its impact.

The court sentences the accused, Rene Smith, to a fine of $7,500 and makes several ancillary orders.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of second degree murder following the shooting death of the victim in a restaurant washroom.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting surveillance video of the appellants at a motel with a firearm on the night prior to the shooting as prior discreditable conduct evidence, and whether the jury was properly instructed as to its permissible uses.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had found no error in the admission or instruction, while the dissenting judge would have ordered new trials.

A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, affirming the convictions.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 2 years and 11 months' imprisonment for firearms and drug trafficking offences, arguing he should have received additional credit for lockdowns and triple bunking during presentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge was aware of the difficult circumstances and that the few additional days of lockdown and triple bunking shown in newly filed records would not impact the sentence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of causing death while driving with excess blood-drug concentration (THC) and dangerous driving causing death, following a fatal collision with a horse and buggy.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that the Crown failed to prove a causal nexus between the respondent's impairment and the collision, and failed to establish a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code does not require proof that the impairment itself caused the death, only that the accused caused the death while committing the predicate offence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in applying the modified objective standard for dangerous driving.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and other offences, receiving a net sentence of four years and seven months.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider his drug addiction and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions as mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly elicited information from the self-represented appellant, who had stated his addiction did not motivate the offence.

The court also held the sentencing judge appropriately weighed the harsh pre-sentence conditions against the seriousness of the offence.

The appellant, Marko Tubic, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The court found that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient in explaining how after-the-fact conduct evidence justified a murder conviction over manslaughter, and that the trial judge erred by referring to an unconstitutional objective standard of fault ('ought to have known') under s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, Dailean John, appealed his conviction for unlawful confinement and his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding him an active participant rather than a mere bystander.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude he played a culpable role given the evidence of the victim's confinement in his apartment and his awareness and control over her movements.

The appellant also sought to appeal his sentence, arguing it was unfit due to its impact on his Permanent Resident status and potential deportation.

The Court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the appeal, holding that reducing the sentence to avoid deportation would result in an unfit sentence given the seriousness and aggravating factors of the offence.

The appellant was convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to eight years in jail.

He appealed the conviction, raising three grounds: the trial judge erred by not applying Vetrovec principles to a witness's evidence and failing to provide sufficient reasons for relying on it, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a Vetrovec caution is not mandatory in judge-alone trials and the trial judge was aware of the witness's credibility issues, relying only on corroborated aspects of his testimony.

The court also found the verdict reasonable, as the circumstantial evidence, viewed holistically, amply supported the conclusion that the appellant knowingly possessed the package.

The appellant, J.F., appealed his convictions for multiple offences including assault, sexual assault, forcible confinement, uttering death threats, and careless storage of firearms.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, specifically regarding the explanation of memory gaps due to trauma, reliance on testimonial demeanour, and the use of lack of exaggeration.

The appellant also argued insufficient reasons for the convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the principles of credibility assessment, did not reverse the burden of proof, and provided sufficient reasons for the verdict.

The appellants, Thulani Chizanga and Shamar Meredith, appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and Mr. Meredith appealed his sentence.

The main issues on appeal included the admissibility of a "Super 8 Video" as prior discreditable conduct evidence, the trial judge's jury instructions on joint enterprise liability, post-offence demeanour evidence, and defence theories, as well as sentencing errors related to aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances.

The majority dismissed all appeals, finding no legal errors in the trial judge's decisions regarding evidence admissibility, jury instructions, or sentencing.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the conviction appeals and ordered a new trial, arguing the Super 8 Video was improperly admitted and instructed upon, particularly concerning its probative value for joint enterprise to kill.

The appellant, Cory Joseph Marsh, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the trial judge placed undue emphasis on the complainant's out-of-court demeanor evidence and provided insufficient reasons for conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the complainant's out-of-court demeanor as admissible circumstantial evidence alongside other confirmatory evidence, and that the reasons for conviction, though brief, were sufficient for appellate review given the straightforward nature of the case and the agreed statement of facts.

During a jury trial for importing cocaine, the accused raised the defence of duress, testifying she and her son were forced at gunpoint to carry the drugs.

In cross-examination, the Crown suggested an alternate theory that the accused initially agreed to carry the drugs voluntarily but was only coerced when the perpetrators forced her son to participate.

The accused denied this.

The court ruled that the Crown could not advance this alternate theory to the jury, finding it lacked an air of reality and was purely speculative, as there was no direct or circumstantial evidence to support it.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on drug trafficking and firearms charges, which followed a successful pre-trial Charter application that excluded evidence obtained via a general warrant and subsequent search warrant.

The reviewing judge had excised portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO) based on a finding that the respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy in video surveillance footage from a condominium's publicly accessible vestibule.

The Court of Appeal held that the reviewing judge erred in this finding, as the respondent had no control over the vestibule, it was accessible to the public, and the information obtained did not significantly engage his informational privacy interests.

With the video evidence included, there were sufficient grounds to issue the general warrant, and it was in the best interests of the administration of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The applicants, Lakhpreet Brar and Sukhvir Singh, sought a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter due to a breach of their section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating the total delay for Brar as 22 months and 10 days, and for Singh as 24 months and 8 days, both exceeding the 18-month Provincial Court ceiling.

The court found minimal defence delay (3 days for Brar, 4 days for Singh) and rejected arguments that COVID-19 or the case's complexity constituted exceptional circumstances justifying the delay.

Consequently, the court found a breach of the applicants' Charter rights and ordered a stay of proceedings for both.

The Crown appealed the seven-year sentence imposed on the respondent for attempted murder of his pregnant intimate partner.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to adequately apply the primary sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence, particularly in a domestic context, by misunderstanding the aggravating impact of planning and deliberation, and by misidentifying the appropriate sentencing range.

The Court emphasized that rehabilitation should not outweigh denunciation and deterrence in such serious cases and that sentencing ranges evolve with societal understanding of domestic violence.

The Court also found an error in the application of "Duncan" credits, which were treated as a direct reduction rather than a mitigating factor.

The appeal was allowed, and a sentence of 15 years imprisonment was substituted, less credit for time served.