Lorne Sossin

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order lifting a stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and amending a default judgment to declare the debt non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) BIA, on the basis that it arose from misappropriation or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

The underlying action involved breach of statutory trust under the Construction Act for unpaid construction materials.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the refusal to admit extrinsic evidence contradicting deemed admissions from the default judgment, nor in considering the appellants' non-compliance with enforcement orders.

The court upheld the finding that the judgment debt arose from misappropriation or defalcation, emphasizing that the deemed admissions, including an award of punitive damages, demonstrated intentional wrongdoing and conduct markedly departing from ordinary standards of decent behaviour, satisfying the "moral turpitude or dishonesty" threshold for s. 178(1)(d) BIA.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of multiple appeals.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario had previously dismissed appeals brought by the appellants and invited submissions on costs.

The parties subsequently reached an agreement on costs.

The endorsement formalizes this agreement, ordering the appellant Lina Bertasiene to pay $7,500 in costs to the Kvyetko respondents, and appellants Lina Bertasiene and Singaras Bertasius to pay $14,700 for the appeal and an additional $5,000 for a fresh evidence motion to the Ilioukevitch respondents.

This appeal concerned a post-closing dispute over HST liability following the sale of a mixed-use property.

The purchasers' counterclaim, alleging HST liability, was dismissed at trial on the basis that they suffered no loss and arguably benefited from a windfall.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the purchasers suffered no loss, which justified the dismissal of the counterclaim.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and it was deemed unnecessary to address other legal arguments regarding the Excise Tax Act or post-closing readjustment.

This is an appeal from an order of the Commercial List judge concerning insolvency proceedings.

The appellants, Bryton, sought to exercise an option to purchase a property and obtain orders declaring the option valid and immune from challenge by other creditors under various acts (Fraudulent Conveyances Act, Assignments and Preferences Act, Canada Business Corporations Act oppression remedy, and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act).

The application judge dismissed Bryton's request for a vesting order and declaratory relief, finding that the claims were not res judicata and that declaratory relief was not the appropriate vehicle to pre-emptively bar unadjudicated creditor claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, confirming that the validity of the option was not res judicata and that the refusal to grant declaratory relief was a proper exercise of discretion, as the application procedure was not suitable for dismissing unproven claims.

The appellant, Adan McIntosh, appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice that proceeded as an uncontested trial due to his repeated non-compliance with court orders, including failure to pay costs and post security.

The Superior Court granted sole decision-making authority and child support to the respondent, Anita Kim, and imputed income to the appellant.

McIntosh also brought an omnibus motion, including a claim of reasonable apprehension of bias based on a case management note by a lower court judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all of McIntosh's appeals and motions, upholding the lower court's decision to proceed with an uncontested trial and its findings on parenting time, child support, and imputed income.

The court also rejected the bias claim, emphasizing that administrative case management notes, when viewed in context, do not create a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against TD Canada Trust, arguing errors regarding the availability of summary judgment in civil jury actions, the exclusion of expert evidence, and procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Hryniak test for summary judgment applies equally to civil jury actions, the motion judge properly excluded the expert evidence, and the process was procedurally fair.

This appeal concerned convictions for second-degree murder and discharge of a firearm with intent.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's jury charge was unfair and unbalanced due to alleged errors in presenting evidence and failing to adequately relate evidence to the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions.

The court concluded that the charge, read as a whole, was fair and adequately conveyed the defence's position and the relevant legal principles, upholding the convictions.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that the date of separation for an equalization claim under the Family Law Act was February 2015.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in making credibility findings by failing to address alleged inconsistencies in the respondent's evidence and in making findings of fact based on conflicting affidavits not subject to thorough cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence and credibility, and no unfairness in the trial procedure regarding witness cross-examination, noting the appellant had requested the limited cross-examination.

The appellant, Armen Petrosian, appealed orders permitting the respondent, Hasmik Tovmasyan, to relocate to California with their two children, and awarding child and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Children's Law Reform Act regarding relocation, including the onus under s. 39.4(6), and no error in the imputation of income for support calculations.

This appeal concerned the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a trial judge's order dismissing a contempt motion and ordering therapy and counselling.

The Court determined that the dismissal of the contempt motion was an interlocutory order, as the appellant had other avenues for relief.

The order for therapy and counselling was a final order made under the Children's Law Reform Act, which properly lies with the Divisional Court.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction over both components of the appeal.

The respondent's motion to quash the appeal was granted, and the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued supplementary reasons regarding the remedy and costs following its prior decision (2023 ONCA 139) which declared s. 37.10.1(2) of the Election Finances Act unconstitutional.

The appellants sought to invalidate additional provisions, including the definition of "political advertising," s. 37.0.1, s. 37.10.1(3)-(3.1), and s. 37.10.2.

The court declined this request, finding these provisions were not inextricably linked to the previously invalidated section and were not independently shown to infringe section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court also noted that the election period spending limits (s. 37.10.1(1)) were not challenged and remain in force.

No disposition was made as to costs, as the parties had reached an agreement.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard appeals from summary judgments enforcing multiple mortgages against the appellants.

The appellants challenged the judgments on various grounds, including allegations of criminal interest rates, invalid mortgage registration, improper crediting of payments, and mortgage fraud, including a claim of forged signatures.

The Court dismissed all appeals, upholding the motion judge's findings that the mortgages were valid and enforceable, and that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The Court also rejected a request to introduce new evidence (handwriting expert report) on appeal due to lack of diligence.

The appellant, J.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on portions of the appellant's police statement that were not properly in evidence and by making a finding of fabrication without independent supporting evidence.

These errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial and impacted the assessment of his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Cipponeri Construction Services Inc. (CCSI), appealed a motion judge's order dismissing its 2020 action against Westin Homes Ltd. and Michael Orsi as an abuse of process.

The 2020 action was commenced to preserve a limitation period for a claim against Westin that had been ineffectively asserted in a prior 2018 counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in dismissing the 2020 action against Westin as an abuse of process, as it was initiated to preserve a limitation period.

The court varied the order, staying the 2020 action against Westin, requiring CCSI to promptly move to amend the 2018 counterclaim to add itself as a plaintiff, and stipulating that no limitation period defense prior to March 16, 2020, would be asserted.

The dismissal against Orsi personally was upheld.

The appellant, Pauline Altberg, appealed a summary judgment that discharged a mortgage held by her and dismissed her counterclaim for payment, based on a limitation period defense.

The core issue was whether a $4,000 payment in 2010 by the respondent, Thomas Maxwell, reset the 10-year limitation period under s. 23(1) of the Real Property Limitations Act.

The motion judge, applying the Hryniak two-stage approach, found insufficient evidence to prove the payment was made towards the mortgage debt, and thus Altberg failed to meet her onus to show the action was within the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, affirming that the motion judge was entitled to make a determination on summary judgment even if facts were difficult to resolve, and that the onus remained on the party seeking to enforce the right to prove the action was within the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion to quash an appeal.

The underlying order, which was the subject of the appeal, concerned the validity of service on the appellant.

The Court determined that orders relating to the validity of service are interlocutory, and therefore, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The motion to quash was allowed, and the appeal was quashed.

The Court noted that the appellant should not be prejudiced by the delay in bringing the matter before the Divisional Court, and counsel for the respondent agreed not to object to a timely extension of time for a motion for leave to appeal in the Divisional Court.

This appeal addressed whether the trial judge erred in declining to pierce the corporate veil to hold a personal defendant liable for a corporation's breaches of contract.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that piercing the corporate veil is an exception, particularly in commercial settings where parties understood they were contracting with a corporation.

The court found that the corporate defendant's "unreasonable" and "capricious" breaches of contract did not amount to "improper conduct" sufficient to justify piercing the veil, as doing so for every breach by a one-person company would undermine corporate separateness.

The cross-appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion to quash an appeal regarding the appointment of a litigation administrator.

The moving parties argued that the appointment was an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable to the Court of Appeal.

The responding parties contended that the order became final because it was joined with a final order validating a provisional opt-out form.

The Court found that the appointment of a litigation administrator is an interlocutory order, distinct from decisions made under that authority.

Consequently, the appeal from the order appointing the litigation administrator was quashed, while the appeal concerning the opt-out form remained.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment motion.

The appellant claimed he was not obliged to repay interest on debts due to misrepresentation and conflict of interest by his lawyer, who was also involved with the respondent lender.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no evidentiary support or legal defence for the appellant's claims.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal the costs order was refused.

This appeal addressed the standard of proof for establishing the existence of an arbitration agreement when seeking a stay of court proceedings under the International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017.

The appellant argued for a balance of probabilities standard, while the motion judge applied an "arguable case" standard.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that, consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Peace River Hydro Partners v. Petrowest Corp., the "arguable case" standard applies to the technical prerequisites for a mandatory stay, including the existence of an arbitration agreement.

The Court found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that an arbitration agreement was arguably in existence based on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, and the stay of proceedings in favour of arbitration was upheld.