Lene Madsen

The appellant municipality appealed a Divisional Court order that quashed an Ontario Land Tribunal decision assuming jurisdiction over a dispute regarding a municipal servicing agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that the Tribunal's decision was interlocutory, as it only assumed jurisdiction on a prima facie basis and deferred the final determination of forum to the Superior Court.

Because the Ontario Land Tribunal Act only permits appeals of final decisions, the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The appeal was allowed and the Tribunal's order was restored.

The appellant estate appealed the dismissal of an application to rectify a will that lacked a residue clause.

The testator and her life partner had wills drafted by the same lawyer, but the testator's will omitted a residue clause, resulting in the residue passing on intestacy to her brother.

The application judge found that while the omission was an error, the evidence of the testator's intention was not so strong that no other contrary intention could be supposed, particularly given the lack of evidence from the drafting solicitor.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought to certify a class action against the municipality for property damage caused by pinhole leaks in copper plumbing, allegedly resulting from the addition of sodium hydroxide to the municipal water supply.

The motion judge certified the negligence claim but struck the nuisance claim, finding it barred by s. 449 of the Municipal Act, 2001, which precludes nuisance claims related to the escape of water from water works.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the nuisance claim was plainly and obviously barred by the ordinary meaning of the statute.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's argument that a breach of contract claim should have been certified, as it was not argued before the motion judge.

The appellants, limited partners in a family-owned limited partnership, appealed the dismissal of their application seeking a declaration that they were entitled to an annual cash distribution of 100% of the partnership's net income.

They argued that section 11(1) of the Limited Partnerships Act and the Accumulations Act mandated such distributions, overriding the general partner's discretion under the limited partnership agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the right to a 'share' of profits under the Act does not equate to a statutory obligation to make annual payments, and that the Accumulations Act does not apply to commercial endeavours.

The appellant was convicted of robbery following a home invasion and sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by relying on the rejected testimony of a co-accused and failing to caution himself about unsavoury witness evidence.

He also sought to introduce fresh DNA evidence and appealed his sentence based on the parity principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and the fresh evidence motion, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the circumstantial evidence or the differing sentences imposed on the co-accused based on their respective moral culpability.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims for adverse possession or a prescriptive easement over parts of the respondents' neighbouring cottage property, which he had historically used to access Lake Erie.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant's use of the lands was with tacit permission as an act of good neighbourliness, rather than acquiescence, and that the easement was not reasonably necessary given alternative access routes.

The court also affirmed the dismissal of the adverse possession claim, as the appellant failed to establish an intention to exclude the true owners.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granting the respondents $605,000 in damages for the anticipatory breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in accepting the respondents' expert appraisal of the property's value and in not sending the matter to trial due to competing expert opinions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's preference for the respondents' expert, who followed accepted methodologies, nor in the determination that the respondents reasonably mitigated their damages by purchasing a comparable property on the assessment date.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats, arguing his right to a fair trial was compromised by his inability to hear the proceedings, that the trial judge erred in assessing a witness's credibility regarding text messages, and that the transcript record was incomplete.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's hearing but found his claim that he could not hear the trial was not credible, given the accommodations made and his repeated confirmations that he could hear.

The court also deferred to the trial judge's credibility findings and concluded the transcript deficiencies did not prevent a meaningful appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a former client of the respondent lawyer, posted unflattering comments about him on an online platform.

The respondent sued for defamation and other torts.

The appellant brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the action, arguing her comments were a matter of public interest and that the action was statute-barred under the Libel and Slander Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the comments related to a private dispute and did not constitute a broadcast.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the contextual inquiry showed no public aspect to the communication and that the appellant failed to prove the platform was a broadcast.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent $1,191,727.94 for a defaulted mortgage.

The appellant argued she was denied a fair hearing because her visual impairment was not adequately accommodated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant had previously been granted two adjournments and did not request a further adjournment based on her disability at the hearing.

The motion judge's decision finding no triable issues was upheld.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their claims for repayment of alleged loans and instead awarded the respondents unpaid wages, punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

The trial judge found that the appellants had 'banked' the respondents' earnings and that the individual appellant acted as a common employer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the banked wages or the common employer doctrine.

The Court also upheld the punitive damages and costs awards, noting the appellant's harsh, offensive, and reprehensible conduct.

The appellant's license to practice law was revoked by the Law Society Tribunal in 2020.

After exhausting all appeals up to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant brought an application in the Superior Court of Justice seeking Charter declarations and reinstatement of his license.

The motion judge dismissed the application as an impermissible collateral attack on the revocation decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant could not use section 24(1) of the Charter to seek a fresh hearing after exhausting statutory remedies, and that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to order reinstatement.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, brought an application before the Court of Appeal seeking production of post-charge police occurrence reports pertaining to the complainant.

The Court established a framework for third-party records applications brought for the first time on appeal, holding that while the Criminal Code's statutory regime does not strictly apply, its underlying principles must inform the appellate court's exercise of discretion.

The Court held that an applicant must first satisfy the two-part test for fresh evidence production, and if successful, the court must then weigh the statutory privacy factors.

The application was dismissed as the appellant failed to demonstrate a non-speculative link between the requested records and his proposed fresh evidence application.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their claims of substantial interference with an easement and nuisance against the respondents, while granting a permanent injunction preventing parking in the right-of-way tunnel.

The respondents cross-appealed the scope of the parking injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation of the easement, application of the substantial interference test, or the tailored scope of the parking injunction.

The trial judge's costs award was also upheld.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal for want of jurisdiction, while the appellant brought a motion to disqualify counsel and compel document production.

The appellant sought to appeal a motion judge's order declining to schedule a motion to stay execution of a judgment from an underlying fee dispute.

The Court of Appeal held that the order declining to schedule the stay motion was interlocutory, meaning jurisdiction for the appeal lies with the Divisional Court.

The appeal was quashed, and the appellant's motion was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to review a motion judge's decision dismissing his request for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal for convictions in 2020 and 2022.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of the test for an extension of time, noting the lack of evidence of an intention to appeal within the timeline and the lack of an adequate explanation for the delay.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment finding them liable for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The appellants argued that the agreement never became binding because the respondent accepted an extension offer one day late.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the appellants elected to treat the contract as ongoing by subsequently waiving conditions, paying a second deposit, and engaging in conduct consistent with a binding agreement.

The expectation damages award of $142,757.89 was upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction on three counts of historical sexual assault against his niece.

He argued that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence by misinterpreting his testimony and overlooking internal inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for various offences, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained his conditional discharge with reduced reporting requirements.

He argued that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety and should be granted an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably relied on expert psychiatric evidence indicating that the appellant required a longer transition period in independent living to ensure medication compliance and mental stability.

The appellant and respondent, adult siblings, were named co-estate trustees of their father's estate.

Disagreements arose over the payment of estate debts, leading to a breakdown in the administration of the estate.

The application judge removed the appellant as estate trustee, finding she had obstructed the estate's administration and preferred her own interests, while dismissing the application to remove the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's discretionary decision and concluding that the appellant's arguments regarding the law of abatement were an ex post facto rationalization for her conduct.