Entrapment

The appellant, Deepan Budlakoti, appealed his conviction for firearms offences, arguing that he was entrapped by a police agent.

The Court of Appeal addressed three grounds: alleged improper reliance on a hearsay statement, failure to consider the police agent’s financial motive, and failure to treat the agent as a Vetrovec witness.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s approach to any of these issues and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Rapinder Bains, appealed convictions for drug-related offences, arguing that the trial judge erred by applying a less onerous standard for entrapment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s approach, holding that it was open to the trial judge to infer from the Agreed Statement of Facts that the officer had the requisite subjective belief to proceed.

The appeal and the sentence appeal were both dismissed.

The court considered an application by Adrian Davey to stay proceedings on the ground of entrapment after he pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court reviewed the sufficiency of disclosure to the defence and whether police had reasonable suspicion before offering Davey the opportunity to commit the offence.

The application was dismissed, with the court finding that the police had reasonable suspicion at the relevant time and that the defence was able to make full answer and defence.

This is an appeal from a decision rejecting an application for a stay of proceedings based on entrapment in a child luring case.

The appellant argued the undercover officer offered an opportunity to commit the offence without reasonable suspicion.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the officer's initial ambiguous response ("yea sometimes ..... im 14 tho") did not constitute an "opportunity" to commit the offence, as the appellant himself initiated and steered the conversation towards sexually explicit topics, thereby committing the luring offence.

The court emphasized that the entrapment doctrine is reserved for the clearest cases of uncondonable state conduct.

The appellant, convicted of attempting to import cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, appealed the dismissal of his entrapment claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of the police agent (PA), whose uncorroborated testimony was central to establishing reasonable suspicion for police intervention.

The court highlighted the PA's extensive criminal history, admitted lies, and substantial financial compensation ($400,000 plus monthly fees) as factors requiring a more rigorous credibility analysis.

It also found that the appellant's later eagerness to participate in the scheme did not corroborate the PA's claim that the appellant initiated the criminal activity.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered solely on the entrapment issue.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed convictions for various criminal offences, arguing that he was entrapped by police.

The trial judge had previously found him guilty of 11 counts, staying 3 on entrapment grounds, and convicting on 8.

The appeal specifically challenged 5 of the remaining 8 convictions, alleging errors in the trial judge's analysis of both the "opportunity" and "inducement" branches of the entrapment test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's application of entrapment law, including her assessment of police conduct and the appellant's independent actions in committing the offences.

The applicant, Elijah Hall, pleaded guilty to three counts of selling fentanyl and cocaine.

He sought a stay of these charges based on entrapment, arguing that the initial drug transaction was initiated by an undercover police officer without reasonable suspicion.

The Crown conceded the lack of reasonable suspicion for the first transaction but argued that this did not taint subsequent transactions.

The court, applying the principles of entrapment, found that the lack of reasonable suspicion at the outset did taint the subsequent transactions, distinguishing the case from R. v. Williams where firearm charges were not stayed.

The court followed R. v. Gambin, concluding that the subsequent transactions were "fruit poisoned by the tree of the first transaction." The application for a stay was allowed, and the three counts were stayed.

The appellant, R.R., appealed convictions for ten offences involving child pornography and counselling to commit sexual interference, arguing entrapment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigation based on the appellant's Craigslist ad and that the investigation did not constitute entrapment.

The court found the appellant's statements in the ad were sufficient to ground reasonable suspicion.

The appellant's appeal from sentence was abandoned.

The defendant, Zachary Collins, was found guilty of 11 counts related to drug and firearm offenses.

The defence brought an entrapment application concerning the firearm charge (Count 11), arguing that an undercover police officer induced the commission of the offence, going beyond merely providing an opportunity.

The court applied the two-branch test for entrapment from R. v. Mack and R. v. Ahmad.

The court found that while the police had reasonable suspicion, their conduct did not amount to inducement.

Despite the officer's persistence in inquiring about firearms, the defendant consistently indicated a willingness to procure them and initiated contact regarding the firearm transaction on October 1.

The court concluded that the police merely provided an opportunity, and the defendant chose to follow through.

The entrapment application was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of child luring following an online sting operation.

He appealed, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking to raise the issue of entrapment for the first time on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the ineffective assistance claim, finding no reasonable probability of a different trial outcome.

However, the court allowed the entrapment issue to be pursued at a new trial, citing the Supreme Court's recent decision in R. v. Ramelson, which provided clearer guidelines for internet sting operations.

The court found that the record did not definitively show compliance with these new guidelines and that the Crown would not suffer procedural prejudice by allowing the issue to be heard.

The conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered solely on the issue of entrapment.

The defendant, Rapinder Bains, applied for a stay of proceedings based on entrapment, arguing that police investigator DC Khan lacked reasonable suspicion when providing an opportunity to commit a drug trafficking offence.

The court found that DC Khan possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion, supported by a confidential human source (CHS) tip and prior text communications indicating drug trafficking activity associated with the target phone number.

The court emphasized that the defendant's unsolicited communication initiated the interaction and that the case did not involve random virtue-testing.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The appellant, Robert Stack, appealed his convictions for internet child luring and breach offences, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the police operation constituted entrapment, an argument not raised at trial.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the entrapment argument, finding that the Crown would be procedurally prejudiced as they were deprived of the opportunity to lead evidence on the bona fide inquiry test at trial.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding wilful blindness and found no error in principle or unfitness in the sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant, Thomas Zakos, appealed his convictions for cocaine trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing police entrapment.

The core issue was whether Detective Constable Green provided an opportunity to traffic before forming reasonable suspicion.

The Court of Appeal distinguished between exploratory questions and an actual opportunity to commit an offence.

It found that the question "U good for powder?" was merely exploratory, and reasonable suspicion was formed when the appellant responded "How much were you looking for?".

The subsequent question "How much for a b?" constituted the opportunity to traffic, by which point reasonable suspicion existed.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no entrapment and distinguishing the facts from R. v. Williams (SCC), where the opportunity was provided without prior reasonable suspicion.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a stay of convictions for trafficking heroin and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing police entrapment in "dial-a-dope" operations.

The appeal centered on the application of the Supreme Court's R. v. Ahmad framework for entrapment, specifically regarding the "reasonable suspicion" test.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge applied an incorrect analytical approach by relying on "bona fide investigation" as a standalone justification, her ultimate conclusion of no entrapment was correct.

The Court determined that reasonable suspicion was formed during the initial and subsequent communications with the appellant before the opportunity to commit the crime was presented.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal arose from convictions for child luring and communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor, stemming from Project Raphael, an undercover police investigation targeting demand for juvenile sexual services.

The appellant, Temitope Dare, appealed his convictions on two grounds: that the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding the mental element of belief (linking it to reading text messages) and that the trial judge erred in dismissing his entrapment application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the jury instructions, when read holistically, were not misleading regarding the requirement of belief, and rejecting the entrapment argument based on reasons provided in a related case.

The appellant, Erhard Haniffa, appealed his convictions for child luring and communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor, arguing entrapment, misapplication of the Kienapple principle, and s. 11(b) Charter delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals regarding conviction, Kienapple, entrapment, and s. 11(b) applications.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, setting aside the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a stayed count and remitting the matter for sentencing on the correct count.

This is an appeal from conviction and sentence.

The appellant, Muhammad Abbas Jaffer, was convicted of child luring and communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor, stemming from an undercover police operation (Project Raphael).

He appealed on grounds of entrapment, arguing both opportunity-based and inducement-based entrapment, and that his sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the police operation did not constitute entrapment and that the trial judge's sentence was fit, adequately considering aggravating and mitigating factors.

The appellant was convicted of counselling the commission of an indictable offence (murder) and appealed her conviction, the dismissal of her entrapment application, and her sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant intended the offence and was not entrapped, and that the sentence was fit.

The Crown sought a preliminary ruling to dismiss the defendant's entrapment application, arguing that prior Project Raphael cases had already determined the police investigation was bona fide and not random virtue testing.

The defendant argued that the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Mills provided a new basis to distinguish his case.

The court found that Mills did not alter the entrapment analysis regarding the bona fide nature and precision of the police investigation, and dismissed the first branch of the defendant's entrapment application, but allowed the defendant to proceed with arguments under the second branch of entrapment (inducement).

Arian Faroughi, convicted of communicating with persons believed to be underage for sexual purposes, brought an application to stay the charges due to police entrapment and a violation of his section 7 Charter rights.

The applicant argued that police inducement occurred through persistent texting, exploitation of his nervousness, and the use of a phone number previously associated with other escort ads.

The Crown contended there was no inducement and the applicant was a willing participant.

The court found that the police were acting under a bona fide inquiry and did not induce the applicant, applying the objective test from R. v. Mack.

The court determined that an average person in the applicant's position would not have been induced, and the police's oversight regarding the phone number was harmless and not a deliberate act of entrapment.

The section 7 disclosure argument was also dismissed.