Defamation

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his anti-SLAPP motion and granting summary judgment of $50,000 in favour of the respondent physician for defamation.

The appellant had posted derogatory comments about the respondent on a doctor rating website after the respondent testified as an expert in a medical malpractice trial involving the death of the appellant's brother.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that the anti-SLAPP motion failed and that the respondent had proven publication, authorship, and malice for the defamation claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The underlying defamation action arose from the appellants protesting outside the respondents' law office with signs alleging unpaid accounts for rehabilitation services.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the expression related to a private commercial dispute, not a matter of public interest, despite the motion judge improperly considering the appellants' motives and the manner of expression.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal the costs order was denied.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The underlying action involved a defamation claim by the respondent regarding statements made by the appellants during a union election campaign.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge erred in concluding the statements did not relate to a matter of public interest, the action survived the merits-based and public interest hurdles under s. 137.1(4).

The appeal was dismissed, allowing the defamation action to proceed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act and the granting of summary judgment and broad injunctive relief in a defamation action brought by the respondent union and its members.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the anti-SLAPP motion, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the harm suffered by the respondents outweighed the low public interest in the appellant's expression.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the injunctive relief, narrowing the publication ban to prohibit only defamatory statements and setting aside the restrictions on the appellant's movements and communications as overly broad and unjustified by the defamation findings.

The appellant sought leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to sue a litigation committee for defamation regarding a report sent to s. 38 litigation participants.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the words were not defamatory and were protected by qualified privilege.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence that the report was sent to non-participants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the fresh evidence application, upholding the finding that the words were not defamatory and noting the appellant had no reputation to protect among the recipients.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their defamation claims for failure to comply with the notice provision in s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The appellants had sent a notice to the respondent newspaper regarding articles that alleged the appellants fabricated criminal charges.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider the notice in the context of all surrounding circumstances.

The Court held that the notice sufficiently conveyed the essence of the matter complained of, allowing the respondents to take appropriate steps to mitigate damages.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its defamation action following a Rule 21 motion.

The motion judge had held that the appellant's notices did not comply with s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act because they failed to sufficiently specify the matters complained of.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the notices clearly specified the statements and inferences from the internet broadcast and newspaper article, and were sufficiently specific to allow the respondents to know the essence of the complaint and decide how to respond.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict finding them liable for internet defamation, awarding $42,000 in damages, and a trial judge's orders granting a permanent injunction and substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding defamatory meanings or malice.

The Court upheld the permanent injunction, noting the appellants' continued publication of the defamatory statements and refusal to remove them.

The jury's awards for aggravated and punitive damages were also upheld as reasonable.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their main action and striking their defence to a counterclaim for delay and failure to comply with undertakings.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision based on the record before him.

However, the appellants brought a motion to file fresh evidence consisting of the previously unproduced financial documents.

Although the fresh evidence did not meet the due diligence requirement, the Court admitted it because it was highly relevant to the ongoing defamation counterclaim.

The appeal was allowed, the pleadings were restored, and the action was returned to the trial list, with costs awarded to the respondent due to the appellants' delay.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that the respondent insurance company did not have a duty to defend them in a defamation action arising from an internet video.

The application judge had concluded that the substance of the claim did not implicate the appellants as employees acting in the course of their employment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge failed to consider cross-claims and third-party claims, which established a mere possibility that the appellants were acting in the course of their employment.

The appellant appealed the summary dismissal of his defamation action against the author and publisher of a book about a street gang.

The appellant claimed a passage comparing him to a movie character carried defamatory meanings, including that he was a murderer and a psychopath.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the words were not capable of bearing those defamatory meanings and that true innuendo had not been properly pleaded.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to reduce the motion judge's costs award from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, finding that Rule 49 did not automatically warrant substantial indemnity costs for a successful defendant.

The defendant broadcaster moved for summary judgment dismissing a defamation and negligence action arising from an erroneous television news report that described an assault as sexual.

The court held that, in the particular circumstances, the plaintiff's notice of action was sufficiently particularized to satisfy s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

Although the notice was served approximately three weeks outside the six-week period, the delay was found reasonable given the plaintiff's solitary confinement, restricted access, and diligence in attempting to retain counsel.

The motion was dismissed because the plaintiff was entitled to pursue the claim and genuine issues required a trial, with costs awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellant, a former probationary employee of the National Research Council, brought a defamation action against his former employer and colleagues regarding statements made in a 'Release on Probation' document.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding it was barred by the grievance scheme under the Public Service Staff Relations Act, lacked evidence of defamation, and was protected by qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action for defamation and intentional interference with economic relations against the respondents under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The motion judge had found the pleadings lacked sufficient material facts to establish that the respondents acted in concert with the author of the defamatory emails.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that when the amended statement of claim was read generously alongside the particulars and the incorporated emails, sufficient material facts were pleaded to disclose reasonable causes of action.

The order dismissing the action was set aside, and the appellants were granted leave to amend their pleadings.

The plaintiff, a municipal councillor, brought an action for defamation against other councillors based on statements made during a council meeting.

The defendants moved to strike the allegations, arguing their statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The motion judge held that absolute privilege does not apply to municipal councillors, who instead enjoy qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that Canadian law applies qualified privilege to municipal council speech and declining to extend absolute privilege without a full evidentiary record demonstrating its necessity.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the Law Society of Upper Canada and its investigator for defamation based on emails sent to victim institutions during an investigation into mortgage fraud.

The motion judge dismissed the action on summary judgment, finding the communications were protected by absolute privilege.

On appeal, the appellant argued that section 9 of the Law Society Act superseded the common law defence of absolute privilege and that the privilege did not apply in the circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 9 supplements rather than ousts the common law, and that the investigator's communications were protected by absolute privilege as they were made in connection with a disciplinary proceeding.

The respondent sued the appellant for defamation arising from a brief sexual relationship.

The appellant counterclaimed for sexual battery and intentional infliction of mental distress.

The motion judge struck the claim in battery, and the appellant appealed.

The appellant, representing herself, repeatedly sought adjournments based on alleged emotional difficulties and medical appointments but failed to provide supporting evidence or appear at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the request for an adjournment and the appeal, noting the appeal had little chance of success.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action against a municipal election candidate.

The candidate had delivered a confidential letter to City Council referencing allegations of improper influence regarding an untendered lease agreement with the appellant's family business.

The trial judge found the letter defamatory but protected by qualified privilege, and found no express malice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the communication was reasonably appropriate to the occasion and that the appellant failed to prove malice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, who was involved in operating a restaurant on City property, sued the respondent, a mayoral candidate, for libel over comments made during a newspaper editorial board interview.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the comments did not refer to the appellant and were not defamatory.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting the respondent's comments focused on the City Council process rather than the appellant personally, and explicitly disavowed accusing anyone of corruption.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for defamation and negligence arising from an article published in Toronto Life magazine and on its website.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were statute-barred and the negligence claim lacked a duty of care.

The Court of Appeal held that the application of the Libel and Slander Act to the internet publication and the issue of discoverability were genuine issues for trial.

The Court explicitly rejected the American 'single publication rule' for internet defamation in Ontario.

However, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' attempt to recapture a claim for the print version of the article as statute-barred under s. 6 of the Act, and dismissed the negligence claim because the brief interactions between the journalists and the plaintiffs did not establish a sufficiently close relationship of proximity to create a duty of care.