Watt

The appellant was convicted of importing fentanyl and possession for the purpose of trafficking after a controlled delivery of a package from China.

On appeal, she raised several grounds, including errors in jury instructions on importing, circumstantial evidence, and after-the-fact conduct, as well as the unreasonableness of the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds but allowed the appeal based on two errors: the trial judge improperly permitted the Crown to invite an adverse inference against the appellant for testifying after another defence witness, and the trial judge erred in dismissing the appellant's application to adduce evidence of a known third-party suspect.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants were convicted of agreeing to bribe a foreign public official, the Indian Minister of Civil Aviation, contrary to the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including unreasonable delay, lack of territorial jurisdiction, and the trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial following late Crown disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the jurisdictional and delay arguments but allowed the appeal on the basis of the mistrial application.

The Court found that the Crown's late disclosure of communications with a key witness and information regarding a central defence exhibit impaired the overall fairness of the trial process.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm against two young boys, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly used circumstantial evidence, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

He also challenged the dangerous offender finding, arguing the trial judge unduly relied on psychiatric evidence and erred in finding a pattern of repetitive behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in its entirety, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, concluding that trial counsel's representation was competent, and upholding the dangerous offender designation based on the predicate offences and the appellant's high risk of re-offending.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of possession of various controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, following the execution of a search warrant at an apartment and storage unit.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge gave an unfair and unbalanced jury charge and erred in refusing to hear a mid-trial Charter application challenging the storage unit search.

He also appealed his five-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and the refusal of the untimely Charter application justified.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, save for setting aside the victim surcharge.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after cocaine was found in her rental car at a border crossing.

She appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge's jury charge was unfair due to rhetorical questions and a failure to fully present the defence position.

She also appealed her 5.5-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the jury charge and concluding the sentence was within the appropriate range for a first-time offender importing approximately 1.5 kilograms of cocaine.

The appellant pleaded guilty to five charges arising from a home invasion, including an imitation firearm charge carrying a mandatory minimum sentence.

He appealed to strike his guilty pleas, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the plea to the imitation firearm charge was uninformed because trial counsel failed to advise him of it.

Furthermore, the court found that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance on the remaining charges by failing to assess the strength of the Crown's case, review disclosure, or consider potential Charter claims before advising the appellant to plead guilty.

The guilty pleas were struck and a new trial was ordered.