Erin Chesney

The parties entered into a contract in 1999 for the provision of market pricing data.

The appellant, a custodial bank, redistributed the data to its numerous affiliates without authorization.

The respondent discovered the breach in 2016 and sued.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the contract and awarded damages based on a rateable approach, but also awarded damages for sharing data with a specific affiliate.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding, concluding the contract only authorized the appellant itself to access the data.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to change his unentered judgment and rejected the appellant's limitations defence.

On damages, the Court struck the award relating to the specific affiliate as double compensation but otherwise upheld the damages assessment, including an adverse inference drawn against the appellant for spoliation of evidence.

During a trial of an issue on damages arising from an application, the applicant objected to numerous pieces of viva voce evidence introduced by the respondents.

The court had previously directed that the damages trial proceed on the closed record as it existed when the application was initially argued.

The court applied a bright-line test, ruling that any evidence not actually found in the underlying application record was inadmissible to prevent trial by ambush.

The court sustained the majority of the applicant's objections, rejecting the respondents' arguments that the new evidence was merely a permissible amplification of the existing record or a necessary response to the applicant's expert.

The plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action following the death of their family member from a delayed splenic rupture two weeks after a fall.

The deceased had been treated by the defendant surgeon at the hospital and subsequently cleared to return to work by the defendant family doctor.

The court found that neither doctor breached the standard of care, as objective evidence at the time did not indicate a splenic injury.

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove causation, finding it likely that an intervening trauma caused the fatal rupture.

The action was dismissed.

The respondents in the underlying application (BNY) brought a motion to adjourn a damages trial until after the disposition of their pending appeal on liability, to adduce further evidence, and to settle the form of judgment on liability.

The court had previously found BNY liable for breach of contract and ordered a viva voce trial on damages due to the complexity of the record.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that an adjournment would effectively impose a bifurcation not agreed to by the parties, contrary to Rule 6.1.01, and that the balance of convenience favoured proceeding with the damages trial to allow a single appeal on both liability and damages.

The court also declined to allow new evidence or settle the form of judgment at this stage.

The joint liquidators of Stanford International Bank (SIB) and a group of investors brought actions against TD Bank, SIB's primary U.S. dollar correspondent bank, for knowing assistance in breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.

The plaintiffs alleged that TD Bank should have detected and prevented the massive Ponzi scheme orchestrated by SIB's owner, Allen Stanford.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the actions, finding that TD Bank had no actual knowledge of the fraud and was not reckless or wilfully blind.

The court also held that TD Bank did not owe a novel duty of care to protect its customer from insider abuse, and even if it did, it met the standard of care of a reasonable banker during the relevant period.

The applicant claimed damages of over $889 million for breach of two Data Services Agreements, alleging the respondents improperly shared market pricing data within their corporate group.

The respondents argued the agreements allowed sharing across their 'line of business' or brand.

The court found the respondents breached the agreements, as the contracts, factual matrix, and parties' conduct indicated the data was restricted to the named entities.

Defences of waiver, estoppel, and limitation periods were dismissed.

However, the court found the paper record insufficient to assess damages and directed the issue of damages to a trial.

The defendant Bank appealed a Master's decision denying its motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, a film production company.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred by placing too high a burden on the Bank at the first stage of the test and by making palpable and overriding errors regarding the plaintiff's liabilities and secured debts.

The Court found the Bank established good reason to believe the plaintiff had insufficient assets in Ontario, and the plaintiff failed to prove it had sufficient exigible assets or that an order for security for costs would be unjust.

The plaintiff was ordered to post security for costs.

The respondents brought a motion under Rule 39.02(2) for leave to file an additional affidavit following cross-examinations in an application concerning the alleged breach of market data licensing agreements.

The court applied the four-part test for leave, finding the objective factual evidence regarding corporate structure relevant and responsive to undertakings given during cross-examination.

However, the court struck out portions of the affidavit that contained impermissible subjective opinions on contract interpretation.

Leave was granted on terms, with costs awarded to the responding party on a substantial indemnity basis.

The appellant, who was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his involuntary admission to a psychiatric facility and his incapacity to consent to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decision on a reasonableness standard.

The court found ample evidence supporting the Board's conclusion that the appellant posed a risk of serious bodily harm to others and lacked the capacity to appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.