John Laskin

The appellants' income property was substantially damaged by fire.

They decided to demolish the site and build an eight-and-a-half-storey condominium, claiming replacement cost and building code upgrades under their insurance policy.

The insurer paid only the actual cash value, arguing the condominium was not a 'replacement' of 'like kind and quality'.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy required any replacement to be of like kind and quality to trigger replacement cost coverage.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a commercial truck driver, was acquitted at trial of importing and possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after 39 kilograms of cocaine were found in his trailer at the border.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's 'blind courier' defence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge made speculative findings of fact unsupported by evidence and committed a legal error by applying a piecemeal approach to the evidence rather than considering its cumulative effect.

The respondents were wholly successful on the appeal and sought partial indemnity costs totaling over $111,000.

The appellants conceded the respondents were entitled to costs but argued the amounts sought were excessive, proposing a total of $30,000.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs payable by the appellants at $20,000 for Vicentini, $10,000 for Ford Credit, and $10,000 for Personal Insurance, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant was convicted of historic sexual offences committed both as an adult and as a young offender.

The trial judge conducted a single trial for both the adult and youth indictments and admitted evidence across the indictments as similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the Youth Criminal Justice Act precludes the joint trial of adult and youth indictments.

The Court also held that the trial judge erred in his similar fact evidence ruling by failing to account for the 30-year gap and the appellant's age difference, and erred in admitting a videotaped statement without affording the appellant an opportunity to cross-examine the witness on her demeanour.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that ordered his continued detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health with permission to live in the community restricted to supervised accommodation.

The appellant argued the Board erred by failing to consider a conditional discharge and by requiring supervised accommodation.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the appellant was not yet ready for a conditional discharge, as recent attempts at community living had failed.

The Court also found the Board's requirement for supervised accommodation was reasonable and supported by expert opinion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and kidnapping of an eight-year-old child.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on post-offence conduct, in admitting a portion of the co-accused's videotaped statement for the truth of its contents, and in failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the co-accused's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidential foundation for an accessory after the fact defence, that the videotaped statement met threshold reliability, and that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to omit a Vetrovec warning at the tactical request of defence counsel.

The appellant, who had a history of bringing meritless proceedings against the respondent professional association following his suspension for unpaid fees, sought to appeal a Superior Court order denying him leave to appeal an internal disciplinary decision.

The respondent requested the Court of Appeal dismiss the appeal and related motion under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal found the proceedings to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as they attempted to re-litigate previously decided issues.

The appeal and motion were dismissed, and the Court provided new procedural directions for future Rule 2.1 requests.

The vendor appealed a trial judgment finding that an Agreement of Purchase and Sale terminated on its own terms, entitling the purchasers to a return of their deposit.

The vendor argued the trial judge erred in finding time was not of the essence and in placing the onus on the vendor to set a new closing date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the original agreement lacked a time of the essence clause and the vendor failed to provide a revised occupancy statement or address the purchasers' concerns as promised.

The vendor was estopped from claiming the agreement was not at an end.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for murder.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge by denigrating the defence and failing to properly caution the jury regarding inferences about his age.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the charge fair when read as a whole.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's ruling that he was at least 16 and a half years old was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence holistically, including the appellant's appearance, criminal record, and peer group, and reasonably concluded he was over 16.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

He argued that the trial judge erred in admitting a portion of his uncautioned statement to the police, erred in his Corbett ruling regarding the admissibility of his criminal record, and imposed an excessive period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on the voluntariness of the statement was reasonable, the Corbett ruling was well-reasoned, and the 15-year parole ineligibility period was within a reasonable range.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, which included a dangerous offender designation.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to stay the proceedings and in assessing future risk and the predicate offence for the dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's factual findings regarding the stay.

The Court also upheld the dangerous offender designation, noting the trial judge properly relied on the appellant's criminal record, expert clinical assessment of high risk for violent recidivism, and history of breaching release conditions.

The predicate offence of robbery at knifepoint was found to constitute an act of serious personal violence.

The applicant, convicted of second-degree murder and other offences, applied under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code for the appointment of government-funded counsel for his appeal.

The Crown conceded that the appeal was sufficiently complex to warrant counsel but opposed the application on the basis that the applicant had not exhausted his Legal Aid remedies or been transparent about his finances.

The Court of Appeal found that while the applicant lacked candour regarding his historical finances, his current financial situation demonstrated he had no assets or other sources of funding.

The application was granted and counsel was appointed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's credibility findings were not supported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's decision to accept the complainant's evidence and reject the defence witness's testimony was reasonable and well-supported by the record.

Following a successful appeal, the parties agreed on appeal costs but could not agree on the costs of the underlying application or the payment of interest.

The Court of Appeal fixed the application costs at $40,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes, taking into account the appellant's offer to settle.

The Court also ordered that interest at three percent per annum is payable on the judgment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after an improper question was asked of the Crown's expert, by admitting a statement he made at the hospital about having swallowed cocaine before, and by refusing an adjournment to call a defence expert on cocaine toxicity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's discretionary rulings were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The trial judge's remedial instruction cured the improper expert question, the hospital statement was highly probative to the issue of duress, and the need for a defence expert should have been foreseen.

The appellant sued her landlord for negligence after suffering serious personal injuries from a fall on a fire escape, alleging it was not kept free of ice and snow.

The trial judge dismissed the action, accepting the superintendent's evidence of daily inspections and finding no snow or ice was present, while rejecting the appellant's evidence on credibility grounds.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and erred in credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the record and there was no basis to interfere with the finding that the standard of care was met.

The Crown sought to appeal the respondent's acquittals for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and flight from a peace officer.

After failing to serve the respondent personally, the Crown applied to the summary conviction appeal court for an order for substituted service.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding no jurisdiction to order substituted service under the Criminal Code for summary conviction appeals.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, holding that section 482(1) of the Criminal Code provides sufficient authority for rules governing substituted service in summary conviction appeals.

The appellant appealed his convictions and global three-year sentence for procuring a 16-year-old girl into prostitution, living off the avails of prostitution, and obtaining sexual services for consideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the convictions were reasonably supported by the evidence, including evidence of persuasion and encouragement.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court emphasizing the gravity of the offences and the vulnerability of the young complainant.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of physical and sexual abuse against his common-law wife, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework, and the reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly distinguished between counts where medical evidence did not support the allegations and the two counts where a witness's evidence confirmed the complainant's injuries.

The acceptance of this confirmatory evidence provided a reasoned explanation for rejecting the appellant's testimony.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment imposed after a re-trial for dangerous driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

At his first trial, he had been sentenced to two years less a day.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to consider the fitness of the original sentence before imposing a greater sentence, as the facts at the second trial were essentially the same.

The appeal was allowed and the original sentence of 18 months for dangerous driving and six months consecutive for failing to remain was restored.