Naomi Lutes

The Crown appealed the acquittal of one respondent and the sentence of another, while the second respondent appealed his conviction.

Both cases involved border officers searching the respondents' digital devices under s. 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act, leading to the discovery of child pornography.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 99(1)(a) violates s. 8 of the Charter because it authorizes highly intrusive searches of digital devices without reasonable suspicion.

The law was declared unconstitutional with a six-month suspension.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court admitted the evidence for both respondents due to the officers' good faith reliance on existing law and the serious nature of the offences.

The first respondent's acquittal was overturned and a new trial ordered.

The second respondent's conviction was upheld.

The Court also established a new sentencing range for child pornography possession, finding the second respondent's conditional sentence demonstrably unfit and stating a three-year sentence was appropriate, though it declined to incarcerate him given the time already served on house arrest.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of one respondent and the sentence of another, while the second respondent appealed his conviction.

Both cases involved border officers searching the respondents' digital devices under s. 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act, leading to the discovery of child pornography.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 99(1)(a) violates s. 8 of the Charter because it authorizes highly intrusive searches of digital devices without reasonable suspicion.

The law was declared unconstitutional with a six-month suspension.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court admitted the evidence for both respondents due to the officers' good faith reliance on existing law and the serious nature of the offences.

The first respondent's acquittal was overturned and a new trial ordered.

The second respondent's conviction was upheld.

The Court also established a new sentencing range for child pornography possession, finding the second respondent's conditional sentence demonstrably unfit and stating a three-year sentence was appropriate, though it declined to incarcerate him given the time already served on house arrest.

The accused was tried for possession and importation of child pornography after border security officers found numerous digital devices in his luggage at Pearson Airport.

The central issue was whether the accused had knowledge of the child pornography on the devices.

The court rejected demeanour evidence but found that the volume and dispersal of the illicit material across seven different devices constituted overwhelming circumstantial evidence of knowledge.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The applicant, charged with possession and importation of child pornography, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence found on his digital devices during a border search.

The court previously found that s. 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held that the applicant was detained under s. 10 of the Charter when border officers requested his device passwords, resulting in a breach of his rights to counsel and to be informed of the reasons for detention.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded because the officers acted in good faith under the law as it existed at the time, and the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicants, who were charged with child pornography offences following searches of their digital devices at the border, brought a constitutional challenge against s. 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act.

They argued that the provision, which allows customs officers to search imported goods without any legal threshold, violates the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter when applied to personal digital devices.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the profound privacy interests in digital devices require a legal threshold for searches.

The court held that the provision violates s. 8 and is not saved by s. 1, declaring it of no force or effect with respect to digital devices, but suspended the declaration of invalidity.

The two accused were charged with drugging and sexually assaulting two different complainants.

The first complainant alleged she was drugged and assaulted by one of the accused in 2003, but the court found reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies in the timeline and lack of corroborating evidence.

The second complainant alleged she was drugged and assaulted by both accused in 2011 after a night of heavy drinking.

The court found reasonable doubt that she was drugged, noting her ability to walk and send text messages during the alleged timeframe.

The court also found reasonable doubt regarding her lack of consent, or alternatively, that the accused had an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

Both accused were found not guilty on all charges.

The defendant tobacco companies brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' proposed class actions as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants breached their contracts by participating in smuggling duty-free tobacco back into Canada, avoiding higher domestic prices.

The defendants argued the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of the alleged smuggling long before commencing the actions in 2009 and 2010.

The court dismissed the motions, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding when the plaintiffs discovered the constituent elements of their claims, particularly given the defendants' consistent denials of involvement in smuggling.

The applicant, charged with attempted murder and various firearm offences, sought release on bail pending trial.

The applicant allegedly shot the complainant in the neck, resulting in paralysis, while on bail for previous gun and drug charges.

The court found that while detention was not justified on the primary ground, it was justified on the secondary ground due to the strong Crown case and the applicant's previous breach of bail conditions.

The court also found detention justified on the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity of the offence and the circumstances.

The bail review application was dismissed.