B.W. Miller

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

He challenged the validity of the search warrant used to locate fentanyl and cocaine at a Toronto residence, arguing that the Information to Obtain lacked sufficient evidence to support its issuance and that the evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Three confidential sources had identified the appellant as a drug dealer through single photo identification, and police surveillance corroborated his connection to the searched address.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error, misapprehension of evidence, or failure to consider relevant evidence in the application judge's analysis, and dismissed the appeal without calling on the respondent.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous operation of a conveyance causing bodily harm arising from a collision with an electric scooter rider on a residential street.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence concerning his emotional state, improperly relied on demeanour evidence, and erred in rejecting his position that the incident reflected only a momentary lapse of attention.

The court held that the characterization of the appellant's emotional condition was supported by the record, that any demeanour-based inference was invited by defence counsel, and that the trial judge committed no reversible error in treating the conduct as a marked departure from the reasonable standard of care.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

A payment processing company appealed sanctions imposed after it was found in civil contempt for repeatedly obstructing a court-ordered audit obtained by mandatory injunction under a commercial services agreement.

The appellant argued the penalties were disproportionate, challenged the direction to pay audit costs into court, and sought leave to appeal the contempt-motion costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the arguments depended on unappealed factual findings that the appellant intentionally obstructed the audit and that no basis existed to interfere with the sanctions or the costs order.

The court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that r. 60.11(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure is not confined to cases where the officer or director has already been found personally in contempt, and remitted the issue of joint and several liability of the sole officer and director for redetermination.

The appellant, who suffered from treatment-resistant schizophrenia, was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for attempted murder after a vicious, unprovoked attack on his neighbour.

The trial judge subsequently designated the appellant a high-risk accused (HRA) under ss. 672.64(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied the wrong legal standards and that the findings were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying the distinct risk thresholds under the two subsections and finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk of grave harm.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found that the individual appellant, who was the sole officer and employee of the corporate appellant, had serially engaged in vexatious litigation since 2017, including bringing proceedings outside the court's jurisdiction and failing to pay significant costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's application of the relevant factors and concluding that the order against both the corporation and the individual directing its litigation was entirely justified.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found the respondent had standing and applied the Lang Michener test, noting the appellants' history of meritless litigation against a former client who is a party under a disability.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and dismissed the appeal, confirming the vexatious litigant order applies to the appellants in their personal capacity.

The appellant, a 58-year-old family friend, was convicted of sexually assaulting the 17-year-old daughter of his close friend and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applying the W.(D.) principles, and finding a lack of consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year term was not demonstrably unfit given the significant breach of trust, the vulnerability of the adolescent victim, and the severe impact of the offences.

The moving parties sought to quash the responding party's appeal of an order validating service of an application record.

The responding party, a foreign state, argued the order was final because it determined substantive rights regarding state sovereignty and the Hague Convention.

The Court of Appeal held that the order validating service was procedural and interlocutory, as it did not finally dispose of the dispute or deprive the responding party of substantive defences.

The motion was granted and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed his total sentence of 76 months for sexual exploitation, making child pornography, and voyeurism involving a 17-year-old complainant and multiple other victims secretly recorded in his home.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by imposing a consecutive sentence for child pornography, treating elements of the offences as aggravating factors, and providing insufficient credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the overall sentence fit under the totality principle and noting the trial judge's discretionary decisions were entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his convictions and global sentence of eight years for sexual offences against three adolescent women.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the testimony of each complainant as similar fact evidence across counts, specifically regarding the finding that accidental tainting had not occurred.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis, noting that the core allegations differed meaningfully and could not be the product of accidental tainting.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the eight-year global sentence was fit given the breach of trust and vulnerability of the victims.

The appellant Ministry of Transportation appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against a contractor as statute-barred.

The parties' standard form construction contract required a notice of protest and alternative dispute resolution to be completed within two years of contract completion.

However, the referee's decision was not released until after this two-year period expired.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in interpreting the contract; it is commercially absurd to require a party to protest a decision before it is released.

Because the contractual limitation period could not apply, the statutory two-year limitation period governed, and the appellant's action was commenced in time.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment set aside.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order, arguing the judge misapprehended evidence regarding the interpretation of a quitclaim deed and its tax consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the interpretation of the deed was a matter of law and intention, not evidence, and that the motion judge correctly considered the tax consequences without misapprehending the evidence.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the motion judge's decision and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $3,000 to the respondents.

The moving party sought a panel review of a decision dismissing her motion for an extension of time to perfect her motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court had previously dismissed her appeal of five Licence Appeal Tribunal decisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, agreeing with the motion judge that despite meeting the first four factors for an extension of time, the justice of the case weighed against granting leave because the proposed appeal lacked merit and general public importance.

The appellant appealed her convictions for drug trafficking and her 4-year custodial sentence.

She argued the trial judge erred in dismissing her application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter by mischaracterizing periods of delay, including those related to COVID-19 and a missing Information.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in the trial judge's attribution of delay to the defence and exceptional circumstances.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 4-year sentence was below the established range for mid-level cocaine trafficking and the trial judge made no error in principle in rejecting a conditional sentence.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to adequately quantify the mitigating effect of harsh pretrial conditions (Duncan credit) and sought a further reduction based on the sentence's impact on his family.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that under R. v. Marshall, harsh pretrial conditions are a mitigating factor to be weighed holistically, not a mathematical deduction.

The court also rejected the family impact argument due to insufficient evidence and the appellant's history.

Following an appeal in a class proceeding, the parties and the Law Foundation of Ontario made a joint submission regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal fixed at $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The husband appealed a family law judgment made following an uncontested trial in which he did not participate due to his failure to comply with court orders regarding financial disclosure and pleadings.

The wife brought a motion to quash the appeal based on the husband's ongoing non-compliance with support and costs orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding it more appropriate to hear the appeal on the merits.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in proceeding with an uncontested trial given the husband's repeated breaches of court orders and failure to provide financial disclosure.

The appellants contracted with the respondent to repair fire damage to their property.

The project was overseen by a third party who fraudulently requested and retained personal payments from the appellants.

The trial judge found the appellants liable to the respondent for the outstanding contract amount, concluding the third party lacked actual or ostensible authority to receive personal payments on the respondent's behalf.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's application of the governing principles of ostensible authority.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their class proceeding for delay under s. 29.1(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The motion judge found that the appellants failed to file a certification motion record or establish a timetable for steps required to advance the proceeding within one year of commencement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that while a contextual approach applies to determining whether a timetable for required steps was established, the one-year deadline is mandatory and no such timetable existed here.

The court also rejected arguments regarding waiver, the availability of a Phoenix order, and the effect of adding a new plaintiff.