Peter I. Waldmann

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The action arose from a social media post by the respondent about Halal mortgages, which the appellant claimed referred to him and his former company.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the post related to a matter of public interest and that the appellant failed to show the defamation claim had substantial merit, as the impugned words did not identify him.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded on a partial indemnity basis.

Following an appeal in a class proceeding, the parties and the Law Foundation of Ontario made a joint submission regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal fixed at $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their class proceeding for delay under s. 29.1(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The motion judge found that the appellants failed to file a certification motion record or establish a timetable for steps required to advance the proceeding within one year of commencement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that while a contextual approach applies to determining whether a timetable for required steps was established, the one-year deadline is mandatory and no such timetable existed here.

The court also rejected arguments regarding waiver, the availability of a Phoenix order, and the effect of adding a new plaintiff.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application for an assessment of the respondent law firm's accounts, the respondent sought costs on a composite partial, substantial, and full indemnity basis.

The court found that the applicants' persistence in making unfounded and scurrilous allegations against the integrity of the late Edward Greenspan and his firm justified an award of full indemnity costs.

The court reduced the claimed amount by disallowing fees for work performed by the represented clients themselves and for a settled security for costs motion, ultimately awarding the respondent $150,262.92 all-inclusive, plus $1,500 for costs submissions.

The applicants sought an assessment of the legal accounts rendered by the respondent criminal defence law firm, alleging overcharging and breach of fixed-price and maximum-price retainer agreements.

The court found no fixed-price agreement existed for the preliminary inquiry and that the firm did not overcharge under the maximum-price contract for the trial phase.

The court also held that allegations of deficient legal services were barred by issue estoppel, having been dismissed in prior criminal proceedings.

Finding no special circumstances to justify an assessment outside the statutory limitation period, the application was dismissed.

A case conference was held to address the scheduling of several outstanding motions after the plaintiffs dismissed their counsel.

The court rescheduled the motions to the week of November 7, 2022, to be heard virtually.

The hearing of the motions was marked peremptory against the plaintiffs and their corporate entities, giving them time to retain new counsel without further delaying the proceedings.

The respondent law firm brought a motion to strike a supplementary motion record and subsequent affidavits delivered by the applicants in an application to assess the firm's accounts.

The applicants delivered the 1,229-page supplementary record over six years after the application was commenced, without leave, and after the applicants had already been cross-examined on their original affidavits.

The court granted the motion to strike, finding that the late delivery constituted improper case-splitting and an attempt to 'shore up' evidence post-cross-examination.

The court also denied the applicants' request to cross-examine a witness, finding they had forfeited the right by failing to exercise reasonable diligence.

A case conference was held to address multiple related actions.

On consent, the claims against Shahzad Siddiqui and Borden Ladner Gervais LLP were dismissed with prejudice and without costs.

The court directed counsel to confer regarding the potential release of individual defendants and established a timetable for scheduling upcoming dispositive motions.

A case conference was held to manage multiple related proceedings.

Counsel for the plaintiffs indicated a recommendation for the plaintiffs to agree to dismissals without costs in most cases, except potentially the claim against Grant Thornton LLP Canada, which requires leave to proceed.

The court directed that a new class action issued by one of the plaintiffs be case managed together with the existing matters.

Counsel were directed to advise on dismissals or agree on a timetable for dispositive motions by a specified date.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend his statement of claim to restore his former family law lawyer as a defendant in an action for professional negligence.

The action against the lawyer had previously been dismissed on consent without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to bring a motion to deliver a fresh as amended statement of claim.

The plaintiff brought the motion five years later.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff had discovered his claim prior to commencing the original action in 2014, the two-year limitation period had expired, and the consent order did not constitute an agreement to toll or waive the limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The defendant appealed a Master's decision setting aside a Registrar's order that dismissed the plaintiff's defamation action for delay.

The defendant argued the Master erred by not upholding the dismissal after finding the plaintiff deliberately delayed the action, and by reversing the burden of proof regarding prejudice.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Master applied the correct contextual approach to the Reid factors and reasonably concluded that the interests of justice favoured deciding the case on its merits, given the lack of significant prejudice to the defendant.

The plaintiff tenant sued the defendant landlord for wrongful termination of a commercial month-to-month tenancy and conversion of its manufacturing equipment and goods.

The landlord locked out the tenant without the required written notice and subsequently disposed of the tenant's property.

The court found the landlord liable for conversion and awarded damages based on the fair market value of the lost equipment and goods, plus punitive damages for the landlord's egregious conduct, less arrears for rent and hydro.

The moving party, a creditor, brought a preliminary motion seeking production of a settlement agreement between the proposal debtor and another creditor.

The debtor opposed production, claiming the agreement was confidential and protected by settlement privilege.

The court ordered production of the settlement agreement, holding that settlement privilege does not apply to claims settlements in a BIA proposal process.

The court found that the public interest in maintaining the integrity and transparency of BIA proposal proceedings outweighs any need to encourage settlement by recognizing privilege.

The plaintiff, having succeeded on a summary judgment motion for unpaid consulting fees, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to the defendants' alleged reprehensible conduct and a time-limited offer to settle.

The court found that the defendants' conduct, including evading service and failing to make any settlement offers, was not 'reprehensible' enough to warrant punitive costs.

Furthermore, the plaintiff's time-limited offer did not attract presumptive cost consequences under Rule 49.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01, the court awarded the plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $65,000, noting the importance of fostering access to justice and the defendants' failure to provide a costs outline.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment seeking recovery of $46,784.11 after it mistakenly credited mortgage payments drawn from a frozen bank account and later discharged the mortgage based on an incorrect payout statement.

The court held that the discharge of the mortgage did not extinguish the underlying debt, and allowing the defendants to retain the benefit of the bank’s mistake would constitute unjust enrichment.

The defendants’ argument based on the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio was rejected, as the bank’s breach of the freeze order was inadvertent and did not bar enforcement of the debt.

However, the court declined to rectify the land titles register to reinstate the mortgage because the parties could not be restored to their original position and the requested third mortgage would prejudice other mortgagees who were not parties to the proceeding.

Judgment was granted for the debt, and the defendants’ counterclaim was dismissed.

Following earlier reasons for judgment determining entitlement to funds held in trust, the successful respondents sought a costs award against the applicant.

The court applied the principles governing costs under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including indemnification of successful litigants, encouragement of settlement, and deterrence of inappropriate litigation conduct.

The court also considered proportionality and the reasonable expectations of the parties, as articulated in appellate jurisprudence.

Although the respondents largely succeeded at trial, they prevailed on only six of nine claim categories, and proportionality concerns warranted some reduction.

The court reduced the fee component of the partial indemnity claim but allowed disbursements, ultimately fixing costs payable by the applicant to the respondents.

In a proposed class proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the moving party brought an omnibus motion seeking multiple procedural and evidentiary orders affecting the record for a certification motion.

Most of the relief sought was either abandoned or dismissed, with only minor unopposed amendments granted.

The court held that the respondents were entitled to costs because the moving party was largely unsuccessful.

Although the respondents sought over $30,000 including substantial indemnity costs for abandoned claims, the court rejected punitive costs and applied the partial indemnity scale.

A proportionate costs award of $20,000 all-inclusive was ordered.

Following a summary judgment motion resolved by agreement, the applicant sought costs against the respondent Figueira.

The court held that the applicant was entitled to full indemnity costs based on the clear wording of a promissory note signed by the respondent, which provided for 'all costs of the collection'.

The court apportioned the total costs claimed among the three respondents and awarded the applicant $39,500 in full indemnity costs against Figueira.