B.W. Miller

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her action without prejudice to her ability to begin a new action that explains her case.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's endorsement, noting that he provided a clear roadmap for the appellant to follow and granted leave to bring a more comprehensible claim.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant landlord sought to expand a shopping centre to accommodate a new LCBO store, which required reconfiguring 36 parking spaces.

The respondent grocery store tenant successfully applied for a permanent injunction, with the application judge finding the tenant had a leasehold proprietary interest in the common parking area.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in law, as the tenant lacked exclusive possession of the parking area.

Assuming the tenant held an easement, the Court found no substantial interference with the tenant's rights, as the reconfiguration did not significantly reduce available spaces and the tenant had no contractual right to specific spots.

The appeal was allowed and the injunction set aside.

The appellant purchased a restaurant from the respondent and subsequently sued for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the restaurant's revenues.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no misrepresentation and stating the appellant should have verified the actual sales receipts provided to her.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by ignoring formal admissions regarding the revenue representations and by improperly relying on the appellant's lack of due diligence as a defence to fraudulent misrepresentation.

The appellant appealed a judgment of less than $50,000 to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that it was properly brought to the Divisional Court due to the monetary amount.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred in not declaring a mistrial after a juror brought internet articles into the jury room.

She also argued her s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated by post-conviction delay and her right to make full answer and defence was compromised by lost airport surveillance video.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inquiry into the jury issue was sufficient, the post-conviction delay was justified by a Gardiner hearing which constituted an exceptional circumstance, and the jury instructions regarding the lost video were fair.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded restricted firearm and possession of a restricted firearm knowing possession is unauthorized.

He appealed his four-year sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in assessing an expert report regarding his post-traumatic stress disorder and in applying Gladue factors.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in assessing the expert's report, which was relevant to the circumstances of the offences and rehabilitation prospects.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to three and a half years.

The appellant appealed a 24-month conditional sentence.

Based on unusual circumstances, significant pre-sentence custody, fresh evidence, and a Crown concession, the Court of Appeal found the original sentence unreasonable.

The court accepted a joint submission and varied the sentence to 12 months' incarceration, less 5 months' credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a net sentence of 7 months.

The appellant sought to appeal the dismissal of his summary judgment motion regarding fraudulent conveyances.

The motion judge had dismissed the motion on the basis that the underlying debt was discharged in bankruptcy and the appellant had failed to follow the correct procedure under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's order was interlocutory because it did not determine the substantive rights of the parties.

Therefore, the appeal properly lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for damages arising from the purchase of a defective wind turbine from one of the defendant corporations.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against two affiliated corporations, arguing they were separate legal entities.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs' claims regarding lifting the corporate veil, agency, and pure economic loss for negligent manufacture raised genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly given the conflicting evidence on the degree of control and integration among the corporations.

The respondent brought a motion to vary his spousal support obligations, arguing that his business revenue had declined and the applicant's health and earning capacity had improved.

The applicant opposed the motion and sought an increase in support.

The court found that the respondent's net income had only decreased by 25%, which was offset by his new spouse's contributions to household expenses.

The court also found that the applicant's improved health and new qualifications were contemplated at the time of the original order.

The motion to vary was dismissed, as no material change in circumstances was established.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside an administrative dismissal of their action, which arose from a real estate transaction.

The action was dismissed by the Registrar after the plaintiffs failed to set the matter down for trial in accordance with a court-ordered timetable.

The court applied the four-part test for setting aside a dismissal and found that the plaintiffs' delay was intentional, as they had prioritized an alternative resolution through the Ministry of the Environment over the litigation.

Given the significant delay in bringing the motion and the prejudice to the defendants, the court refused to set aside the dismissal.

The applicant commercial tenant sought relief from forfeiture and an injunction against eviction, arguing the landlord orally agreed to defer rent payments until the tenant resolved third-party litigation.

The respondent landlord denied the agreement and relied on a subsequent written settlement agreement negotiated by counsel, which the tenant breached.

The court found no indefinite oral agreement to defer rent and held that the written settlement agreement, despite missing a word, was unambiguous in context and binding.

The court also held the tenant was bound by his solicitor's ostensible authority.

The application was dismissed and the interim injunction dissolved.

The defendant brought a motion for security for costs and a stay of previous costs orders made against him.

The plaintiff had previously obtained summary judgment for indemnification regarding an estate administration and intended to withdraw the remaining claims.

The court found that ordering security for costs would have no practical significance, as the only remaining step was the plaintiff's motion to withdraw the claim.

The court also found no reason to stay the previous costs orders.

The defendant's motions were dismissed.

The moving party (respondent in the family proceeding) brought a motion to reopen a final order made in default, arguing that his severe illness prevented him from participating in the litigation and instructing counsel over a three-year period.

The court found that the moving party had engaged in a history of delay and obstructive behaviour, including actively resisting the sale of family property, which contradicted his claims of incapacity.

The court held that disagreement with findings of fact does not constitute a 'mistake' under Family Law Rule 25(19) and dismissed the motion, awarding costs to the responding party.

The moving party (respondent in the main action) brought an interlocutory motion for the partition and sale of two jointly owned family cottages.

The responding party opposed the motion, arguing that the Partition Act was not specifically pleaded and that he might be able to buy out the moving party's interest after the equalization of net family property at trial.

The court held that the failure to specifically plead the Partition Act was not a bar to relief, as there was no unfairness or surprise.

The court granted the motion, finding that the responding party failed to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial or that a forced sale would be vexatious, malicious, or oppressive.