J. David Keith

Following a successful summary judgment motion discharging a mortgage as statute-barred, the plaintiff sought costs of $33,557.18, arguing for substantial indemnity costs based on a $100 offer to settle.

The court found the offer contained no real element of compromise and applied an exception to Rule 49.10.

Applying principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,394.32.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to discharge a collateral mortgage, arguing that the defendant's enforcement action was statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The defendant claimed a $4,000 payment was made in May 2010, which would have reset the 10-year limitation period.

Applying the Hryniak framework, the court found the defendant's evidence of the payment—a single ambiguous bank book entry—insufficient to meet her onus of proving the claim was brought within the limitation period.

The plaintiff's motion was granted and the defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.

The applicants brought an application against the respondents, including Sylvie Tremblay, alleging misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and other claims.

The application against Tremblay was dismissed.

Tremblay sought costs on a full or substantial indemnity basis, claiming she was entitled to indemnification for all respondents' legal costs.

The court found the applicants' case against Tremblay was extraordinarily weak and exposed them to serious costs consequences due to allegations of dishonourable conduct.

The court awarded Tremblay costs on a substantial indemnity basis, but reduced the amount because she failed to submit a pre-hearing costs outline and did not differentiate her costs from the other respondents.

Tremblay was awarded $15,000 all inclusive.

The applicant property owner sought an order declaring an Occupancy Agreement and Option to Purchase Agreement null and void, and a Writ of Possession.

The respondent occupant had entered into a rent-to-own arrangement and attempted to exercise the option to purchase.

The applicant argued the respondent failed to strictly comply with the notice and deposit requirements of the option.

The court found the agreements constituted a bilateral contract, meaning strict compliance was not required and substantial performance was sufficient.

The court held the respondent substantially complied with the ambiguous terms of the agreement and dismissed the application.

The plaintiff, acting as estate trustee for her deceased mother, sued her sister for repayment of a $75,000 loan made by their parents.

The defendant sister moved for summary judgment, arguing the loan was forgiven in the parents' wills.

The court found that the plaintiff lacked standing because the mother's interest in the loan passed to the father upon her death.

Furthermore, interpreting the wills, the court concluded the testators intended to forgive the loan upon their deaths.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

Following a successful motion by certain defendants, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The court exercised its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and considered the principles governing reasonable costs, including the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the guidance from appellate jurisprudence.

Although the successful defendants sought recovery based on extensive hours claimed for research and preparation, the court found portions of the time claimed excessive.

Considering the moderate complexity of the issues, the conduct of the parties, and prior settlement offers, the court fixed a reduced but reasonable partial indemnity costs award.

The moving defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the amended statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs alleged defamation and intentional interference with economic relations arising primarily from emails authored by another defendant.

The court held that the pleadings contained no material facts linking the moving defendants to the allegedly defamatory statements or establishing that they acted in concert or through an agency relationship with the author of the emails.

The pleadings also failed to properly particularize the alleged tort of intentional interference with economic relations or inducement of breach of contract.

The action against the moving defendants was dismissed.