C. Boswell

The offender was convicted of conspiring to import 300 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The Crown sought a sentence of 15 to 16 years, while the defence argued for a significantly lower sentence based on the offender's limited role and the principle of parity with co-conspirators.

The court found that the offender played a minor role in the conspiracy and noted that co-conspirators with greater involvement received or were facing sentences of 5 to 6.5 years.

Applying the principles of proportionality and parity, the court determined a fit sentence was 8 years, reduced to 7.5 years to account for strict pre-sentence bail conditions.

The accused, Pritpal Singh, was tried for multiple drug trafficking and possession offences alongside a Garofoli application challenging several search warrants.

The court dismissed the majority of the Garofoli application, finding that the accused did not have standing to seek excision of evidence obtained through the breach of a third party's Charter rights, and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) established reasonable grounds for most of the warrants.

Based on an Agreed Statement of Fact, the court found the accused guilty of trafficking heroin, possession of heroin and opium for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime, relying on circumstantial evidence and the doctrine of constructive possession.

The co-accused daughter was acquitted at the Crown's request.

The accused, a young Black man, was stopped by police while driving and subsequently subjected to a pat-down search, arrest, and strip search, leading to the discovery of a loaded handgun and drugs.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging racial profiling and arbitrary detention.

The court found that the traffic stop was a pretext for a drug investigation and that racial profiling played a significant role in the suspect selection, rendering the detention and subsequent searches unlawful.

Finding multiple breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 15 of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) and entered acquittals on all counts.

The accused, charged with multiple counts including impaired operation and refusing to provide a breath sample causing death and bodily harm, brought a pre-trial application seeking to quash, amend, or sever the refusal counts.

The court dismissed the request to quash the counts based on issue estoppel and rejected the argument that the Crown was limited to a single refusal count under s. 320.15(4) of the Criminal Code.

However, the court granted the application to sever the refusal counts from the impaired and dangerous operation counts, finding that the interests of justice favoured severance to allow the accused to testify on the refusal counts without prejudice to the remaining charges.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter and trafficking in cocaine and fentanyl after selling drugs to a vulnerable individual who subsequently died of a fentanyl overdose.

The Crown sought a 12-year sentence, while the defence argued for 4 to 6 years.

The court emphasized the extreme danger of fentanyl and the need for denunciation and deterrence, rejecting the argument that the victim's autonomous choice to ingest the drugs mitigated the offender's moral blameworthiness.

The court imposed a global sentence of 8 years in prison, comprising 8 years for manslaughter, 30 months concurrent for fentanyl trafficking, and 1 year concurrent for cocaine trafficking.

The accused was charged with impaired operation causing death and refusing to provide a breath sample following a serious motor vehicle collision.

He brought pre-trial applications alleging multiple Charter breaches and seeking to exclude evidence of his refusals to provide breath samples and data seized from his vehicle's Airbag Control Module.

The court found breaches of s. 8 (unlawful roadside breath demand), s. 9 (unjustified continued detention), and s. 10(b) (failure to hold off questioning).

Applying s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the accused's refusals at the roadside and in the booking area.

However, the court found that a subsequent demand by a breath technician constituted a 'fresh start' and admitted the final refusal.

The application to quash the search warrant for the vehicle data was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to possessing a loaded, prohibited firearm after fleeing from a residence during the execution of a search warrant.

The Crown sought a 30-month sentence, while the defence sought 18 months, citing harsh remand conditions and systemic racism detailed in an Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report.

The court found no causal link between the offender's experiences with anti-Black racism and the offence, but granted mitigation for harsh pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The court imposed a 30-month sentence, reduced to 417 days net after applying Summers credit for pre-sentence custody, along with 18 months of probation.

The defendants in a motor vehicle accident claim brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend defence medical examinations and to disclose the entire contents of her social media accounts.

The court dismissed the request for medical examinations, finding the defendants failed to provide a reasonable explanation for seeking the examinations long after the deadline for serving expert reports under Rule 53.03 had passed.

Regarding the social media accounts, the court declined to order blanket disclosure due to privacy concerns, but ordered the plaintiff to produce a further and better Affidavit of Documents listing relevant photographs.

The accused, a former elite hockey coach, was charged with historical sexual offences against a former player who was 14 to 16 years old at the time.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, rejecting the accused's categorical denials.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation, as he was in a position of trust.

However, the accused was acquitted of sexual assault for the period after the complainant turned 16, as the Crown failed to prove he actively induced her to engage in sexual activity.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought several pre-trial applications seeking to exclude his confession to police, set aside search warrants, and exclude GPS cell phone data.

The court found that while the police breached the accused's s. 8 Charter rights by conducting a non-compliant strip search, the breach did not warrant a stay of proceedings or the exclusion of his voluntary confession under s. 24(2).

The court also dismissed the Garofoli application, finding no material omissions in the search warrant informations.

Finally, the court ruled that GPS location data from the accused's phone was admissible without expert testimony, taking judicial notice of the reliability of GPS technology.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation, the successful defendants sought full indemnity costs of $17,800.89.

The court considered the defendants' offer to settle and the principles under Rule 49.10(2), noting that the presumptive rule for elevated costs does not strictly apply when a plaintiff's claim is entirely dismissed.

Balancing the complexity of the motion, the amount at stake, and the reasonable expectations of the parties, the court fixed costs at $11,563.29 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The accused was charged with possession and distribution of child pornography.

The police used automated software tools (the Roundup Suite) to detect the accused's IP address sharing child pornography files on the BitTorrent peer-to-peer network.

The accused brought a Charter s. 8 and Garofoli application to exclude the evidence, arguing that the automated surveillance constituted an unreasonable search and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant was flawed.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address, port, or the files he knowingly exposed in a shared folder on a public network.

The court also upheld the validity of the search warrant and production order, finding the ITOs were adequate and not misleading.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was 50.5 months.

The court deducted 11 months of defence delay and 17.25 months of delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic as discrete exceptional events.

The resulting net delay was 22.25 months, which fell below the 30-month Jordan ceiling for cases in the Superior Court.

The application was dismissed.

Following the settlement of an estate litigation dispute regarding the validity of a will, the parties sought a determination on costs.

The respondent sought partial indemnity costs from the applicant personally, claiming success in the settlement.

The applicant, as estate trustee, sought reimbursement from the estate for her legal expenses.

The court found that neither party was successful and ordered no costs as between the parties.

However, the court held that the applicant acted reasonably in defending the will and was entitled to be fully indemnified by the estate for her legal expenses in the amount of $38,676.13.

Following a lengthy construction lien trial where the plaintiff recovered approximately $100,000 of a $250,000 claim, the plaintiff sought costs of over $239,000.

The court found that while the plaintiff was ultimately successful in obtaining a net judgment, the defendant was overwhelmingly successful on the central issue of charge-backs.

Applying principles of proportionality and considering the plaintiff's exaggerated lien claim and unreasonable litigation conduct, the court significantly reduced the plaintiff's costs, awarding a total of $87,226.43 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The accused was charged with sexual interference and administering a stupefying substance to his 11-year-old step-daughter.

During a pre-charge conference, the issue arose whether the accused could be found to have 'administered' the substances (alcohol, marijuana, and pills) if the child voluntarily consumed them.

The court ruled that the jury would not be instructed to consider consensual consumption, finding that an 11-year-old cannot give fully informed consent to consuming such substances, particularly when provided by a parent figure with the alleged intent to facilitate a sexual assault.

The Crown applied under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code to adduce the preliminary inquiry testimony of a key witness who was deemed too ill to testify at trial due to severe mental health challenges triggered by her previous testimony.

The accused opposed the application, arguing lack of full opportunity to cross-examine and trial unfairness due to new evidence.

The court found the witness was too ill to testify, the defence had a full opportunity to cross-examine her at the preliminary inquiry, and the admission of the evidence would not render the trial unfair.

The application was granted, and the transcripts were admitted as substantive evidence.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and drug trafficking, brought an O'Connor application seeking production of a key Crown witness's psychiatric hospital records.

The Crown had previously applied under s. 715 of the Criminal Code to admit the witness's preliminary hearing testimony, arguing she was presently too mentally ill to testify at trial.

The defence argued the hospital records were likely relevant to assessing her mental health before the preliminary hearing.

The court dismissed the application at the first stage, finding the records from early 2020 were too remote to be likely relevant to her present state of health or to whether the preliminary hearing triggered her recent mental health decline.

During a trial for drug trafficking and manslaughter, the Crown brought an O'Connor application to disclose the medical records of a fragile witness.

The Crown sought to adduce the witness's preliminary hearing transcript in lieu of oral testimony.

The court applied the two-stage O'Connor procedure to the second tranche of subpoenaed medical records.

Finding the records relevant to the witness's ability to testify, the court ordered the disclosure of the psychiatric assessment portions with appropriate redactions to protect the witness's privacy.

The Crown brought an O'Connor application to obtain the medical records of a key witness who claimed she was medically unstable to testify at the accused's trial for drug trafficking and manslaughter.

The court found the stage one threshold was easily met, as the records were likely relevant to the witness's mental health and ability to testify.

After reviewing the first tranche of records at stage two, the court ordered the release of relevant portions to counsel, subject to redactions for non-relevant personal and medical information, balancing the public interest in the search for truth against the witness's privacy interests.