COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-111980
DATE: 20221128
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Prasher Steel Inc, Plaintiff
AND:
Pre-Eng Contracting Ltd., Defendant
BEFORE: Justice C. Boswell
COUNSEL: Angela Assuras for Prasher (“Prasher”)
Emilio Bisceglia and Daniel Campoli for Pre-Eng (“Pre-Eng”)
HEARD: Costs Submissions in Writing
ENDORSEMENT ON COSTS
[1] On June 13, 2022 I released a ruling following the trial of this lengthy construction lien action.[^1] I invited the parties to make written submissions on the issue of costs. They did so, however, the resolution of the costs issue has been delayed as a result of the need for a further hearing about the way in which I treated HST in relation to the amounts I found owing to Prasher in the judgment. That issue has now been resolved and an amended version of the judgment will be released concurrent to this costs endorsement.
The Judgment
[2] Pre-Eng acted as the general contractor in relation to the construction of the Rick Hansen elementary school in Aurora. Prasher, a steel fabricator and erector, was retained by Pre-Eng, through two separate contracts, to complete structural steel work and miscellaneous metals work on the project. Concerns about the completeness and quality of Prasher’s work led to charge-backs by Pre-Eng against the amounts Prasher expected to be paid for its work. This action followed.
[3] There were a multitude of issues to be determined following the trial. Amongst others, they included (1) whether Prasher had registered valid and timely liens against the project for amounts owing with respect to both the structural steel and miscellaneous metals contracts; and (2) the amounts owing with respect to each contract.
[4] In the reasons for judgment, I concluded that Prasher had failed to preserve its lien rights with respect to the structural steel contract but had validly preserved its lien rights with respect to the miscellaneous metals contract. I nevertheless found that Prasher was entitled to a personal judgment for amounts owing to it under the structural steel contract, pursuant to s. 63 of the Construction Lien Act.
[5] I ultimately found that Prasher was owed $57,959.35 on the structural steel contract and $12,425.55 on the miscellaneous metals contract.
[6] Counsel were agreed – and easily persuaded me – that I had erred in the manner in which I had calculated the HST owing on the contracts. Following a case conference on November 2, 2022, I amended the judgment to reflect that Prasher is owed $83,404.50 on the structural steel contract and $15,942.33 on the miscellaneous metals contract, for a total owing of $99,346.83 plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.
The Principles Governing Costs Awards
[7] The court’s discretion to award costs is grounded in section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. C.43 and is guided by Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[8] Rule 57.01 lists a number of factors for the court to consider in the assessment of costs which include, but are not limited to the following:
(a) the result in the proceeding;
(b) any offer to settle;
(c) the complexity of the proceeding;
(d) the importance of the issues;
(e) the conduct of any party that tended to shorten or to lengthen unnecessarily the duration of the proceeding;
(f) whether any step in the proceeding was improper, vexatious or unnecessary or taken through negligence, mistake or excessive caution;
(g) the principle of indemnity; and,
(h) the concept of proportionality, which includes at least two factors:
i. the amount claimed and the amount recovered in the proceeding; and,
ii. the amount of costs that an unsuccessful party could reasonably expect to pay in relation to the step in the proceeding for which costs are being fixed.
See Elbakhiet v. Palmer, 2014 ONCA 544.
[9] The weight to be applied to any of the enumerated, or other, factors in any given assessment may vary. It is, however, now well-settled that the overarching principles to be observed in the exercise of the court’s discretion to fix costs are fairness, proportionality and reasonableness: see Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840; Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 2004 CanLII 14579 (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.); and Moon v. Sher (2004), 2004 CanLII 39005 (ON CA), 246 D.L.R. (4th) 440 (C.A.).
[10] By convention, costs will be awarded to a successful party and will generally be measured on a partial indemnity basis: Bell Canada v. Olympia & York Developments Limited et. al. (1994), 1994 CanLII 239 (ON CA), 17 O.R. (3d) 135 (C.A.). This general rule accords with common sense and serves a number of purposes, identified by Perrell J. in 394 Lakeshore Oakville Holdings Inc. v. Misek, 2010 ONSC 7238, [2010] O.J. No. 5692 (S.C.J.), at para. 10 including: (1) the indemnification, at least to some extent, of successful litigants; (2) the facilitation of access to justice; (3) the discouragement of frivolous positions and/or inappropriate behaviour; and (4) the encouragement of settlements.
[11] Appellate courts have directed that there are two circumstances in which elevated costs may be justified: (1) where they are triggered by the cost consequences of an offer to settle under Rule 49.10; and, (2) where the losing party has engaged in reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous conduct: see Davies v. Clarington (Municipality), 2009 ONCA 722, at para. 28.
The Parties’ Positions
[12] Prasher seeks an award of costs in its favour in the amount of $239,140.66. That figure represents $191,782.50 in fees and $17,277.48 in disbursements, with the balance being HST.
[13] In Prasher’s submission, it was the successful party and costs should follow the event.
[14] Prasher acknowledges that it was not successful on all issues, nor was it completely successful in the amount of damages sought. But, it says, the court must consider that the action included Prasher’s claim for roughly $250,000 and a counterclaim by Pre-Eng for $300,000. Prasher claims complete success on the counterclaim and significant success on its own claim.
[15] Though the amount sought in costs admittedly exceeds the amount awarded in damages, Prasher asserts that the principle of proportionality does not demand a reduction in the fees and disbursements awarded. This is so, Prasher contends, because, amongst other things: (1) Prasher’s success must properly be considered to have a value of roughly $400,000; (2) the issues were moderately complex and the trial required substantial time to complete; (3) Pre-Eng failed to make any reasonable offer to settle, forcing Prasher to litigate; and (4) Pre-Eng, by delivering documents late, made the process longer and more difficult.
[16] Pre-Eng opposes Prasher’s request for costs, asserting that the amounts claimed are excessive and disproportionate to the result achieved. Pre-Eng argues that Prasher recovered only a fraction of the amount claimed; by its calculation, perhaps as little as 20%. Pre-Eng contends that it prevailed on many of the issues in the litigation. In light of the divided success, Pre-Eng submits that no costs should be ordered.
Discussion
[17] This case got out of hand. It is an example of a failure of rationality. Realistically, the amount at stake was a maximum of $250,000. Prasher’s partial indemnity fees are close to $200,000. Presumably the actual fees incurred exceed $300,000. I expect Prasher’s actual fees, disbursements and HST total in the neighbourhood of $350,000. And I expect that the actual fees, disbursements and HST incurred by Pre-Eng are likely in the same range. In other words, the parties spent roughly three times the maximum amount in dispute litigating over it.
[18] There are three general areas that I intend to canvas, which inform the costs awarded. They are (i) the issue of “success”; (ii) conduct that tended to lengthen the litigation and make it more expensive; and (iii) proportionality. I will examine them in turn.
(i) Success
[19] Prasher asserts that it was successful in this litigation and that costs should naturally follow. On one level, it is difficult to disagree. Prasher perceived that it had been underpaid for its steel work on the project. It sued. Pre-Eng made three offers to settle, none of which were significant enough to generate any interest on Prasher’s part. At the end of the trial, I found that Prasher is owed roughly $100,000. To that extent, there was certainly some success.
[20] But is “success” solely a function of who ended up being owed at the end of the day? I think not. I think an assessment of “success” in the context of considering what a fair, reasonable and proportionate allocation of costs is demands a deeper dive into the circumstances of the lawsuit and the manner in which the litigation played out. Moreover, success – at least measured by the amount claimed and recovered in the proceeding – is just one of the relevant factors r. 57.01 directs the court to consider. The court is otherwise afforded a wide discretion to consider any other matters relevant to the issue of costs.
[21] This case was, at its core, a taking of accounts between a general contractor and a sub-contractor. Although Pre-Eng asserted, in its counterclaim, that Prasher substantially delayed the project, that assertion was not seriously pursued at trial. This case was about how much, if anything, Prasher was owed, in light of the work it had performed (including extras) and the shortcomings with respect to that work.
[22] I do not agree with Prasher’s submission that this case was a fight over $550,000, which Prasher calculated by adding up the gross amounts sought in the claim and counterclaim. Prasher did not “wholly defeat” the counterclaim. They persuaded me that the value of the work they performed on this project exceeded the amount they had been paid by about $88,000 plus HST. In the assessment of proportionality, the amount recovered by Prasher is $100,000, not $400,000 as they suggest.
[23] Though the accounting between the parties resulted in a net amount owing to Prasher, I find that Prasher was not successful in many aspects of the claim.
[24] I begin with the observation that Prasher liened for more than $255,000. Pre-Eng bonded off the lien. For reasons set out in the judgment, I found that Prasher was entitled to a lien against the bond in an amount just under $16,000. In other words, the value of its provable lien was only about 6% of the amount it had liened for.
[25] Prasher sought roughly $87,000 in extras. They proved only half of them.
[26] More remarkably, Prasher conceded only $8,952.40[^2] (plus HST) in charge-backs for work either not done or done deficiently. I found that $111,472.09 (plus HST) had been established by Pre-Eng as valid charge-backs. In other words, an amount twelve times what Prasher conceded. The bulk of the litigating – and certainly the bulk of the time spent sorting out the parties’ accounts – was spent on charge-backs. No one could credibly argue that Prasher was successful on this issue.
[27] Incorporated in the total sought by Prasher are the costs of three motions and a case conference. The motions include one brought by Prasher to compel a representative of Pre-Eng to attend an examination for discovery, one brought by Pre-Eng for security for costs, and another brought by Pre-Eng on the eve of the trial to discharge Prasher’s lien and dismiss its action. In each of the three motions, costs were reserved to the trial judge.
[28] The first two motions were the subject of a combined resolution, which led to a consent order. I have no basis, on the record before me, to conclude that Prasher was “successful” on those motions. It appears to me that, if anything, they were a “wash”. I am not prepared to award any costs for them.
[29] The third motion was brought on the eve of trial. Though I do not have the materials filed on the motion, it appears that it was the functional equivalent of a request for summary judgment. The argument of Pre-Eng was constructed in much the same way as its argument at trial. To wit:
(a) The provisions of the Construction Lien Act[^3] (the “CLA”) that grant lien rights to suppliers are to be strictly construed;
(b) A strict construction of s. 31(1) of the CLA dictates that each contract be considered separately in terms of the lien rights it gives rise to;
(c) Prasher failed to properly preserve its Claim for Lien for any amounts alleged to be owing under the structural steel contract. Moreover, the provisions of the CLA, properly interpreted, do not permit Prasher to pursue a personal judgment for any amounts purportedly owing on the structural steel contract;
(d) Prasher failed to preserve any Claim for Lien with respect to the miscellaneous metals sub-contract. Its registered Claim for Lien described the services or materials supplied as “structural steel and related materials”. There was no mention of miscellaneous metals; and,
(e) Any claim for a personal judgment on the miscellaneous metals contract is statute barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B.
[30] Pre-Eng’s motion came before Bird, J. who found that the issues raised were better determined at the impending trial. She adjourned the motion pending the outcome of the trial and reserved costs to the trial judge.
[31] In my reasons for judgment, I agreed with Pre-Eng that Prasher had failed to preserve its lien rights under the structural steel contract. I found, however, that they were entitled to a personal judgment for amounts found to be owing under that contract. Furthermore, I disagreed with Pre-Eng that Prasher had failed to preserve its lien claim with respect to the miscellaneous metals contract. In short, the position taken by Pre-Eng on the motion was, for the most part, unsuccessful at trial. Prasher is, in my view, entitled to its partial indemnity costs of this motion, as part of the overall assessment of costs.
[32] Finally, there was a case conference held on December 14, 2021 to address a procedural issue connected to the filing of written closing submissions. I had specifically requested that counsel make oral closing submissions and not written submissions. That request went largely unheeded in the end and it became necessary to establish a timetable for the filing of written materials. That timetable provided for Prasher to make written reply to the oral/written submissions of Pre-Eng. Pre-Eng was given a right of surrebuttal.
[33] The delivery of written submissions quickly went sideways and the parties disputed the propriety of the content of the surrebuttal. Moreover, Prasher sought a right to make reply submissions to the surrebuttal, largely on the basis that Pre-Eng articulated in the surrebuttal, for the first time, a Limitations Act, 2002 argument regarding any claim to a personal judgment for monies allegedly owing pursuant to the miscellaneous metals contract.
[34] I ultimately agreed with the position of Prasher that it should be permitted to file a reply to the surrebuttal. I reserved the issue of costs.
[35] As it happens, the Limitations Act, 2002 argument did not prevail at trial. I found that Prasher had preserved its claim for lien in a timely way with respect to the miscellaneous metals contract.
[36] In my view, no specific order needs to be made regarding the costs of the case conference. It is simply a step taken in the proceedings that I will consider in the overall assessment of costs. Prasher asks for its costs of that conference on a substantial indemnity basis. I am not prepared to accede to that request. Nothing in the conduct of Pre-Eng in relation to that conference could be said to rise to the standard of reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous conduct.
[37] In any event, the amount of costs awarded must reflect the fact that there was genuine divided success in these proceedings.
(ii) The Conduct of the Proceedings
[38] There are a number of factors relating to the manner in which Prasher conducted the litigation that, in my view, bear on the quantum of costs to be awarded.
[39] I begin at the beginning, with Prasher’s Claim for Lien. It was very poorly drafted. So much so that it resulted in additional litigation over whether the lien could properly be interpreted to include work on the miscellaneous metals contract at all. Prasher ultimately prevailed on that issue, but Pre-Eng certainly had an arguable case to make about the interpretation of the lien.
[40] Prasher went on, for reasons best known to it, to insist on litigating the issue of whether there was one contract or two, when it was patently obvious that there were two separate contracts – one for miscellaneous metals and one for structural steel.
[41] The upshot of the two contracts determination is that Prasher failed to preserve its lien claim on the structural steel work in a timely way. In my view, the conclusion that Prasher’s lien on the structural steel contract was out of time was a straightforward and obvious one. I appreciate that Prasher might wish that the circumstances were different. But on the clear facts of this case, they should have recognized and conceded that their lien, insofar as it related to the structural steel work, was out of time. Their failure to concede that obvious point resulted in what was, in my view, needless litigation.
[42] Moreover, the bulk of the liened amount related to work performed on the structural steel contract. Of the $100,000 I found to be owing to Prasher, only about $16,000 related to work done on the miscellaneous metals contract. In order to bond off Prasher’s lien, Pre-Eng was required to post a bond in the amount of $319,943.38. The cost to maintain that bond was $3,199 per year. I have concluded that Prasher has a valid lien against that bond for just $15,942.33. In hindsight, a $20,000 bond would have been sufficient, with its attendant cost of $200 per year.
[43] I acknowledge, of course, that the validity of Pre-Eng’s charge-backs against the miscellaneous metals contract was very much a contested issue. It is not improper for a lien claimant to lien for an amount that is legitimately in dispute. Having said that, I make two comments.
[44] First, the gross value of the miscellaneous metals contract was $133,000. There were no extras on that contract. Prasher was paid $27,052 for its work under that contract. The maximum amount of the lien claim was, in the circumstances, roughly $106,000.
[45] Second, I am of the view that Prasher did not take a reasonable position with respect to the charge-backs on the miscellaneous metals project. Of a total of $117,573.87 claimed, I found that $94,951.74 were valid. That means Pre-Eng was successful on more than 80% of its claimed charge-backs, which is a very significant rate of success for Pre-Eng on that central issue.
[46] I conclude that Prasher’s lien was exaggerated and it led to excessive bonding costs being incurred by Pre-Eng. I make no conclusion about what precise value the lien should have been registered at. But I would say it should have been no higher than $100,000. That amount would have resulted in bonding fees of $1,250 per year ($100,000 plus 25% for costs), instead of the $3,199 they actually incurred – a difference of almost $2,000 per year.
[47] The annual excess bonding fees are exacerbated by the fact that this case took the better part of seven years to get to trial. I do not have any evidence to explain why the case took so long to reach the trial stage. That said, I make two pertinent observations. First, the primary responsibility for the progress of an action lies with the plaintiff: Prescott v. Barbon, 2018 ONCA 504, at para. 30. Second, the CLA aspired to create, insofar as possible, a summary procedure for the prompt determination of lien claims. Liens tend to be prejudicial to defendants. As Hebner J. held in Southwestern Sales Corp. v. Spurr Bros. Ltd., 2015 ONSC 6908, at para. 19, affirmed 2016 ONCA 590:
A lien claim can be an onerous thing for a defendant. A defendant is faced with the prospect of either having its land tied up as a result of the registration of a claim for lien or, alternatively, having to finance sometimes substantial payments into court in order to free up title to the land…For these reasons, it seems to me that a lengthy delay in a claim for lien case…constitutes prejudice to Pre-Engs...If the lien claimant wants to take advantage of the provisions of the Construction Lien Act and tie up title to a defendant's property, it ought to proceed expeditiously to have its claim determined... A lien claimant ought not to be entitled to sit back and allow years to pass while Pre-Eng's property (or, as in this case, Pre-Eng's money) is held hostage.
[48] I find that Prasher’s delay in prosecuting its claim and the exaggerated amount claimed in its lien unfairly prejudiced Pre-Eng and increased its costs.
[49] I found in my reasons for judgment that Mr. Prasher was a bombastic witness. His testimony often consisted of rhetoric as opposed to fact. I find that one significant reason why this litigation was so difficult and time-consuming was that Mr. Prasher’s posturing was frequently completely untethered to the realities of the case. By way of example:
(a) He refused to accept that his company left deficiencies in their structural steel work outstanding for many months, when the clear and uncontroversial records of the independent inspection company hired by the York Region School Board to oversee the steel work documented those very deficiencies. Moreover, he took the position in this lawsuit that there were no deficiencies in the steel work, yet took the opposite position in a lawsuit commenced by his steel erectors who sued him for non-payment on this project;
(b) A great deal of time was spent litigating over his insistence that he was owed almost $50,000 as an extra for the remediation of a deflecting beam, when he had essentially no records to support that his forces did the work on that item. Indeed, the records that do exist point to a conclusion that forces other than his did the vast majority of the work; and,
(c) He refused to accept responsibility for the fact that his company had profoundly failed to meet their obligations under the miscellaneous metals contract and, in the result, took an unreasonable approach to the resolution of charge-backs on that contract.
[50] Any costs awarded to Prasher must reflect a reduction for the approach that Prasher took to this litigation. I find that approach to have lengthened the litigation and increased its costs.
[51] Before moving on from this section, I will mention the fact that both sides complained about the late delivery of documents from the other. I am not persuaded that the late delivery of documents is an issue that impacts on the costs award. This was a very document-heavy lawsuit. And by the time the trial was completed, more than nine years had passed since the project was completed. It is unsurprising to me that the existence and significance of some of the documents filed in this case were late breaking.
(iii) Proportionality
[52] Parties are free to pay their lawyers whatever they like, regardless of the amounts at stake. But it is quite another thing to ask an opposing party to pay inflated costs when you have overvalued your claim and taken unreasonable positions in the litigation.
[53] I accept that there are times when costs are assessed that exceed the amount recovered. Costs are not always disproportionate solely because they are higher than the amount recovered. But each case must be assessed on its own merits.
[54] This was not a $550,000 case as Prasher argues. It was not even a $250,000 case. Based on the revised Scott Schedule this case included a dispute over extras totalling $86,723.59, of which Pre-Eng conceded $7,326.70, and charge-backs totalling $150,324.72, of which Prasher accepted $32,152.40. In the result, the gross amount actually in dispute was $197,569.21. And that figure is only as high as it is because of Prasher’s unreasonable positions with respect to both extras and charge-backs.
[55] I simply cannot accept that it was reasonable or proportionate for Prasher to expend something in the range of $350,000 in fees and disbursements to litigate this case. I am not prepared to impose partial indemnity costs on Pre-Eng based on those types of fees.
[56] Prasher advanced an argument to the effect that its fees must be proportionate because Pre-Eng did not produce its own Bill of Costs. Their failure to do so supports a reasonable inference, Prasher asserts, that their fees were likely in the same range as Prasher’s. Even if I accept that to be true, the fact that Pre-Eng incurred costs similar to those of Prasher does not mean that Prasher’s fees are proportionate. In my view, it means that both sides’ fees are disproportionate to the amount at stake.
[57] One significant difference between the parties is that Pre-Eng is the defendant. They were forced to respond to Prasher’s claim. Moreover, they aren’t looking for Prasher to pay a portion of their arguably disproportionately high fees.
[58] I accept that one of the factors enumerated in r. 57.01 is my assessment of the amount of costs an unsuccessful party could reasonably expect to pay in the circumstances. I understand the argument that Pre-Eng should reasonably expect to pay costs in the range being sought if it had incurred fees in a range similar to those incurred by Prasher. But I make two observations. First, Pre-Eng had a good deal of success in these proceedings, notwithstanding that the end result is that it owes Prasher $100,000. Second, Pre-Eng would not be anticipating being called upon to pay costs that are disproportionate to the amount awarded. And that, in my view, is what Prasher is seeking.
Conclusion
[59] Having said all of that, Prasher did ultimately prevail in the proceedings based on the fact that it obtained a damage award of roughly $100,000. The best offer advanced by Pre-Eng was $55,000, all-inclusive. That offer was made, as I understand it, in July 2021, when the trial was already eleven days in. It was not near enough to create a serious chance of settlement.
[60] Pre-Eng underpaid Prasher on this project and were a little over-zealous with their charge-backs.
[61] I will not attempt to parse Prasher’s Bill of Costs. In my view that is not a profitable exercise. Instead, I will begin by fixing what I consider to be a more proportionate amount for costs given the amounts at stake, the complexity of the case and the time that should reasonably have been required to conduct this litigation. I would fix a starting point for fees at $125,000.
[62] I would reduce that figure by 40% because, in my view, Prasher’s unreasonable positions made this case longer than it needed to be and more difficult to settle. Moreover, and more significantly in my view, the amount of costs awarded must not only be proportionate to the amounts sought and recovered. It must also be proportionate to the measure of success. As I noted above, the assessment of success in a proceeding may well involve more than just a consideration of who owes whom at the end of the day.
[63] In this trial, the biggest portion of time was taken up on litigating Prasher’s deficiencies and the validity of Pre-Eng’s charge-backs. On these issues Pre-Eng was overwhelmingly successful. In my view, an award of 60% of otherwise proportionate fees appropriately reflects the divided success in the action. Applying a 40% reduction brings the fees down to $75,000.
[64] I would reduce that figure even further because it includes amounts for two motions that, in my view, Prasher is not entitled to costs on. The costs sought for those motions is $10,153. It would not be fair to deduct that face amount because I have already reduced the global fees claimed (which include the motions) from $191,782.50 to $75,000, a total reduction of 61%. In other words, I have already reduced the motion fees claimed proportionately from $10,153 to $3,960. I would deduct that amount from the $75,000, for a net of $71,040.
[65] Finally, I would reduce the fees one further time to reflect the fact that Prasher’s exaggerated lien claim caused Pre-Eng to incur unnecessarily significant bonding fees. Though the amount I ultimately settle on is perhaps a little more art than science, I would fix recoverable fees, all things considered, at $60,000, plus HST, for a total of $67,800.
[66] I have reviewed Prasher’s disbursements and have no comments to make about them. Nor were they specifically contested in Pre-Eng’s submissions. They total $19,426.43, inclusive of HST.
[67] The total awarded for fees, disbursements and HST is accordingly $87,226.43.
The Draft Judgment
[68] Counsel have been unable to agree on the form of the draft judgment. Each submitted their own preferred form. I think either would work. On balance, I tend to prefer that of Pre-Eng and so that is the one I have signed. It will be provided to counsel together with these reasons and a corrected version of the judgment to reflect the parties’ agreement on the correct application of HST.
[69] I note that I have amended the amount of pre-judgment interest provided for in the draft judgment, to reflect the amount of pre-judgment interest owing to the date of the judgment.[^4]
C. Boswell J.
Date: November 28, 2022
[^1]: Reported at 2022 ONSC 3458
[^2]: Mr. Prasher’s position on charge-backs he was willing to accept was somewhat of a moving target. This figure - $8,952.40, is taken from Prasher’s revised Scott Schedule.
[^3]: R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30. Though the CLA has been replaced by the Construction Act, the parties agreed that this action was governed by the terms of the CLA.
[^4]: Calculated as 1.3% interest on $99,346.83 over 3,498 days from November 14, 2012 to June 13, 2022, for a total of $12,377.25.