Anthony G. Bryant

The offender was convicted of manslaughter and trafficking in cocaine and fentanyl after selling drugs to a vulnerable individual who subsequently died of a fentanyl overdose.

The Crown sought a 12-year sentence, while the defence argued for 4 to 6 years.

The court emphasized the extreme danger of fentanyl and the need for denunciation and deterrence, rejecting the argument that the victim's autonomous choice to ingest the drugs mitigated the offender's moral blameworthiness.

The court imposed a global sentence of 8 years in prison, comprising 8 years for manslaughter, 30 months concurrent for fentanyl trafficking, and 1 year concurrent for cocaine trafficking.

The Crown applied under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code to adduce the preliminary inquiry testimony of a key witness who was deemed too ill to testify at trial due to severe mental health challenges triggered by her previous testimony.

The accused opposed the application, arguing lack of full opportunity to cross-examine and trial unfairness due to new evidence.

The court found the witness was too ill to testify, the defence had a full opportunity to cross-examine her at the preliminary inquiry, and the admission of the evidence would not render the trial unfair.

The application was granted, and the transcripts were admitted as substantive evidence.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and drug trafficking, brought an O'Connor application seeking production of a key Crown witness's psychiatric hospital records.

The Crown had previously applied under s. 715 of the Criminal Code to admit the witness's preliminary hearing testimony, arguing she was presently too mentally ill to testify at trial.

The defence argued the hospital records were likely relevant to assessing her mental health before the preliminary hearing.

The court dismissed the application at the first stage, finding the records from early 2020 were too remote to be likely relevant to her present state of health or to whether the preliminary hearing triggered her recent mental health decline.

During a trial for drug trafficking and manslaughter, the Crown brought an O'Connor application to disclose the medical records of a fragile witness.

The Crown sought to adduce the witness's preliminary hearing transcript in lieu of oral testimony.

The court applied the two-stage O'Connor procedure to the second tranche of subpoenaed medical records.

Finding the records relevant to the witness's ability to testify, the court ordered the disclosure of the psychiatric assessment portions with appropriate redactions to protect the witness's privacy.

The Crown brought an O'Connor application to obtain the medical records of a key witness who claimed she was medically unstable to testify at the accused's trial for drug trafficking and manslaughter.

The court found the stage one threshold was easily met, as the records were likely relevant to the witness's mental health and ability to testify.

After reviewing the first tranche of records at stage two, the court ordered the release of relevant portions to counsel, subject to redactions for non-relevant personal and medical information, balancing the public interest in the search for truth against the witness's privacy interests.

The Crown sought to qualify an OPP officer as an expert witness to interpret coded text messages and provide context on the illicit drug trade in a trial for drug trafficking and manslaughter.

The defence did not contest the admissibility of the evidence but reserved the right to cross-examine on potential bias.

The court applied the Mohan and White Burgess frameworks, finding the proposed evidence logically relevant, necessary, and the officer properly qualified.

The officer was qualified to provide opinion evidence on the indicia of trafficking, street values of drugs, and the interpretation of coded language.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of a statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for drug trafficking and manslaughter.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary because police failed to record their interactions with the accused from the time of his arrest until the formal interview, relying on R. v. Moore-McFarlane.

The court distinguished Moore-McFarlane, finding the uncontradicted testimony of the police officers credible and reliable.

The court concluded there were no threats, promises, or oppressive circumstances, and the accused's minor injury during arrest did not affect his operating mind.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

The accused, charged with manslaughter and trafficking following a fatal drug overdose, brought an O'Connor application seeking third-party records, including cell phone records and mental health treatment records of the deceased and a key Crown witness.

The court found that the mental health records did not meet the likely relevance threshold, as the request relied on stereotypical assumptions about drug users and mental illness rather than case-specific evidence.

The application for the cell phone records of the witness's mother was granted to proceed to the second stage of the O'Connor analysis, while the remaining requests were dismissed.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder, pointing a firearm, and unauthorized possession of firearms after fatally shooting a man who had aggressively approached his home following a series of altercations.

The victim, who was highly intoxicated and angry, had repeatedly rammed the accused's vehicle with his truck and approached the accused's door brandishing a stick.

The accused, who was inside his home, fired a single shot through the door, killing the victim.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting in self-defence, resulting in an acquittal on the murder and pointing a firearm charges.

The accused was found guilty of unauthorized possession of firearms.

In a trial for second-degree murder, the Crown applied to admit statements made by the accused to police, while the accused sought to exclude them under the Charter.

The accused argued his statements were involuntary due to police inducements, his right to counsel was breached because his consulted lawyer had an unknown conflict of interest, and he was arbitrarily detained at the police station after a warrant of remand was signed.

The court found the statements were voluntary, the right to counsel was not breached as the state played no role in the conflict, and although the continued detention at the police station was arbitrary, the breach was not serious enough to warrant exclusion under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The statements were ruled admissible.

Following a lengthy jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the court addressed post‑charge objections raised by the Crown and several defence counsel regarding the jury instructions.

The objections concerned the adequacy of instructions on forcible confinement, party liability, the mental state required for planned and deliberate murder, and the temporal‑causal connection required for constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the charge, when read as a whole, correctly conveyed the applicable legal principles and adequately reflected the parties’ positions.

With one limited exception, the court declined to give additional corrective instructions, finding the charge clear and legally sufficient.

The defendants, on trial for first-degree murder arising from a home invasion and robbery, raised numerous objections to the Crown's closing address to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown misstated evidence, improperly referenced out-of-court statements, and undermined the presumption of innocence, seeking a mistrial or the right to make reply submissions.

The court reviewed the objections and found that while some of the Crown's comments required corrective instructions in the final jury charge, the conduct did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.

The applications for a mistrial and for reply submissions were dismissed.

During a lengthy jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the court ruled on several pre‑charge issues affecting the jury instructions and evidentiary materials.

The court addressed whether transcripts of recorded police statements should accompany the jury, whether certain medical records required redaction, and whether instructions on wilful blindness and alternative routes to first‑degree murder should be given.

The court allowed transcripts of most recorded statements to go to the jury but excluded the transcript of one accused’s statement due to lack of probative value.

Medical records referring to “severe hypoxia” were admitted without redaction.

The court declined to instruct the jury on wilful blindness for the driver accused, finding insufficient specificity of suspicion to impute knowledge.

During a multi-accused jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the Crown sought to revisit a pre‑trial editing ruling that had excluded a portion of one accused’s police statement referencing a conversation with a co‑accused driver.

The Crown argued that subsequent cross‑examination created a material change in circumstances because the witness acknowledged misleading the driver about the purpose of the trip, making the excluded statement relevant as a prior inconsistent statement and to credibility.

The court held that the threshold for revisiting the ruling was met but declined to change the original decision.

Although the probative value of the statement had increased, its prejudicial effect against the co‑accused—against whom it remained inadmissible—continued to outweigh its value, particularly given the stage of the trial and fairness concerns.

The Crown’s application was therefore dismissed.

During a jury trial for murder arising from a home invasion, the accused sought to call a cardiologist to testify that a congenital heart condition could have caused hypoxia leading to confusion and impaired cognition during the incident.

The Crown opposed the evidence, arguing it lacked relevance, necessity, and proper qualification and risked misleading the jury.

Applying the Mohan framework as refined in White Burgess and Abbey, the court held the proposed expert testimony was logically relevant, necessary to explain the accused’s serious medical condition, and within the expert’s qualifications.

The court further concluded that any limitations in the opinion affected weight rather than admissibility and that the probative value of the defence-led evidence was not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

The expert evidence was therefore admitted for consideration by the jury.

During a jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the accused sought to call a cardiologist to provide expert evidence regarding congenital heart disease and its potential impact on mental functioning.

The Crown challenged the admissibility of the expert testimony, arguing issues of relevance, qualification, and reliability under the Mohan framework.

The court determined that a focused Mohan voir dire was required to clarify the precise opinion and assess the expert’s qualifications.

The judge held that the expert could testify on the voir dire only to identify the proposed opinion and establish qualifications, and that broader cross-examination was unnecessary for the admissibility determination.

During a jury trial for offences arising from a home invasion and robbery, the Crown sought to revisit a prior evidentiary ruling that had ordered references to the accused’s consultation with duty counsel removed from a police statement.

The Crown argued that subsequent testimony placing the reliability of the statement in issue increased the probative value of the fact that the accused had received legal advice before speaking to police.

The court reconsidered the issue under the residual discretion to exclude evidence where prejudicial effect outweighs probative value.

The judge held that the probative value of the consultation with counsel remained slight and that admitting the evidence would invite improper speculation about privileged communications.

The earlier ruling requiring redaction was therefore maintained.

The accused, along with three co-accused, was charged with first degree murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion.

The accused brought a Corbett application to restrict cross-examination on his criminal record, which included five prior convictions for assault.

The Crown and a co-accused brought cross-applications to adduce evidence of the underlying facts of those assaults and other violent conduct as propensity evidence.

The court granted the accused's application, limiting cross-examination to his non-violent convictions, and dismissed the cross-applications.

The court found that the prejudicial effect of admitting the prior violent conduct substantially outweighed its probative value, particularly given the risk of propensity reasoning in a trial involving blunt force trauma.

In a jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a violent home invasion, the Crown challenged the sufficiency of a defence expert report disclosed under s. 657.3(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defence intended to call a cardiologist to testify about the accused’s congenital heart disease and the possible cognitive effects of exertion‑induced hypoxia, which could raise a reasonable doubt about the specific intent required for murder.

The court held that the report provided sufficient disclosure of the expert’s anticipated areas of evidence and the grounds underlying them, though it did not disclose the expert’s ultimate opinion regarding the accused’s symptoms at the time of the offences.

Considering the advanced stage and logistical constraints of the lengthy jury trial, the court declined to order further particulars or other remedial measures.

The issue of the expert’s qualifications to testify about hypoxia‑related cognitive effects was left to a focused Mohan voir dire.

In a jury trial for first degree murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the accused brought applications for directed verdicts at the close of the Crown’s case.

They argued the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support inferences of planning and deliberation or the requisite intent for murder and attempted murder, and that the rule in Hodge’s Case required exclusion of those theories.

The court held that the governing test on a directed verdict motion is whether there is any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, and that the rule in Hodge’s Case does not apply at this stage.

The court found there was evidence capable of supporting inferences that the killing was planned and deliberate and that the accused participated with the necessary intent.

However, the Crown was barred from advancing second degree murder liability against the driver under the common unlawful purpose doctrine due to insufficient evidence of subjective foresight of death.