Pathik Baxi

The defendants brought a motion requiring the self-represented plaintiff to post security for costs.

The plaintiff resides in China, has no assets in Ontario, and has over $1,000,000 in unpaid judgments from other proceedings.

The court granted the motion, ordering the plaintiff to pay $100,000 in installments.

The court also awarded costs thrown away to one defendant for a motion to strike necessitated by the plaintiff's delay in filing a Notice of Intention to Act in Person.

The plaintiff entered into an unwritten real estate arrangement orchestrated by a third-party broker, whereby she obtained mortgage financing to purchase a property from power of sale proceedings, allowing the former owner to live there and potentially repurchase it after one year.

When the year expired, the former owner failed to secure financing to repurchase the property.

The court held that the plaintiff retains full title to the property and is entitled to vacant possession.

The court also found that the broker breached his duty of care by failing to document the arrangement or advise the parties to seek legal counsel, making him liable for the plaintiff's costs and for $20,000 to the former owner.

Furthermore, the court ordered the removal of a third mortgage fraudulently registered against the property by another defendant.

The moving party, who had applied to register the trademark 'Bombay Frankies' for a planned franchise of Indian restaurants, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the responding parties from using the name 'Bombay Frankie' for their recently opened restaurants.

The court applied the RJR MacDonald test and found a serious issue to be tried regarding trademark priority.

The court concluded the moving party would suffer irreparable harm through loss of first-mover advantage and goodwill, and that the balance of convenience favoured the moving party.

The interlocutory injunction was granted.

The plaintiffs and defendants swapped possession of their respective properties in 1991 without transferring title.

The plaintiffs obtained an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board against the defendants for unpaid rent on one of the properties.

The defendants moved for an interlocutory injunction to stay the eviction order pending the resolution of the plaintiffs' action for title transfer and the defendants' counterclaim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants failed to meet the test for an injunction, as the plaintiffs had a strong case, the defendants did not adequately demonstrate irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff subcontractor sought payment from the owner's holdback funds after the general contractor failed to pay for work on a restaurant construction project.

The court determined that the contract between the owner and general contractor was not a fixed-price contract but rather a costs-plus arrangement, meaning the owner's 10% holdback obligation was calculated based on the total actual costs incurred.

The court also found the owner was not liable for a further notice holdback because it did not receive written notice of the liens in the prescribed form.

Finally, the court interpreted trust agreements between the owner and other subcontractors who had discharged their liens, awarding them payments from the trust funds based on the specific terms of their respective agreements.

The applicant property owners sought a writ of possession and the removal of a caution to complete the sale of a commercial unit to a third-party purchaser.

The respondent tenant, who had been overholding since the expiration of the original lease, claimed a First Right of Refusal (FRR) to match the purchase offer.

The court found that the FRR expired with the original lease and did not carry over into the overholding period.

The application was granted, the caution was ordered removed, and a writ of possession was issued.

The applicant property owner sought an order declaring an Occupancy Agreement and Option to Purchase Agreement null and void, and a Writ of Possession.

The respondent occupant had entered into a rent-to-own arrangement and attempted to exercise the option to purchase.

The applicant argued the respondent failed to strictly comply with the notice and deposit requirements of the option.

The court found the agreements constituted a bilateral contract, meaning strict compliance was not required and substantial performance was sufficient.

The court held the respondent substantially complied with the ambiguous terms of the agreement and dismissed the application.

The applicant mortgagee sought to vacate three instruments, including certificates of pending litigation, registered by the respondent against the mortgaged property.

The mortgagee had entered into an agreement of purchase and sale under its power of sale, and the purchaser requisitioned the removal of the instruments.

The court held that the application was premature, as section 35 of the Mortgages Act extinguishes subsequent encumbrances upon the completion of the sale by statutory declaration, making a court order unnecessary at this stage.

The application was adjourned until after the sale closes.

The defendant appealed a consent order authorizing the court-supervised sale of a property owned by his sister.

Following the consent order, the mortgages on the property went into default, and the first mortgagee exercised its power of sale, rendering the court-supervised sale moot.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding it was moot, futile, and that the defendant failed to seek or establish grounds for leave to appeal a consent order under section 133(a) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicants (vendors) brought an application for a declaration that the respondent (purchaser) repudiated two agreements of purchase and sale for a property to be severed.

The agreements required a second deposit upon severance approval.

The applicants obtained approval but delayed notifying the purchaser for months, then demanded the second deposit on unreasonably short notice while the purchaser was out of the country.

When the deposit was not paid by the deadline, the applicants terminated the agreements.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants failed to act in good faith and set an unreasonable deadline, and therefore could not rely on the 'time is of the essence' clause to terminate the contract.

The moving defendants sought partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action to recover an unpaid loan and lease payments, arguing they had no knowledge of the loan and that the claim was statute-barred.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that conflicting evidence regarding the parties' business relationships and an alleged payment that could extend the limitation period raised genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court declined to use its fact-finding powers, concluding that a trial was necessary to properly assess credibility and avoid the risk of duplicative proceedings or inconsistent findings.

Following a successful appeal that dismissed the plaintiffs' action against the moving defendants, the issue of costs for four summary judgment motions was returned to the motion judge.

The moving defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the plaintiffs alleged fraud and failed to accept a walk-away offer.

The court rejected these arguments, finding no fraud was pleaded and the communication was not a formal offer to settle.

Applying the principle of reasonableness and noting duplication of effort among multiple defence counsel, the court awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at a total of $235,000.

The moving party, a religious corporation, brought a motion to set aside a consent order that enforced a settlement agreement regarding unpaid loans.

The moving party argued the settlement was executed by a rogue director without board authorization and that its former counsel consented to the order against instructions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the director had consulted the board and obtained approval, the counsel acted on valid instructions, and there was no material change in circumstances or clear injustice to warrant setting aside the final order.

Following summary judgment motions brought by nine defendants, which were largely dismissed but resulted in the narrowing of the plaintiffs' claims, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs sought $182,725 on a partial indemnity basis, while the defendants sought $289,249.

The court found that the plaintiffs were generally successful as the actions were not dismissed, but granted the defendants a 25% credit ($72,000) for their partial success in narrowing the issues.

The plaintiffs were awarded net costs of $100,000.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Chief Building Official revoking a building permit for the construction of a two-family dwelling.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding it was barred by res judicata as the revocation order had been previously upheld.

On the merits, the court held that while the property had legal non-conforming use status, the appellant's proposed construction constituted an extraordinary intensification of use that required a zoning variation from the Committee of Adjustments, which falls outside the authority of the Chief Building Official.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order granting the plaintiffs the right to amend their statement of claim to add parties.

The defendants argued that the amendment should have been prohibited due to an expired limitation period and a failure to plead discoverability.

The court denied leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decision on a matter of principle and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's exercise of discretion regarding the disputed discoverability evidence.

A proposed purchaser under an agreement of purchase and sale sought leave to intervene in a mortgage enforcement proceeding where the defendants had brought a motion to stay a power of sale and sought relief from forfeiture.

The court considered Rule 13.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing intervention by added parties.

The proposed intervenor demonstrated a real interest in the litigation because the outcome could affect his contractual right to complete the purchase of the property and his submissions would assist the court in assessing issues including fair market value.

The court found that at least one of the disjunctive criteria under Rule 13.01(1) was met and that intervention would not unduly delay or prejudice the proceedings.

Leave to intervene as an added party on the defendants’ motion was granted.

The appellant brought a motion to reopen a final judgment based on fresh evidence, specifically a document ('exhibit H') purporting to show the correct zoning for his property, which would resolve a dispute over a revoked building permit.

The court found it had jurisdiction to reopen the case under Rule 59.06(2)(a) to prevent a miscarriage of justice, despite the appellant's lack of reasonable diligence in bringing the document forward.

However, after reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that exhibit H was not an authentic document.

The motion to alter the previous judgment was dismissed, and the original remediation timetable remained in effect.

The plaintiff brought an action for non-payment of rent against the corporate defendant and its guarantor.

The defendants filed a defence and counterclaim before the corporate defendant was voluntarily dissolved.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment to dismiss the counterclaim, arguing the dissolved corporation lacked capacity to litigate.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that under section 242(1) of the Business Corporations Act, a dissolved corporation retains the right to defend an action and continue a counterclaim commenced prior to dissolution.

The court also authorized a former director to give instructions on behalf of the dissolved corporation.

Former tenants commenced a civil action against their landlord alleging that, following eviction and termination of a residential lease, the landlord trashed or retained personal property left at the premises and sought damages of $100,000 plus punitive damages.

Earlier proceedings before the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal had found a breach of an agreement to allow additional time for removal of belongings, but the Divisional Court set aside the rent abatement and directed that damages be determined.

At trial, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove ownership of the alleged property, failed to establish that the landlord destroyed or retained any goods, and relied on a list of items the court found unreliable and misleading.

The court also found that certain items alleged to be present were not even available for purchase in Ontario at the relevant time.

The plaintiffs therefore failed to establish damages or liability on a balance of probabilities.