L. Shaw

The offender, a 68-year-old first-time offender, was convicted by a jury of importing 8.365 kg of cocaine into Canada.

The Crown sought a sentence of seven years, while the defence sought a net sentence of 38.6 to 45.3 months, arguing for enhanced credit due to harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and the offender's age and health.

The court determined that the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody should be treated as a mitigating factor (a Duncan credit) rather than a mathematical deduction.

Balancing the aggravating factors of the large quantity of drugs and profit motive against the mitigating factors of age, health, and harsh custody conditions, the court imposed a sentence of seven years, less 653 days of Summers credit, resulting in a net sentence of 62.5 months.

The offender was convicted by a jury of sexual assault after engaging in non-consensual vaginal intercourse with a friend who was intoxicated.

The Crown sought a four-year sentence, while the defence sought six months followed by probation.

The court rejected the defence's argument that the victim's prior consensual sexual activity with another person mitigated the offender's blameworthiness.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to three years' imprisonment.

The plaintiff, a blaze welder with 36 years of service at a predecessor company, was terminated shortly after the defendant purchased the business.

The defendant argued it only purchased assets and hired the plaintiff on a fixed-term contract as a general labourer to assist with moving.

The court found the defendant purchased the business as a going concern and failed to unambiguously communicate a fixed-term contract to the plaintiff, making her an indefinite employee.

Applying the Bardal factors and recognizing her prior service, the court awarded the plaintiff 12 months' reasonable notice.

The applicant sought a declaration that he was not married to the respondent and an order that she vacate his property.

The parties participated in a religious marriage ceremony in 2004 while the applicant was still married to his first wife.

The court granted summary judgment declaring the marriage void ab initio, as the applicant lacked capacity to marry, rendering s. 31 of the Marriage Act inapplicable.

Consequently, the property was declared not to be a matrimonial home.

However, the court declined to order the respondent to vacate the property on an interim basis, finding she had a potentially meritorious constructive trust claim that required a trial.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found drugs in his vehicle during the execution of a search warrant.

The accused brought a pre-trial Charter application to exclude the evidence, arguing the search warrant was improperly issued and his right to counsel was delayed.

The court found the search warrant for the vehicle was valid, but the warrant for the residence was invalid.

The court also found a serious breach of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel due to a systemic police practice of delaying access to counsel until after a search warrant is executed.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence seized from the vehicle and the accused's statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The plaintiff, an elderly pedestrian, was struck by a city bus and sustained injuries.

On the eve of trial, the plaintiff accepted a $25,000 settlement due to her declining health, with costs to be agreed or assessed.

The plaintiff sought over $124,000 in costs, while the defendants argued for $10,000 based on proportionality.

The court fixed costs at $96,780.93 on a partial indemnity basis, finding that the defendants' late admission of liability and the necessity of expert reports justified a costs award exceeding the settlement amount.

The offender, a youthful first-time offender, broke into a home while intoxicated and briefly touched the buttocks of a 13-year-old victim in her bedroom.

He was convicted of break and enter to commit an indictable offence and sexual interference.

The court found the Kienapple principle did not apply to stay the sexual interference charge, as the offences protect different societal interests.

Weighing the aggravating factor of a home invasion against significant mitigating factors including the offender's pro-social background and rehabilitation prospects, the court rejected the Crown's request for a seven-year sentence and imposed a concurrent 15-month sentence followed by two years of probation.

The offenders were found guilty by a jury of exercising control, direction, or influence over the movements of two complainants who provided sexual services, and of receiving a financial benefit from those activities.

The court found the offenders exploited the young, vulnerable complainants for profit, with Mr. Deidun providing drugs and transportation, and Ms. Bernard booking hotel rooms.

After considering the Tang/Miller factors, the parity principle, pre-sentence custody, and Downes credit for restrictive bail conditions, the court sentenced Mr. Deidun to a net term of 30 months less 10 days, and Ms. Bernard to a net term of 11 months and 15 days.

The plaintiff real estate brokerage sued the defendants for a $250,000 commission under a Buyer Representation Agreement (BRA) after the defendants purchased a commercial property.

The sole issue at trial was whether the defendant signed a specific initial on the BRA extending its term to one year, which would cover the date of the purchase.

Both parties called forensic document examiners to testify on the authenticity of the initial.

The court found the plaintiff's expert more reliable and concluded on a balance of probabilities that the defendant did sign the initial.

The plaintiff was awarded the $250,000 commission.

The accused was charged with break and enter, sexual assault, and sexual interference after entering a stranger's home in the middle of the night and touching the 13-year-old complainant's buttock in her bedroom.

The court found the complainant and her family to be credible and reliable witnesses, despite minor inconsistencies in their evidence.

The court rejected the defence's arguments of inadvertent collusion and motive to fabricate.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The respondent (moving party) sought an order for the pre-trial sale of the jointly-owned matrimonial home under the Partition Act, as well as interim parenting and child support orders.

The applicant opposed the sale, alleging bad faith and a constructive trust claim.

The court granted the order for sale, finding the respondent had a prima facie right to sale and the applicant failed to establish malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct that would cause prejudice.

The court deferred making interim parenting and support orders due to conflicting and insufficient evidence, but continued a temporary stay of child support enforcement.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a 2016 final order for child and spousal support, seeking a retroactive decrease based on a material change in income, termination of spousal support due to remarriage, and relief from obtaining life insurance.

The court found the father was intentionally underemployed and had a history of avoiding his support obligations, including moving to Pakistan for a low-paying job.

However, the court recognized a temporary material change due to his return to Canada just before the COVID-19 pandemic and reduced support for the period he received CERB.

Thereafter, an income of $60,000 was imputed to him.

The requests to terminate spousal support and cancel the life insurance obligation were dismissed.

The applicant father sought a refund of child support and section 7 expenses paid for his adult son's post-secondary education.

The father had continued to pay the full table amount of support while the son lived away from home, and argued that many of the section 7 expenses claimed by the respondent mother were already covered by the table amount.

The court found that the son was required to contribute to his own education from summer earnings and grants, and that expenses such as food, utilities, and toiletries were covered by the table support.

The court ordered the mother to reimburse the father $20,822.73 for overpaid section 7 expenses and support paid after the son began working full-time.

The applicant brought a motion to change a final order to include retroactive child support, arguing the respondent failed to disclose a $29,908 debt registered as a lien on the matrimonial home.

The original settlement had offset child support arrears against the applicant's equalization payment for the home.

The respondent failed to appear at the hearing.

The court found the undisclosed debt constituted a change in circumstances under the Divorce Act, as the applicant would not have agreed to the offset had she known of the lien.

The court varied the order, requiring the respondent to pay $34,454 in child support arrears and $15,000 in costs, and dismissed the respondent's cross-motion.

The applicant and respondent, former spouses, were involved in a shareholder dispute regarding a family-owned real estate holding company.

The parties agreed that the respondent would purchase the applicant's 40% share, but disputed the valuation date.

The applicant sought a valuation at the date of the hearing, alleging oppressive conduct, while the respondent sought a valuation at the date he commenced his application in 2015.

The court found that the respondent's failure to provide financial disclosure constituted oppressive conduct and was not statute-barred.

However, considering the delays caused by both parties and the applicant's lack of involvement in the company, the court determined that the fair and just valuation date was the corporate year-end in 2017.

The plaintiffs, owners of a shoe restoration business, brought a motion for an interim injunction to compel the defendant, a former employee, to remove social media posts alleging that the plaintiffs were racist and had terminated her for supporting the Black Lives Matter movement.

The court applied the stringent test for injunctive relief in defamation actions, which requires the moving party to show that the words are clearly defamatory and that any defences of justification or fair comment will inevitably fail.

The court found that, based on the evidence presented, it would not be perverse for a trier of fact to find that the defences of justification or fair comment had been made out.

The motion for an interim injunction was dismissed.

The applicant purchased property and obtained title insurance from the respondent.

The former owner sued the applicant to set aside the sale, and the respondent initially assumed the defence.

The applicant later lost title to the property through power of sale proceedings, prompting the respondent to deny a continuing duty to defend on the basis that the applicant no longer owned the property.

The applicant brought an application seeking a declaration that the respondent owed a continuing duty to defend.

The court found that the underlying action included a claim for damages based on unjust enrichment, which triggered the respondent's duty to defend even though the applicant no longer owned the property.

The applicant moved to remove the respondent's lawyer and his firm as counsel of record, arguing she intended to call the lawyer as a witness at trial regarding the negotiation of a separation agreement she sought to set aside for duress.

The court applied the nine-factor test from Essa (Township) v. Guergis and found that the lawyer's evidence would largely be protected by solicitor-client privilege, other sources of evidence were available, and removing counsel would severely prejudice the respondent.

The motion to remove counsel was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a further and better affidavit of documents and to compel the defendants to appear for continued examinations for discovery.

The plaintiff had previously conducted brief examinations for discovery of the individual defendants but failed to request the documents now sought.

The court dismissed the motion against the individual defendants, finding the plaintiff had his opportunity during discovery and failed to use it, and there was no evidence the requested documents were in their possession.

However, the court noted the plaintiff could still schedule an examination for discovery of the corporate defendant.

Following a trial that resulted in a shared parenting arrangement, the parties could not agree on the quantum of ongoing child support.

The respondent argued for a strict set-off amount of $715 per month based on their respective incomes.

The applicant sought a higher amount due to the disparity in their incomes and her modest expenses.

Applying section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines and the Contino framework, the court found the set-off amount inappropriate given the significant disparity in the parties' incomes and monthly expenses.

The respondent was ordered to pay $1,000 per month in child support.