Hugh Scher

Following the dismissal of a proposed $240 billion class action regarding a data breach, the successful defendants sought costs.

The plaintiffs argued costs should be limited to a partial indemnity scale for a pleadings motion.

The court found that the plaintiffs' unsubstantiated allegations of professional misconduct against defence counsel, combined with their egregious violations of pleading rules and massive expansion of the claim, justified costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court awarded $725,000 to Capital One and $500,000 to Amazon Web.

The court reconsidered a previous costs award of $112,500 made against the plaintiffs following the dismissal of their refusals and interlocutory injunction motions in a proposed class action regarding a data breach.

The plaintiffs argued the defendants' costs claim reflected over-lawyering and sought costs in the cause.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' submissions, finding their motions were unnecessary, overreaching, and deplorably prosecuted.

The court confirmed the original partial indemnity costs award of $112,500 and awarded an additional $12,500 for the costs submissions, for a total of $125,000 payable to the defendants.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action regarding a data breach sought court approval to settle and discontinue their claims against the defendant GitHub.

GitHub, an American corporation, had challenged the court's jurisdiction.

After an initial adjournment to address jurisdictional concerns, the plaintiffs submitted revised materials.

The court approved the settlement, finding that discontinuing the action against GitHub was fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class given the litigation risks, costs, and the fact that the remaining defendants had sufficient financial strength to meet any damages.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought costs exceeding full indemnity, while the defendants argued for costs in the cause or a reduced amount due to the plaintiff's delay.

The court found that the defendants did not act in bad faith or unreasonably in bringing the motion, noting that the delay was largely attributable to the plaintiff's counsel.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $25,735.54.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action regarding a data breach sought court approval of a settlement with the defendant GitHub.

The court declined to approve the settlement as proposed, noting that it could not make a binding ruling on its own jurisdiction based on the consent of the parties, and that the substantive merits of the settlement (essentially a discontinuance) did not support approval at this stage.

At the parties' request, the motion was adjourned sine die.

The plaintiff sued his former employer and three individual managers for wrongful dismissal, moral damages, punitive damages, and intentional infliction of mental suffering, alleging workplace harassment and reprisal.

The defendants brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the claims against the individual defendants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the claims against the individual defendants were factually intertwined with the claims against the corporate employer and were not readily separable.

The court concluded that granting partial summary judgment would create a material risk of inconsistent findings and would not be a proportionate or cost-effective way to resolve the litigation.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action regarding a data breach brought motions to compel answers to questions refused on cross-examinations of two affiants and an omnibus motion to strike out various affidavits, factum paragraphs, and a sealing motion.

The court dismissed the refusals motions, finding the questions asked were beyond the narrow scope of the underlying motions (an injunction motion and a sealing motion) and were properly refused.

The court also dismissed the omnibus motion, finding no reason to strike the evidence or alter the timetable for the upcoming jurisdiction and certification motions.

The applicant, who was declared dead by neurologic criteria (brain death), sought an order to be maintained on mechanical ventilation, arguing that her Christian belief that life continues as long as the heart beats should be accommodated under the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the common law definition of death includes brain death and that the applicant met the medical criteria for brain death despite exhibiting spinal reflex movements.

The court further held that the Charter does not apply to a deceased person or to a physician making a medical determination of death.

The common law definition of death was found to be consistent with Charter values, as the need for certainty and objectivity outweighs religious accommodation.

Finally, the court ruled that the Consent and Capacity Board lacks jurisdiction over disputes involving deceased persons, as mechanical ventilation of a corpse does not constitute 'treatment' under the Health Care Consent Act.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to permit 72 hours of continuous videotaping of a patient who had been declared brain dead, arguing that her bodily movements were responsive to commands and indicative of brain function.

The respondent hospital and physicians opposed the motion, providing medical evidence that the movements were consistent with spinal reflexes and that ancillary tests showed no blood flow or electrical activity in the brain.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no scientific or medical support for the necessity of 72 hours of videotaping and concluding it would not assist the court in making a final determination.

The applicant sought to qualify Dr. Paul Byrne as an expert witness on the neurological determination of death (NDD) and related medical principles in an application to prevent the withdrawal of life support.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and the White Burgess gatekeeper framework to assess admissibility.

The court found that Dr. Byrne lacked the necessary training and experience with adults and the CMAJ Guidelines.

Furthermore, the court held that Dr. Byrne lacked independence and impartiality due to his demonstrated bias against the concept of brain death.

The request to qualify him as an expert was denied.