D.E. Harris

The accused was charged with the first-degree murder of his estranged wife, whom he stabbed to death in a park.

The court found the accused's statements to police voluntary and admissible.

The evidence, including videos the accused took of the victim dying and sent to others, overwhelmingly proved he committed the stabbing with the intent to kill.

The court further found the murder was planned and deliberate, based on the accused's jealousy motive, his bringing of a knife to the meeting, and a threat he made the night before.

The accused was found guilty of first-degree murder.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

The court had previously detained the applicant but issued these postscript reasons to address the validity of 'bail set not met' orders, where a release order is made but surety approval is deferred to a separate proceeding.

The court held that such orders are valid in law, including in reverse onus situations.

The court found that the prior decision in R. v. C.S., which held such orders invalid, was decided per incuriam as it failed to consider a long line of binding authority and established practice.

The court emphasized that bail procedures must remain flexible and that the ladder principle's inapplicability in reverse onus cases does not preclude bifurcated surety approval proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

He argued that the trial judge erred in her analysis of whether he had language deficits that interfered with his understanding of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the objective test to the arresting officer's observations and reasonably relied on video evidence to conclude the appellant understood his rights.

The trial judge's negative credibility findings regarding the appellant's testimony on his language comprehension were fatal to his claim.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding phone records.

The appellant, a driving instructor, sexually assaulted the complainant in his office.

At trial, the defence argued the appellant's phone records did not show calls to the complainant on the day of the offence.

The trial judge accepted the complainant's evidence that the appellant had multiple phones.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and noting that the issue of how the parties arranged to meet was peripheral to the trial judge's reasoning.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge arguing that ss. 119(1)(c) and 120(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act violate ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The applicant argued that because pre-sentence custody is not recognized in calculating parole eligibility, offenders denied bail are arbitrarily delayed in their day parole compared to those released on bail.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the right to apply for parole engages a liberty interest, the deprivation is not grossly disproportionate or overbroad given the distinct purposes of pre-trial custody and the conditional release regime.

The applicant sought an order compelling the respondents to deliver books, records, and equipment to the court-appointed receiver, and a declaration that the respondents breached the Receivership Order.

The respondents argued that their pending application for leave to appeal the Receivership Order automatically stayed the proceedings.

The court held that while filing an appeal as of right triggers an automatic stay under section 195 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, filing an application for leave to appeal does not.

The court granted the requested orders, finding the respondents in clear breach of the Receivership Order.

Following a finding of guilt for robbery and firearm offences, the self-represented accused brought an abuse of process motion alleging that police stole $23,000 in cash from his home during the execution of a search warrant.

The court bifurcated the motion to first determine the factual issue of whether the theft occurred.

The court found the evidence of the accused and his common-law wife to be vague, inconsistent, and illogical.

The accused failed to meet his burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the police stole the money.

The motion was dismissed.