Blair

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a declaration that the respondent was eligible for accelerated parole.

The respondent had pled guilty to conspiracy offences that straddled the date the Abolition of Early Parole Act repealed accelerated parole.

The Court of Appeal held that for the purposes of s. 11(i) of the Charter, a crime is committed when culpability attaches, even if it is a continuing offence.

Since the respondent entered into the conspiracies before the repeal, he was entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment (accelerated parole).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to certify a global class action against an Ontario accounting firm for auditor's negligence regarding a clean audit report used in a US private placement.

The motion judge denied certification, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario for the foreign investors and concluding that joinder was preferable to a class proceeding.

The Divisional Court upheld this decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by mischaracterizing the claim as being about the foreign financing rather than the Ontario-based audit, and by failing to properly conduct the comparative access to justice analysis required for the preferable procedure criterion.

The action was certified as a class proceeding.

In a multi-jurisdictional class action regarding credit card merchant fees, Class Counsel entered into a Fee Sharing Agreement with a competing law firm to resolve a carriage dispute.

The agreement provided the competing firm up to $800,000 from Class Counsel's fees in exchange for staying rival actions.

On a motion to approve a partial settlement and fees, the motion judge reduced Class Counsel's requested fees by 10%, declared the Fee Sharing Agreement unenforceable, and prohibited any payments to the competing firm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the fee reduction and the prohibition on paying the competing firm from the settlement or approved fees, finding the agreement was subject to court approval under the Class Proceedings Act.

However, the Court set aside the declaration that the agreement was entirely unenforceable from any source, as the competing firm was not given notice or an opportunity to make submissions on that specific issue.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that she was incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment.

The appellant argued that her symptoms were caused by physical ailments rather than a mental condition, and that the Board misapplied the test for capacity from Starson v. Swayze.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test and reasonably concluded that the appellant was unable to appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment because she could not recognize the possibility that she was affected by a mental condition.

The appellant tenant commenced an application for a declaration of a valid lease after the respondent landlord terminated the tenancy and took possession of the premises.

Three years later, the appellant moved to direct a trial of the issues and amend its pleadings to claim damages for wrongful termination and loss of inventory.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the proposed amendments raised new causes of action that were statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the proposed damages claim was an alternative remedy arising from the same factual nexus originally pleaded in the application and supporting affidavit, and therefore did not constitute a new cause of action.

The appellants appealed an order staying their action against an Alberta hotel corporation for lack of a real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that none of the presumptive connecting factors were met.

The court also rejected the appellants' argument that Ontario should assume jurisdiction under the forum of necessity doctrine due to the expiry of the Alberta limitation period, noting the appellants made a tactical decision not to sue in Alberta.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent brought a motion in his family law proceedings to compel his former solicitor to deliver his complete file to his new lawyer.

The former solicitor resisted, claiming a solicitor's lien for unpaid fees.

The motion judge ordered the file to be turned over temporarily for copying.

The former solicitor appealed.

During the appeal hearing, the parties agreed to a variation of the order allowing the former solicitor to retain original signed documents and provide electronic copies of electronic records.

The Court of Appeal varied the order accordingly and awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the summary judgment dismissal of her motion to change a consent final order that terminated spousal support.

She argued the motions judge erred in ruling third-party letters inadmissible, placing the onus on her to adduce expert evidence, finding the claim statute-barred under s. 17(10) of the Divorce Act, and failing to accord procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the medical evidence was admitted, it did not establish that the alleged worsening of her medical condition was related to the marriage as required by s. 17(10).

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence.

During the hearing, she withdrew her appeal against the conviction.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's admission of the appellant's confession or the finding of guilt.

The court granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge considered all relevant principles and circumstances, and that the sentence imposed was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from a certification judge's refusal to certify a negligent misrepresentation claim as a class action.

The claim arose from a 'best efforts' statement in an information folder provided to investors in the appellant's investment fund.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a class action was the preferable procedure.

The Court held that the common issues of duty of care, falsity of the representation, and negligence would significantly advance the claims, and that the individual issues of reliance and damages could be managed within the class proceeding framework, thereby providing access to justice for claims that were not economically viable to litigate individually.

The appellant unions challenged the constitutionality of the federal Expenditure Restraint Act (ERA) and the Government's conduct in collective bargaining, arguing they infringed their members' freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The ERA imposed wage increase caps and rolled back previously negotiated increases in response to the 2008 global economic crisis.

The Court of Appeal held that the ERA and the Government's conduct did not substantially interfere with the collective bargaining process.

In the alternative, any limits on s. 2(d) rights were demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter given the pressing and substantial objective of managing the economic crisis.

The court also upheld the application judge's decision to admit and prefer the evidence of the Government's participant expert over the unions' expert.

The successful respondent on an appeal sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $93,000 for the action, various motions, and the appeal, in addition to the $75,000 already awarded for the summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal applied principles of reasonableness and proportionality, noting that both sides had unnecessarily complicated a simple collection case.

The court reduced the requested costs to $64,500 and then applied a further reduction for overall disproportionality, ultimately awarding the respondent $44,500 in costs.

The parties separated after a 15-year marriage.

The trial judge granted the respondent a 50 per cent beneficial interest in the matrimonial home on a resulting trust and dismissed the appellant's claims for unequal division of net family property and retroactive support.

The appellant appealed, seeking an interest in the respondent's RRSP and retroactive support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had not pleaded the RRSP trust claim at trial and that the trial judge made no errors in denying retroactive support based on the parties' conduct and circumstances.

The appellant, counsel for the plaintiff in an underlying action, appealed a motion judge's order requiring him to personally pay $84,000 in costs on a joint and several basis with his client under Rule 57.07.

The underlying action had been dismissed as an abuse of process and a collateral attack on prior rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had adequate notice of the grounds for the costs order and that the motion judge properly exercised her discretion.

The motion judge correctly concluded that the appellant caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause by commencing an abusive action and taking unreasonable procedural steps, such as insisting on a jurisdiction motion proceeding alongside a motion to strike.

The appellants appealed a trial decision finding that they had no interest in certain mining claims under an Option Agreement.

The appellants argued the agreement was an outright sale, while the respondent argued it was an option agreement requiring the appellants to fund development to earn their interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation, finding that the agreement was an option and that legal title reverted to the respondent because the appellants failed to fulfill their funding obligations.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his third party claim for delay.

The third party, a dissolved corporation, had successfully moved to dismiss the claim arising from a 1990 oil spill.

The Court of Appeal held that under section 242(1) of the Business Corporations Act, a dissolved corporation has the capacity to defend an action and bring a motion to dismiss without first being revived.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant's delay was inordinate, inexcusable, and caused presumed and actual prejudice to the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The debtor operated a marina on premises owned by the appellant landlord.

After a receivership order was made, the receiver continued to operate the debtor's business at that location until the lease expired.

The receiver changed the locks and restricted the landlord's access.

The landlord brought a motion for occupation rent, which the motion judge dismissed on the basis that the receiver's conduct did not amount to a deprivation of use.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred by conflating deprivation of use in a real property sense with economic detriment.

The receiver took control of the premises to the exclusion of others, constituting occupation.

The appeal was allowed and the receiver was ordered to pay occupation rent.

The appellants, a terminated insurance agent and his company, appealed the dismissal of their claim against Sun Life for post-termination commissions under the Commissions on Release (CORe) program.

The CORe agreements stipulated that payments would cease if the agent induced clients to replace their policies.

The appellant transferred over 600 clients to a new business, prompting Sun Life to terminate the payments.

The Court of Appeal held that the termination clause was an enforceable forfeiture provision, not a penalty, and that the appellants were not entitled to equitable relief from forfeiture given their flagrant breach of the agreement.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his medical malpractice action against his former family doctor.

The appellant alleged the doctor negligently removed surgical staples from his knee, causing permanent injury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the action was statute-barred, as the appellant knew of the material facts giving rise to the claim more than two years before commencing the action.

The Court also agreed that the claim required expert medical evidence, as it was not one of the clearest of cases where such evidence could be dispensed with.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, two bar managers, appealed their convictions and sentences for aggravated assault after punching a customer who had been ejected from the bar.

The victim suffered devastating head injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge reasonably identified the second assailant from video evidence and properly concluded the appellants acted in concert, making it unnecessary to determine which blow caused the injury.

The sentences of three and three-and-a-half years were upheld as fit.