Blair

The Nortel group of companies filed for insolvency protection across multiple jurisdictions.

Following the sale of Nortel's assets, approximately $7.3 billion was placed in escrow.

The trial judge ordered that these lockbox funds be allocated on a pro rata basis among the various debtor estates, finding that Nortel operated as a highly integrated multinational enterprise and that the master research and development agreement did not govern allocation upon insolvency.

Several parties sought leave to appeal under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeals were not prima facie meritorious, did not raise issues of significance to the practice, and would unduly hinder the progress of the proceedings.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against her former co-operative housing provider, its lawyers, a court employee, and a Landlord and Tenant Board member.

The motion judge had dismissed the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the action was an attempt to re-litigate her eviction and rent subsidy proceedings, and that the claims against the lawyers, court employee, and Board member were bound to fail due to lack of duty of care and statutory immunity.

The appellant appealed his conviction for armed robbery.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's decision, agreeing that the only reasonable rational conclusion arising from the circumstantial evidence was that the appellant was a party to the offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $200,000 for breach of a factoring agreement that was not pleaded.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's finding that it was liable for intentional interference with economic relations and the award of $175,000 in damages at large to the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the $200,000 judgment because the claim was not pleaded and would have been statute-barred.

The Court dismissed the cross-appeal, upholding the finding of intentional interference with economic relations and the damages at large award, and refused to allow the respondent to raise equitable set-off for the first time on appeal.

The plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident caused in part by an unidentified driver.

He failed to report the accident to the police or his insurer within the time limits prescribed by the Uninsured Automobile Coverage regulation.

The trial judge granted the plaintiff relief from forfeiture under s. 129 of the Insurance Act and apportioned liability 60% to the plaintiff and 40% to the unidentified driver.

The insurer appealed the relief from forfeiture and the liability apportionment, while the plaintiff cross-appealed the liability apportionment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, holding that failure to give timely notice constitutes imperfect compliance for which relief from forfeiture is available, and that the trial judge's liability findings were supported by the evidence.

The Attorney General appealed a decision discharging the bankrupt, arguing that the bankrupt's personal income tax debt exceeded the threshold under s. 172.1 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

At the time of the discharge hearing, the bankrupt had unpaid income tax assessments totalling approximately $4.478 million, of which $4.424 million was subject to outstanding appeals to the Tax Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal held that assessed amounts of personal income tax under appeal are contingent claims that the trustee can refuse to admit as proven claims.

Therefore, these amounts are not included in calculating the bankrupt's personal income tax debt under s. 172.1(1).

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents, former employees, sued the appellant employer for unpaid wages and were granted summary judgment.

The appellant argued it was authorized under s. 13 of the Employment Standards Act to deduct amounts from the unpaid wages because the respondents failed to return a company computer containing intellectual property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the employment contracts did not contain written authorization permitting such deductions.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's discretionary refusal to stay the enforcement of the judgment pending the appellant's counterclaim for conversion.

The appellant, an Ontario resident, was injured in a motorcycle accident in British Columbia while a passenger on a motorcycle driven by an Alberta resident.

The appellant sued the driver, his insurer, and her own Ontario insurer in Ontario.

The driver successfully moved to stay the action against him for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the appellant argued her Ontario insurance contract, which required her to sue her insurer in Ontario, was a presumptive connecting factor giving Ontario jurisdiction over the entire dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that an insurance contract is not a presumptive connecting factor over an extra-provincial tortfeasor, and declined to apply the forum of necessity doctrine as the appellant could pursue her claim in British Columbia.

Following a successful appeal setting aside a series of ex parte 'investigative receivership' orders, the successful appellants sought costs against both the original applicant and the court-appointed receiver.

The Court of Appeal held that both were liable for costs.

The applicant was liable on a partial indemnity scale because he initiated and supported the proceedings.

The receiver was held personally liable for costs on a substantial indemnity scale because it acted as a 'real litigator' and pursued an impermissibly overreaching roving receivership, losing its objectivity as an officer of the court.

The Court also clarified that substantial indemnity costs are calculated as 1.5 times partial indemnity costs under Rule 1.03, rather than as a percentage of full indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding child custody, child support, property equalization, and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions granting sole custody to the respondent, calculating child support based on 2012 income, and excluding gifts and inheritances deposited into a joint account from the respondent's net family property.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, finding the trial judge erred in awarding full recovery costs based on an offer to settle that expired before trial.

The trial costs award was varied to $76,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant sought to set aside four property transfers made by the respondent to his wife and her company under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The trial judge found the 1987 and 1988 transfers were not fraudulent, but set aside the 1992 and 1993 transfers of the matrimonial home and a Florida property.

Both parties appealed the trial judge's findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, his refusal to pierce the corporate veil, or his rejection of the laches defence.

Motions to admit fresh evidence were also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's interpretation of a consent order incorporating terms of settlement regarding zoning restrictions on a proposed plan of subdivision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the language of the consent order clear and unambiguous in excluding the contested lots from the restrictions.

The Court further held that even if there were ambiguity, the parole evidence rule would not assist the appellants, and there was no basis to find unilateral or mutual mistake.

The appellant sought full indemnity costs for his successful appeal and two underlying motions regarding his bankruptcy discharge and the treatment of a personal injury settlement.

The Court of Appeal declined to award full indemnity costs, finding that the Trustee's conduct was not reprehensible and that Rule 49.10 did not apply to grant a defendant substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs of $5,000 for the motion before Spence J. and $10,000 for the appeal.

The United States sought the extradition of the appellant for child luring based on internet communications traced to an IP address.

The extradition judge committed the appellant for extradition after inferring that the appellant was the user of the IP address at the relevant time because he was the subscriber.

The Court of Appeal held that this inference was unreasonable without further evidence linking the subscriber to the actual use of the device at the time of the offence, and quashed the committal order.

The Court also dismissed a constitutional challenge to the ex parte gathering and sending provisions of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, finding they contained adequate safeguards to satisfy procedural fairness under the Charter.

The appellant advanced funds to finance the cost of repairs by third parties to an aircraft owned by the respondent.

It brought a motion for a declaration that it had a non-possessory lien under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant was not a 'repairer' under the Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that advancing funds to finance repairs does not constitute making a repair or bestowing skill, labour, or money on the aircraft.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision granting the equitable remedy of rectification to correct mistaken share redemptions that triggered unintended tax consequences.

The application judge found that the respondents had a continuing intention to carry out loan arrangements on a tax-neutral basis and that the share redemptions were a mistake.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under the binding authority of Juliar, the critical requirement for rectification is proof of a continuing specific intention to undertake a transaction on a particular tax basis, which the respondents had established.

The appellant appealed an order declaring a child to be a child of the marriage and requiring him to pay retroactive and ongoing child support, as well as spousal support.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on the child's status, his income, and the respondent's ability to contribute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or serious misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence regarding the appellant's income, noting it lacked cogency and that the trial order already provided a mechanism for adjusting support based on annual income tax returns.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an appeal book endorsement directing that an order go as per the amended draft order filed by the parties.

The appellant appealed a formal order containing only support orders made by the trial judge, including an order for retroactive support of $53,800.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as the order fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellants asserted an oppression claim under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act, alleging misappropriation of funds from a widely held public company and seeking to recover those funds for the company.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding it was solely that of the company and had to be pursued as a derivative action with leave of the court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that where a claim seeks to recover solely for wrongs done to a public corporation and does not allege harm to the complainant's individualized personal interests, it must be pursued as a derivative action.