Blair

The applicant obtained a default judgment for fraud against the respondents regarding a tax loss allocation scheme.

He subsequently obtained an ex parte order under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act appointing a receiver over the respondents' assets.

Through further ex parte applications, the receivership was expanded into a broad investigative receivership freezing the assets of 43 additional non-party individuals and entities to protect the interests of thousands of other investors.

The Court of Appeal set aside the orders, holding that while s. 101 permits investigative receiverships in appropriate circumstances, the orders here were unjustifiably overreaching and went beyond protecting the applicant's judgment recovery.

Apotex's generic version of a patented drug was kept out of the market for two years by Eli Lilly using the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.

After the patent was invalidated, Apotex sued for unjust enrichment, seeking disgorgement of Eli Lilly's monopolistic profits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision to strike the claim, finding that Apotex suffered no corresponding deprivation of the monopolistic profits because it would never have earned them.

The appellant, a medical doctor dismissed from a residency program, sued the university and several faculty members for various torts including conspiracy and intimidation.

The motion judge struck all claims against the individual respondents and the intimidation claim against the university, denying leave to amend.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claims, finding the pleadings failed to distinguish individual acts from corporate acts or plead the essential elements of the torts.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, granting the appellant leave to amend her statement of claim since no prior amendments had been made and the motion judge provided no reasons for denying leave.

The appellant, a bankrupt who suffered severe injuries in a motor vehicle accident, appealed a motion judge's order regarding the calculation of his surplus income under s. 68 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion judge had included financial assistance payments, statutory accident benefits settlement proceeds, and portions of a personal injury settlement in the appellant's total income, resulting in a surplus income payment obligation and a $15,000 penalty for failing to disclose the settlements.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the financial assistance loan, legal costs, and damages for future care and housekeeping should not have been included in the total income calculation.

The surplus income payment was set aside, but the $15,000 penalty for non-disclosure was affirmed.

The appellants were convicted of numerous fraud-related offences arising from a widespread credit and debit card skimming scheme operated through a storefront business.

Three of the appellants were also convicted of participating in and committing offences for the benefit of a criminal organization.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of wiretap evidence, the finding that they constituted a criminal organization, and various individual convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the wiretap authorization was properly granted and the group met the statutory definition of a criminal organization.

The sentence appeals of the two principal offenders were dismissed, while the sentences of the two lesser offenders were varied in part.

The appellant, Teranet Inc., appealed a Divisional Court decision certifying a class action brought by the respondent land surveyor for copyright infringement.

The respondent alleged that the appellant's provision of electronic copies of land surveys to the public for a fee infringed the surveyors' copyright.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court did not err in allowing the respondent to revise its class definition and common issues on appeal, as the changes were not fundamental and did not prejudice the appellant.

The Court further upheld the certification, concluding that the revised class definition was not merits-based, the common issues would significantly advance the litigation, and the respondent was a suitable representative plaintiff despite not relying on the appellant's services.

The appellant sought an adjournment, which was refused.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that although the original Superior Court action claimed a higher amount, it was settled together with a small claims court action for a global amount within the jurisdiction of the small claims court.

Therefore, any appeal lies to the Divisional Court.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant sought to appeal an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an interlocutory order.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiff, a municipal councillor, brought an action for defamation against other councillors based on statements made during a council meeting.

The defendants moved to strike the allegations, arguing their statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The motion judge held that absolute privilege does not apply to municipal councillors, who instead enjoy qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that Canadian law applies qualified privilege to municipal council speech and declining to extend absolute privilege without a full evidentiary record demonstrating its necessity.

The respondent was arrested during the G20 summit and filed a timely complaint against the arresting officers.

After receiving the investigative report, he discovered that higher-ranking officers may have ordered the arrests, prompting him to file a second complaint outside the six-month statutory period.

The Director of the OIPRD refused to deal with the second complaint, citing the time limit without further explanation.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding the Director failed to apply discoverability principles and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Director's appeal, affirming that discoverability applies to the screening of complaints and that the Director's cursory reasons were inadequate and unreasonable.

The appellant purchased a second mortgage as an investment, but the mortgagor fraudulently misrepresented the balance of the first mortgage.

After the property was sold under power of sale, leaving no funds for the appellant, she sued the mortgage broker for negligence and breach of contract, and the title insurer for coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action.

The court found the title insurance policy did not cover the loss, and the claim against the broker was statute-barred because it was discovered more than two years before the action was commenced.

The court clarified that the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applied, rather than the ten-year period under the Real Property Limitations Act, because the claim was based in negligence and contract rather than an interest in land.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their 14-year-old medical malpractice action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the hearing judge properly applied the two-part test requiring an acceptable explanation for the delay and no non-compensable prejudice.

The court agreed that the appellants failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for a delay of almost 11 years since the delivery of the statement of defence.

The parties entered into a joint venture to purchase and convert a property into a self-storage facility, which included a put/call agreement.

The respondent exercised the put, forcing the appellant to purchase the property at a price determined by an appraiser.

The appellant refused to close, alleging the appraiser made a manifest error by not using the income approach.

The trial judge granted specific performance to the respondent and awarded substantial indemnity costs based on an unserved offer to settle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no manifest error in the appraisal, upholding the award of specific performance for the vendor, and confirming the costs award.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against the police for negligent investigation.

The appellant alleged the police negligently failed to send a needle for communicable disease testing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis for a negligence claim because uncontroverted evidence showed that testing the needle was impossible or unreliable, meaning no damages flowed from the failure to test.

The respondents, former employees and officers of a union local, brought an application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board alleging unfair labour practices.

They requested the vice-chair recuse himself because he had previously acted for one of the respondents in an employment dispute.

The vice-chair declined and dismissed the application for serving no labour relations purpose.

The Divisional Court quashed the decisions, finding a conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court erred by applying the test for a lawyer's conflict of interest rather than the test for reasonable apprehension of bias by an adjudicator.

The Court found the presumption of impartiality was not rebutted and reinstated the vice-chair's decisions.

The appellant, a commercial truck driver, was convicted of importing cocaine after 53 kilograms of cocaine were found hidden in his trailer.

At trial, the Crown introduced an expert police report on the use of commercial vehicles for transporting contraband.

The report contained both general opinions and case-specific opinions regarding the appellant's credibility and knowledge of the drugs.

The Court of Appeal held that the case-specific opinions were inadmissible as they usurped the role of the trier of fact.

Finding that the trial judge improperly relied on this inadmissible evidence to conclude the appellant knew about the cocaine, the majority allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, administering a noxious substance, and failing to provide the necessaries of life in relation to her two-year-old son.

At trial, the Crown relied on expert evidence from the Motherisk Program regarding hair testing to prove the child had ingested cocaine over a 14-month period.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence challenging the methodology and validity of the hair testing.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it credible and potentially decisive.

The convictions related to cocaine ingestion were quashed and a new trial was ordered, but the order was stayed because the appellant had already served her sentence.

The appeal from the fracture-related convictions was abandoned.

The deceased promised to bequeath his farm and cottage to his common-law wife's grandsons in exchange for their unpaid labour.

He later married the appellant, who claimed dependant's relief against the estate.

The trial judge ordered the properties conveyed to the grandsons and awarded the widow support based on an inflated estate value, refusing to consolidate the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that the promise was to bequeath, not convey, meaning the properties remained in the estate and were subject to the widow's dependant's relief claim under s. 71 of the Succession Law Reform Act to the extent their value exceeded the grandsons' consideration.

The matter was remitted for a new trial on the dependant's relief claim.

The appellants, nieces of the deceased and remainder beneficiaries of his estate, appealed a decision declaring the Constantine Gicas Family Trust validly created.

They argued the trust lacked the three certainties and was not properly constituted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the trust was validly declared and constituted, and that specific shares were properly transferred to it.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs award, finding that because the litigation was reasonably necessary to administer the estate due to the testator's conduct, costs should be paid out of the estate rather than by the appellants personally.

The appellants were convicted of multiple mortgage financing frauds involving the manipulation of recent immigrants to obtain mortgage financing and take title to properties.

They appealed their convictions and sentences of four years' imprisonment, fines in lieu of forfeiture, and a joint restitution order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding co-conspirators, treatment of evidence, or response to Crown counsel's closing remarks.

The sentence appeals were also dismissed, as the custodial sentences were within the appropriate range for large-scale fraud, and the fines and restitution orders were properly imposed.